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Attitudes and Beliefs about Distributive Justice in China 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines the patterns of popular attitudes and beliefs about economic 
inequality and distributive justice in contemporary China. Using an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework on social cognition and employing novel quantitative approaches, this dissertation 
challenges the widely held view that regards distributive injustice as one of the most critical 
sources of sociopolitical instability in today’s China, and presents new empirical findings on how 
beliefs and opinions about distributive justice are structured in people’s minds. Empirical 
analyses present following results.  
First, it is found that for the majority of ordinary people, their belief system concerning 
various faces of distributive justice is constructed in a way featuring weak association, lack of 
coherence, and dimensionality. The results suggests that most people, even relatively ideological 
individuals, do not possess well-organized attitudes toward the problem of distributive injustice. 
Second, there are psychosocial dispositions of conservative orientations strengthened 
among individuals with lower socioeconomic status. My study shows how the distribution of 
such dispositions among people is shaped by regional educational inequality. By examining 
individuals’ authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, it shows how the lower level of 
education among low socioeconomic groups increases conservative psychological tendencies 
that suppress critical attitudes toward inequality, justify the system, and legitimize the 
hierarchical order of society. 
iv 
 
Finally, analysis of the patterns of individuals’ reasoning shows that people’s ideas about 
inequality and distributive justice include heterogeneous and mutually conflicting ideas; 
individuals tend to have both conservative and liberal ideas together in their lay theoretical 
understanding and evaluation of inequality. This finding suggests that although people may find 
the large income gap and wealth inequality uncomfortable or unjust, they also tend to think that 
such economic disparity is inevitable and even necessary at the same time.  
These three main findings suggest that it is unlikely to see an explosion of social 
discontent fueled by people’s insuppressible anger towards the injustice of the wealth gap in the 
foreseeable future. These findings also provide an explanation for why income inequality is 
largely tolerated in many societies and why the existence of redistributive politics does not 
necessarily lead to the redress of distributive injustice. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines popular attitudes toward distributive justice in contemporary 
China and the patterns of attitudinal structure and reasoning about economic inequality and 
redistribution. In this chapter, I explain three specific empirical, theoretical, and methodological 
goals for this thesis. Although these three goals deal with qualitatively different dimensions of 
sociological inquiry, all of them point to same underlying research questions: What are the 
characteristics of people’s views and beliefs about various issues of distributive justice in China, 
a unique social environment that transitioned from state-socialism to mixed capitalism 
accompanied by a rapid increase in income inequality? What are the mechanisms that produce 
different attitudinal tendencies regarding distributive justice across individuals? And what do the 
patterns of popular attitudes tell us about the relationship between distributive injustice and 
political stability?  
By pursuing these research questions, this dissertation contributes to the political-cultural 
sociology of attitudes and public opinion, empirical social justice research, bridging sociological 
and psychological approaches to inequality, and studies on Chinese society. More specific 
explanation will be provided in the following sections of this chapter, which focus on the 
empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions of this study and explain how each 
empirical chapter will specifically accomplish them. In doing so, this study will provide a larger 
picture of how this dissertation challenges and changes our understanding of beliefs about 
inequality, public opinion, and the state of contemporary Chinese society.  
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The Case 
Today’s Chinese society is a gigantic blast furnace, fuming with the heat and energy of 
rapid social, political, economic, and cultural transformations, unprecedented institutional 
experiments, changing dynamics of labor relations, people’s ardent yearning for upward 
mobility, and continuous fusion and confusion between the old and the new, at the scale of twice 
the population of the United States and European Union combined. These changes, happening 
across a country the size of a continent in both territory and population, display the extremely 
complicated intertwining of historical contingencies and locally embedded characteristics with 
huge regional variance, which provides sociologists with compelling examples for understanding 
the nature of institutional change, political economy, socioeconomic inequalities, social 
networks, and so on, making the Chinese case more than a mere comparative counterpart to the 
Western hemisphere.  
Among the myriad changes occurring in this giant society, the problem of huge income 
and wealth inequality is regarded as one of the most serious. China’s income inequality, 
measured by Gini coefficients, is ranked highly in the world, and its pace of increase is 
comparable only to the speed of the country’s economic development. Past surveys have shown 
that ordinary Chinese people perceive the wealth gap between the rich and the poor as the most 
important social concern in the development of a “harmonious society” (23.7%) and that “wealth 
distribution, income disparity and social injustice” are ranked as the most important topical 
issues of concern to the public (90.0%) (Wang 2006). The social discontent prevalent among 
ordinary citizens is well reflected in the sheer number of “mass incidents,” which include riots, 
strikes, protests, demonstrations, and so on, that happen every year: it is estimated that there 
were at least 180,000 mass incidents in 2010, which is twice as many as in 2006 (Sun 2011).  
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What does the high level of income inequality and the public’s discontent mean for 
today’s Chinese society? Aside from the fact that such a high level of income inequality is 
undoubtedly undesirable in and of itself, it has a particularly strong political implication. The 
huge number of protests is especially worrisome in the consciousness of the political leaders of 
the Chinese communist party since they share the historical memory of the party’s political 
legitimacy originating in mass mobilization (Heilmann and Perry 2011; Skocpol 1979), and once 
the tides of mass opinion grow out of their control and people’s demand for democracy surges 
up, the political stability of the party-state will be like a house of cards. As Ching Kwan Lee 
(2008) noted by quoting Barrington Moore’s (1978) Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience 
and Revolt, strong moral feelings are one of the most important causes leading people to act 
against social order, as evidenced in the major political struggles in history, and the large number 
of daily protests and public opinion polls critical of inequality are ominous signs in the eyes of 
political leaders in China. 
In response to this popular mood, the Chinese government has made a series of efforts to 
reduce the income gap that are no less than transformative in terms of the direction and scope of 
social policies. The shift in the focus of social policy began as Hu Jiantao succeeded into power 
in 2002. The change basically meant redefining the development priorities from “letting some 
people get rich first” (Deng Xiaoping) or nurturing private enterprises (Jiang Zemin), to a series 
of social policy implementations under the “harmonious society” program and pro-people 
approach (Zheng 2010). Although this policy shift was partly caused by the policy need to make 
more investments in inland and rural areas (particularly western, central, and northeastern 
regions) in order to find a new engine of development and provide basic social security for the 
rural and urban poor, migrant workers, and laid-off state-owned enterprise workers, it was also 
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strongly motivated by the political need to gain popular support and maintain social stability for 
the legitimacy of the political status quo. And under this transformative policy shift, which 
redefined the strategy of the party-state, lie political leaders’ concern that huge income disparity 
and distributive injustice are the key source of social discontent that may break the balance of the 
current “rocky stability” (Shambaugh 2000) and lead to the eruption of a “social volcano” 
(Whyte 2010). This assumption, the idea that income disparity is one of the most threatening 
conditions to social stability and one of the biggest sources of popular discontent, produced 
significant consequences; inequality gained the serious attention of politicians, policy makers, 
numerous foreign observers, and China specialists, and fell under the spotlight of mass media, all 
of which contributed to the recent expansion of the Chinese welfare state.  
Although I agree that socioeconomic inequality in China is a serious social problem in 
terms of both moral and practical points of view, I argue in this thesis that there are several 
reasons to confidently posit that income inequality itself is unlikely to be a substantive threat to 
political stability and will not bring about social turmoil in the foreseeable future.  
The first, somewhat simple, reason is that the level of China’s inequality is actually not 
excessively high. The latest official Gini index reported by the China National Bureau of 
Statistics (2012) is 0.474. This is undoubtedly large by international comparison, but it is not 
difficult to find a number of other countries whose income inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, is even higher. The Gini indices, of various sources, of the United States hover 
between .45 and .49, which is similar to that of China. And in most of the countries with 
comparable Gini indices, country-wide mass incidents provoked by income inequality per se are 
very rare.1 Why, then, is the Chinese government so concerned about inequality? One reason is 
                                                             
1 Even the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States in 2011was primarily caused by the public awareness 
of the unjust influence of large corporate sectors, particularly finance, on the economy, social welfare, and 
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that the level of inequality in China has rapidly increased over time, transforming China from 
one of the most equal societies up until the early 1980s to a very unequal society in just slightly 
over two decades, less than a generation. However, at the same time, the Chinese economy also 
boasted impressive economic growth throughout most of the three decades of the post-reform 
period; thus increasing levels of inequality have been more or less justified or masked by the 
national goal to make China gain the world’s recognition and become a powerful nation, which 
have effectively fed nationalist sentiments. Another reason is, as noted above, that because the 
political legitimacy and moral power of the Chinese communist party came from mass 
mobilization and political campaigns in the past, the communist party leaders are inherently 
afraid of potential backlash from the mobilized mass, such as the Tiananmen Square incident, for 
which inequality might be a trigger. The fact that there are about 20,000 to 50,000 Internet police 
and Internet monitors (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013) for online censorship well reflects the 
government’s fear. Thus, the anxiety of the party leadership is largely due to the political 
legitimacy problem and the historical memory of the critical role of mass support for political 
stability. Overall, the level of income inequality, in terms of Gini or Theil indices, is not in an 
extremely dangerous zone, in contrast to the anxiety of political leaders for whom any indication 
of social and political disorder of the empire is the biggest fear. 
The second reason that income inequality is unlikely to cause substantial political 
inequality has to do with the distinct pattern of income inequality in China. Among many sources 
of inequality, rural and urban disparity constitutes the major part of the overall economic 
                                                             
government’s decision-making process, around the time that economic downturn and massive government spending 
to rescue the financial entities responsible for the economic crisis overlapped. Although the movement swiftly 
incorporated the problem of inequality into its central issues, the direct cause of the movement was not inequality 
per se. The recent mass protests in Brazil are also related to the deeply rooted corruption of the political class rather 
than income inequality. 
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inequality in China, nearly 52% according to data from 2007 (Li, Luo and Sicular 2011; Guo 
2010). Despite the Chinese government’s continuous efforts to reduce the gap, figures from 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (2009) show that the urban-rural income gap is the widest 
since the economic reform of 1978; the gap is currently about 4.1 to 1 on average (Li, Luo and 
Sicular 2011)2 and the largest in the world (Fan 2008). This strongly suggests that one of the key 
characteristics of income inequality in China is that it is largely geospatial; this produces a deep 
and wide “physical gulf” (Shapiro 2002) between the poor and the rich, creating a huge physical 
segregation between rural hinterlands and the richest upscale neighborhoods in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzen, and other wealthy urban centers. China is a vast country, and such 
a physical gulf also leads to an empathy gulf, meaning that it is hard for the poor in remote areas 
to fathom the wellbeing of the rich or desire to emulate the lifestyle of the affluent on a daily 
basis. For this reason, the high level of inequality in China may not directly translate into severe 
aggravation of the poor as far as the regional inequality is concerned.  
Thirdly, if one looks into the actual composition of mass incidents, the events that 
instigate people to mobilize themselves to carry out collective action are mostly related to 
problems of procedural, legal, and interactional injustices rather than distributive injustice. 
According to Legal Daily (2012), the breakdown of the direct causes of mass incidents in 2012 
was as follows: social disputes/issues (24.4%); conflict between police and the people (22.2%); 
forced demolitions/removals (22.2%); conflict between officials and the people (13.3%); ethnic 
conflict (8.9%); environmental rights defense (8.9%). These statistics strongly suggest that, 
despite some inevitable overlap, the geographical “distribution of individual anger” (Abell et al. 
1971; Gurr 1970) in Chinese society does not perfectly correspond to the geographical 
                                                             
2 This does not include other social benefits enjoyed by urban residents. 
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distribution of wealth and resources in the country. That is, the proximate cause of individuals’ 
grievances and frustration is derived from their direct experiences of legal, procedural, or 
interactional injustices that severely compromise their social, economic, or human rights (e.g., 
confiscation of land/property or environmental pollution without proper compensation, power 
abuse by and excessive rent-seeking behaviors of local government officials or township 
authorities, harsh labor conditions, restrictive policies towards ethnic minorities, religious 
persecution, lack of public participation in the government’s decision-making process, etc.), 
rather than somewhat abstract and distant social issues such as the income gap in society.  
Finally, past studies that examined Chinese social surveys on popular perceptions of 
inequality and distributive justice show that Chinese citizens do not express more critical 
attitudes when compared to citizens in other countries, such as the United States, Japan, and 
several West and East European countries (Whyte 2010). Moreover, it has been found that 
Chinese citizens possess a strong belief in merit-based ideas, stronger than East European 
citizens and similar to the citizens in advanced capitalist economies: people hold a strong belief 
that individuals’ ability, talent, and hard work are the critical factors that determine whether one 
becomes wealthy or poor (Whyte 2010). On the other hand, rural citizens, who are in 
disadvantageous socioeconomic positions compared to their urban counterparts, show generally 
more positive and optimistic attitudes regarding various issues of distributive justice (Whyte 
2010; Han 2009; Whyte and Im 2013), suggesting that the high level of rural-urban disparity is 
unlikely to be a source of mass uprising or social turbulence in the near future. Based on the 
thorough examination of the 2004 survey of inequality and distributive justice, Whyte’s study 
(2010) concludes that there is no clear sign of “social volcano.”3 
                                                             
3 Indeed, there are many other possible hypotheses and justifications for the claim that inequality is actually not a 
substantively dangerous factor to the status quo of the political leadership and Chinese society, such as China’s 
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 Aside from these reasons that that China’s inequality is not in the often suggested 
“danger zone” (Shirk 2008), I want to add another account to support the claim that there is no 
social volcano waiting to be erupted by distributive injustice. It has to do with the fundamental 
characteristics of attitudes. That is, attitudes as an expression of people’s evaluative perception 
of the social world have complex inner structures and are driven by their own distinct governing 
mechanisms, so that simply averaging attitudinal responses with a limited number of numerical 
indices can be limited or even misleading for grasping the true attitudinal structure shared among 
people. Without a deep understanding of the underlying mechanisms of attitudes, public opinion 
will remain an elusive one, as Walter Lippmann once described public opinion as a “phantom” 
and V.O. Key called it a “holy ghost” (Herbst 1998). 
Analyzing people’s attitudes, beliefs, or opinions with conventional methods such as 
descriptive analysis or a regression-based approach can show us some general tendencies in the 
public opinion. However, such methods are not particularly useful for uncovering what is 
actually going on under “average” attitudes or the relationship between some selected 
independent and dependent variables. As one of the earliest sociological studies on how attitudes 
can be measured noted (Thurstone 1928), “opinions are multidimensional…they cannot be 
represented in a linear continuum” (p. 534). For example, people’s ideas about inequality and 
distributive justice cannot be reduced to a single numerical measure, since they are associated 
with a large number of related opinions and ideas that affect their evaluation of the problem of 
inequality. While attitudes are often regarded as “object-evaluation associations” in memory (see 
the seminal work of Fazio, Chen, McDonel, and Sherman [1982]), these associations do not exist 
                                                             
distinct traditional moral-cultural value system that affects individuals’ perception of and attitudes toward 
inequality, the social psychological effect of rapid economic growth for nearly three decades, the more or less 
successful reduction of the poverty rate, and so on.  
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independent of other associations but comprise a larger network of attitudes, such as belief 
systems or cognitive and attitudinal schemata. Thus, understanding attitudes about inequality and 
distributive justice requires examining the associative patterns of various kinds of attitudes. Also, 
the network of attitudinal associations often reveals dimensional structure, which produces 
attitudinal ambivalence (Kruglanski and Stroebe 2005) and compartmentalized belief systems. 
Hence, one’s attitudes are not always logically coherent and do not show a high level of internal 
consistency, and different and mutually conflicting views about inequality can coexist together in 
the same person’s belief system. On the other hand, aside from such a multifaceted and 
multidimensional aspect, attitudes often stem from one’s underlying worldview that is largely 
guided by people’s lay theories about the social world. As a result, it can be misleading to 
interpret people’s attitudes selectively and infer that their “real” attitudes/opinions are directly 
reflected in those attitudinal responses. Finally, attitudes are not only affected by social 
backgrounds, such as age, education, gender, income, or religion, but are often shaped by 
individual-level dispositional factors, which are individual-specific psychological traits and 
tendencies that display some degree of stability. While individuals’ dispositional tendencies can 
significantly affect their attitudes, dispositions are hard to measure compared to objective social 
backgrounds, and the dynamics of attitudes are less predictable due to the somewhat elusive 
nature of latent dispositions.  
Incorporating these issues into analysis, this dissertation tackles the problem of popular 
attitudes toward distributive justice in China by examining the relatively neglected features of 
attitudes. In order to do so, the dissertation lays out a conceptual and analytic framework for 
specifying the mechanisms of attitude formation and applies the framework to concrete empirical 
analysis. In this framework, attitudes are the joint product of association, motivation, and 
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reasoning (this will be more fully discussed in the next section). Based on the model, my analysis 
attempts to answer the following set of questions. First, how are various kinds of attitudes and 
beliefs about inequality and distributive justice in Chinese citizens associated with one another, 
and what kinds of structural properties does their belief system have? This question pertains to 
investigating the characteristics of associative patterns of ideas of distributive justice. The 
analysis will specifically map different kinds of cognitive-attitudinal schemata shared among 
different groups of individuals and provide us with a more comprehensive picture of the diversity 
of people’s beliefs about distributive justice. Second, in past studies, social and political 
psychologists have found that there are certain motivational bases shaping one’s dispositions that 
influence the person’s attitudes and belief system. Can the attitudes of Chinese citizens toward 
inequality be accounted for, at least partially, by any kind of motivational tendencies? I approach 
this question with two kinds of psychosocial dispositions that stem from certain epistemic and 
existential motives, such as desire for order and structure and need for the avoidance of threat. 
And finally, is there any coherent and widely shared pattern of reasoning with a high level of 
internal consistency and clear logic that sustains people’s distributive justice attitudes? Are there 
any concrete lay theories on economic inequality that guide people’s thinking process and 
influence their attitudes and beliefs? To what extent do the lay theories underlying people’s 
attitudes show consistent and logical reasoning process?  
Through these series of analyses, I intend to question the assumption widely held among 
political leaders, policy makers, China experts, and foreign and domestic observers that regards 
income inequality as one of the most serious threats to social stability and to the Chinese 
government. With the four reasons proposed above, the findings of this dissertation will add 
another layer of empirical evidence to the idea that distributive injustice is unlikely to trigger a 
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social volcano and show why the oft-heard statement that “inequality is a major source of social 
unrest in China” is an unwarranted assumption. 
As a final note, although China has its own idiosyncratic characteristics and distinct 
historical trajectory, it has been often studied together and compared to East European countries 
as an example of post-socialist economies. However, while studies on popular attitudes toward 
inequality in East European countries greatly benefited from a series of International Social 
Justice Project (ISJP) surveys and other cross-national surveys, such as the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), which have produced a very large number of research papers and 
books on public opinion in the countries under the post-socialist transition to matured capitalist 
economy, studies on the Chinese case have been relatively rare due to the lack of nationally 
representative data sets and the sensitivity of the subject matter in the eyes of government 
officials, except for the studies produced by two waves of China Survey of Inequality and 
Distributive Justice (2004 and 2009). This dissertation expands this line of research, particularly 
the survey-based approach of Whyte (2010), and makes use of multiple nationally representative 
Chinese social surveys and contributes to the burgeoning research on inequality, poverty, and 
public opinion in China. 
If attitudes, beliefs, and ideas are produced under distinct mechanisms need to be 
understood to more accurately grasp the patterns of popular mood and opinions about inequality 
and distributive justice, then what kind of conceptual model or framework do we need to 
approach the subject? The following section discusses how I deal with this problem and explains 
the theoretical setup of the thesis. 
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The Theory 
The theoretical discussion of this dissertation takes a unique approach. While each of 
three empirical chapters finds its own theoretical niche in existing literature, the topics of the 
three chapters are grounded upon a larger theoretical quest of formulating the general mechanism 
of social action and social cognition. Since the focus of this dissertation is on the latter, 
particularly people’s attitudes, beliefs, ideology, and ideas, I will largely confine my following 
discussions to that.  
My theoretical approach stands in the tradition of sociological inquiry of social action, 
but it also pays equal attention to the problem of social cognition. It is because analyzing the 
characteristics and mechanisms of human cognition is simply fundamental to understanding 
human beings; to quote Wuthnow (2007), “the best work in sociology has always paid attention 
to questions about cognition” (p. 355). Reflecting the importance of the problem of cognition, 
the number of sociological studies influenced by the cognitive approach has continuously 
increased over recent years, becoming one of the central themes in the sociology of culture and 
generating interesting branches of discussion and debates regarding how to accurately 
understand and model actors’ cognitive dimension (Lizardo and Strand 2010; Swidler 2003; 
Cerulo 2010; DiMaggio 1997; Martin 2010). Although I think the development of cognitive 
theories and models in sociology, which usually involves such notions as cognitive schemata, 
frames, repertoires, social representation and so on, is more than welcome, such an emphasis on 
(pure) cognition misses two other important aspects of the human mental process that operate in 
tandem with the cognitive process: motivation and reasoning.4  
                                                             
4 In this model, affect and emotion are regarded as primary forms of motivation (Petri 1986). 
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Based on this idea, I formulated a new synthetic model proposing that social action and 
cognition can be understood and explained by the effect of and mutual interaction between three 
embodied psychological processes: association, motivation, and reasoning. While this model 
tries to provide an explanation of the general mechanisms of social action and cognition, in this 
dissertation, I specifically focus on the channels through which attitudes, beliefs, ideas, and 
ideology are shaped through the lens of this model. This model does not necessarily aim to reject 
a particular theory or perspective but rather seeks to unify, reformulate, and integrate the 
seemingly unconnected dots scattered in past literature and selectively take their insights to 
specify the general operating mechanisms of social action and cognition. Even though this is an 
ambitious goal, it is far from any attempt to construct a “grand theory,” which does not have 
reference to empirical reality (Bourdieu 1998: 2), but is designed to carry out empirical 
investigations with a mechanism-based, analytic approach. Thus, this theoretical setup can be 
regarded as an attempt to build conceptual and analytic tools for effective empirical 
investigation. 
In the following paragraphs, I will first discuss three major components of my theoretical 
framework, which are association, motivation, and reasoning (hereafter AMR), and explain why 
they are important for understanding the patterns of individuals’ attitudes. After then, I will 
briefly show how the three components constitute the AMR framework and discuss its 
theoretical implications. It should be emphasized that my empirical analysis does not test the 
whole theoretical model (AMR model), such as intricate interrelationships among association, 
motivation, and reasoning. The model only provides a theoretical basis for why empirical 
analysis of the three aspects (association, motivation, and reasoning) of individuals’ attitudes is 
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important, and its whole mechanism and dynamics will not be empirically examined in this 
thesis. 
The first characteristic of individuals’ attitudes that I examine is association. The concept 
of association is close to what David Hume called “association (or connexion) of ideas” (Hume 
2009 [1740]); however, my model conceptualizes associations as not only involving networks of 
ideas but also associations between objects, affects, or routinized coordination between sensory 
input and motor actions. In other words, it basically refers to any kind of activated association 
between ideas, signs, emotions, and actions that are more or less stable as embodied mental 
structures (Damasio 1994). Such networks of associations provide structural patterns in 
cognitive, affective, and bodily domains that substantiate motivation and reasoning; motivation 
and reasoning rely on the structural, patterned circuitry of associative networks in their 
functioning. For analytic convenience, I categorize associations into two kinds of subtypes, each 
of which also consists of subcomponents: epistemic association (schematic and semantic; 
affective and attitudinal; situational) and self-association (identification and differentiation; 
episodic and biographical; psychomotor association). Through the two types of associative 
networks, a self-sustaining functional loop of associative circuitry is created, so that epistemic 
association is reinforced based on the patterns of shared representations in one’s community, and 
self-association is reproduced by more or less durable identity and habits. These associations are 
not webs of affect-free objects. They are hot: affect, emotion, feeling, and evaluative attitudes are 
their core constituents. Defining association in this way allows us to incorporate a larger 
dimension of psychological and physiological elements into the theory of social action and 
cognition; it can integrate the ideas of key sociological theories (e.g., identity theory, practice 
and pragmatist theories, cognitive approaches, ethnomethodology, etc.) while at the same time it 
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easily adopt new ideas from other disciplines, such as neurosciences and cognitive, social 
psychology, which imparts more scientific grounds to our understanding of the sociology of 
mind.  
In sociology, studies inspired by the socio-cognitive approach5 have examined the role 
and effect of network of associations in our mind. They include studies on the role of cognitive 
schema (DiMaggio 1997), discursive frames (Benford and Snow 2000), categories and 
boundaries (Lamont 1992, 2002; Zuckerman 1999), thought communities (Zerubavel 1997), and 
cultural repertoires (Tilly 1992). In Chapter 2, following this line of literature, I study the 
associative pattern of individuals’ attitudes toward distributive justice. While an attitude is 
considered as association between object and evaluation in our memory, each association also 
forms associations with other associations, constituting a large network of attitudinal 
associations, a belief network, or a cognitive-attitudinal schema. Such a schema shows large 
variation among individuals, and I attempt to show the individual-level heterogeneity of the 
associative networks of distributive justice attitudes. Particularly, the heterogeneity in contents 
and constraint of attitudinal association will be examined.  
The next component in the AMR model is motivation. Motivation governs the human 
psychology of want, need, and ought. By motivation, I refer to an underlying motivational 
substructure as a fundamental motivation (Baumeister and Leary 1995) and to the general 
unconscious tendencies in the human mind, rather than specific day-to-day motivational goals or 
motives hinged upon specific objects, such as work motivation or monetary incentives. Although 
                                                             
5 At the origin of the cognitive approach lies philosophical intrusion into sociology, particularly the emergence of 
phenomenological sociology during the 1970s, which laid the intellectual groundwork for subsequent interest in the 
socio-cognitive approach (see Gross 2007). 
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understanding the problem of human motivation is crucial in theorizing social action, sociology 
has paid limited attention to it for several reasons.6  
The AMR model sheds light on the importance of motivation in understanding action and 
cognition and calls for a motivational turn in many branches in sociology. This turn is 
particularly necessary after the so-called cognitive turn in the 1970s, which emerged with the 
development of social constructionism and the neoinstitutional approach influenced by 
phenomenological traditions, and after the development of “culture and cognition” as a small but 
solid line of literature. Although cognitive approaches, including recent interest in the 
                                                             
6 Here I list four kinds of reasons, in a somewhat lengthy way. The first reason is that when motives were considered 
in sociology, they were mostly treated and discussed as consciously desired ends, rather than fundamental 
mechanisms that govern action and cognition, which can be specifically described by certain elements in a cultural 
value system (e.g., voluntaristic theory of action), a utilitarian framework (e.g., rational choice theory), or concrete 
goals in context (e.g., goal-directed behaviors). The problem of such treatment of motivation is that the first two 
frameworks are based on problematic assumptions about motivation, and the latter does not offer systematic 
knowledge about motivation. The second reason is that sociologists’ conceptualization of motivation was based on 
somewhat limited and unsystematic approaches and often influenced by psychoanalytic approaches that are largely 
ignored in today’s social sciences. For example, Parsons’ understanding of motivation, which was heavily 
influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis, entailed attachment-seeking, gratification-optimizing, and deprivation-
minimizing tendencies, which are internal fuels for the personality and power of normative components of action 
(Hamilton 1992: 25; Wilburn 1969). Giddens (1984) focused on anxiety-controlling mechanisms, based on the 
insights of Erikson’s psychoanalytic theory, and proposed the feeling of ontological security as the key human 
motivation. In a somewhat connected insight, Foote (1951) proposed a theory of motivation that treats actors’ needs 
for identification (“appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity”; p.17) as the key motivation. In 
Bourdieusian framework, regularities, predictable routines, and commitment to arbitrary schemes that appear as 
necessary and natural (Bourdieu 1990) are what motivated actors to strive, and a habitus is constituted by “cognitive 
and motivating structures” (p.56). Although these theories provide useful insights for understanding human 
motivation, they are more or less based on theorists’ intuition or lay understanding of what drives human behaviors 
and do not reflect the numerous kinds of theories, typologies, and concepts of motivation developed in psychology. 
Third, in collectivist theories, structural approaches, and any kind of “oversocialized” views of human action, the 
problem of motivation is “eliminated as a theoretical concern” (Alexander 1987:14). In such approaches, 
individuals’ motives cannot be an adequate starting point for explaining individual behaviors, since we can explain 
and predict actors’ responses based on external or objective factors. This kind of view is actually widely shared 
among many sociologists as a basic tenet, treating actors’ motivational basis as almost a blank sheet, which is to be 
filled in by culture, social values, socialization, or situational forces. This led to under-theorization of the 
characteristics of motivation, which is problematic, since having a weak microfoundation hinders theorizing the 
micro-macro link of social action, and motivation is one of the most important operating mechanisms in the micro 
dimension. As Tallman and Gray aptly said (1990), “without a theory of motivation, we cannot explain what sparks 
the ‘engine of action’” (p.429). Finally, when sociologists were interested in the non-cognitive aspect of micro-
mechanism, namely the affective domain, they usually focused on the effect of emotion: shared sentiments, 
collective effervescence, the mood of the public, intergroup antagonisms, and so on. Despite the important role of 
emotion, my model does not treat emotion as an independent category in its theoretical formulation, but instead 
regards emotion as a primary form of motivation (Petri 1986), which determines the strength and direction of 
intentionality dwelling in motivation. 
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distributive nature of cognition (cf. Zerubavel and Smith 2010), have provided groundbreaking 
insights into the nature of actors’ subjective domain, they have largely ignored the question that 
needs to be addressed first, which is what drives cognition in the first place. The literature of 
cognitive approaches in sociology mainly looked at how culture and institutions confer cognitive 
lenses onto the members of society and how individuals’ behavioral patterns are reproduced by 
such a cognitive setup cultivated in community, so actors’ reflective capacity is bounded by 
cognitively constrained reflexive responses toward their environments. In doing so, the literature 
carried an implicit assumption that the source and engine of human action and cognition had 
cultural origins and neglected to systematically uncover their motivational sources and examine 
how action and cognition are shaped by motivation. A motivational turn can provide sociologists 
with a rich source of explanatory power for the mechanisms of human behavior, since the realm 
of human motivation consists of a variety of micro-level forces, such as motives for morality 
(Haidt 2001, 2007; Etzioni 1988), justice (Lerner 1975; Ross and Miller 2002), epistemic 
certainty (Kruglanksi 1990; 1999), religiosity (Willer 2009), self-evaluation (Leary 2007), 
intergroup discrimination and prejudice (Altmeyer 1998; Pratto et al. 1994; Duckitt 2001; 
Duckitt and Sibley 2009), ideological orientations (Jost et al. 2003), motivated cognition and 
reasoning (Kunda 1990; Lodge, Milton, and Taber 2000; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011), and 
so on. Therefore, in examining individuals’ attitudes and beliefs, uncovering their motivational 
bases is particularly useful since it will show us the operating mechanisms that produce people’s 
attitudes.  
Based on psychological literature on motivation, my AMR model theorizes that a 
human’s various fundamental motivations can be broadly categorized into two groups for 
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analytic purposes: a) cognitive and existential motivation7, and b) moral and relational 
motivation. These categories rely on past research on motivated social cognitive perspectives, 
formulated by Jost et al. (2003) and proposed by others (Duckitt 2001; Kruglanski 1996; 
Dunning 1999; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Dijksterhuisa et al. 1996).8 Jost et al. (2003) 
distinguish three kinds of motivations related to ideological orientations and political 
conservatism: epistemic, existential, and ideological. In a more recent work, Jost, Federico, and 
Napier (2009) introduce and distinguish epistemic, existential, and relational motivations. Based 
on their work, my model adds moral motivation (Haidt 2007) to the list and groups the four kinds 
of motivations into two according to the above-mentioned criteria.9 Chapter 3 will specifically 
focus on the joint effects of motivation and cognition, by focusing on two of the most widely 
studied psychological dispositions related to conservative ideology and attitudes, which are 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. These two psychological dispositions are 
regarded as stemming from individuals’ existential and cognitive motives, such as “needs for 
order, structure, and the avoidance of uncertainty and threat” (Jost et al. 2003). (For more 
discussion on their motivational underpinnings, see chapter 3). Such motivational tendencies 
cause the two kinds of dispositions to become generally conservative ideological orientations. 
While numerous sociological and anthropological studies have tried to show the social 
                                                             
7 Cognitive motivation refers to the need for cognitive certainty, reducing cognitive complexity, and preference for 
order, structure, and closure. Existential motivation refers to the desire for security, feeling of control, and self-
esteem.  
 
8 The motivated social cognitive perspective focuses on the relationship between motivational underpinnings and 
people’s ideological orientations and beliefs (Jost et al. 2003: 340).  
 
9 Susan Fiske (2004) also presented a core motive model that unifies previous social psychological approaches to 
social motives. Her model consists of five kinds of core social motives: belonging, understanding, controlling, 
enhancing self, and trusting. The five kinds of motives can be adequately mapped onto my framework.   
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embeddedness of cognition (e.g., Tomasello 1999), this study emphasizes that human motivation 
is also configured in socio-cultural contexts. More discussion will be provided in Chapter 3. 
While association and motivation have been studied and regarded as important factors in 
shaping individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and ideas, sociologists have, to large extent, been very 
silent about the problem of reasoning, even though reasoning, which is the human being’s 
distinct mental power to think, understand, calculate, argue, and make decisions, plays an 
undoubtedly critical role in attitude formation. With respect to reasoning, sociologists’ main 
focus has been to discount the role of economic, utilitarian rationality in social action, but they 
also developed their theories of reasoning in the context of practical reasoning (e.g., practice 
theory). The basic idea of practice theory is that our practical reasoning is mostly guided by 
routinized, durable, dispositional, and embodied habits rather than deliberative, conscious, and 
theoretical reasoning. In other words, sociological theories of practical reasoning are to large 
extent theories of practice rather than of reasoning itself. In my model, the source of the 
structured patterns in our habits and thoughts lies in the area of association, rather than 
reasoning; this is a critical distinction since it is important to distinguish the logic of reasoning 
(e.g., inference, deduction, causal thinking, lay theorizing, etc.) from the logic of structuration in 
reasoning. 
 In contrast to such a focus on practice theory, my framework more directly focuses on 
reasoning itself and contends that reasoning has a two-fold function of decision-making and 
sense-making (full explanation in Chapter 4). From a sociological perspective, both functions 
and mechanisms are based on and processed by actors’ internal lay theories of their social world 
and experience (Furnham 1988; Ostertag 2010). Lay theory organizes one’s experiences and 
observations into a theoretical understanding of the social world, which in large part borrows a 
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basic cognitive frame from common-sense reasoning (in an ethnomethodological sense: see 
Cicourel 1964. Also see Somers [1994]).  
Although this concept of lay theory is useful for understanding the goal and process of 
the reasoning in people’s minds, it is unclear how lay theories actually look. Studies often use 
interviews or experimental tests and analyze actors’ narratives in order to understand the reasons 
and motives for their actions or their opinions about certain social issues. While the actual 
motives and reasons of our actions are sometimes very similar to such spoken narratives when 
the narratives reflect specific “inner speeches” or the “dialogical self” (Wiley 2006; Archer 
2003) that occurred in an individual’s mind in the course of action, the actual reasoning process 
at the pre-narrative stage, which is not yet captured into discursive consciousness (Giddens 
1984), is usually different from the post-hoc reasons or justifications stated in verbal accounts. 
For example, when asked about for an opinion on distributive justice, a person will attempt to 
organize his/her fragments of thought and nebulous ideas into a certain coherent argument and 
reasonable storyline. However, the logic of latent attitude-construction is hardly the same as the 
logic expressed in verbal accounts, but rather stems from somewhat incoherent, messy, 
emotional, and illogical steps. Chapter 4 will investigate a pattern of underlying lay theories that 
are not channeled into discursive consciousness and examine its structural characteristics. 
On the whole, the theoretical and conceptual framework of my dissertation is based on 
the model illustrated in Figure 1.1. The process and outcome of social cognition in individual 
actors are shaped by the effect of and mutual interaction between association, motivation, and 
reasoning as an organic, integrated flow. Again, this illustration is for explaining the underlying 
ideas behind the AMR model, and not something I will directly test in my empirical chapters. 
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Figure 1.1 AMR Model and Attitudes, Beliefs, and Ideology 
To very briefly describe this integrated model, the role of each component in this triad 
model can be explained as following. First, motivation provides underlying operational 
mechanisms for associative networks and practical reasoning, bringing about motivated 
cognition and motivated reasoning. The process and mechanism of the inner workings of 
association and reasoning can be understood by the fundamental motivational tendencies. And 
association provides structural patterns in cognitive, affective, and bodily domains that 
substantiate motivation and practical reasoning, which brings about individually (and often 
collectively) enacted cognitive and affective habits. Motivational and reasoning rely on the 
structural, patterned circuitry of associative networks in their functioning. Finally, reasoning 
provides the mental work to reflect and decide, by placing motivational substructure and 
associative networks into actual contexts and problem situations. It reinforces and reformulates 
associative networks and selectively controls or depresses motivational impetuses.   
Past studies in sociology on people’s attitudes are often based on either problematic 
assumptions (e.g., belief-action model or means-ends model) or approaches that are more or less 
accurate but whose concrete mechanisms are underspecified (e.g., practice or pragmatist 
models).  This AMR model has a clear advantage over other sociological models of action and 
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cognition, since it can more concretely specify the general mechanisms of most social action and 
cognition. Gross (2009) proposed a pragmatist approach to overcome the inadequate theorization 
of social action in past theories and suggested that by conceptualizing actions as social practices, 
we can analytically disaggregate the chain of cause and effect into an actor’s habitual response to 
problem situations. In spite of many merits of such a pragmatist (and practice) approach, it seems 
to me that it still does not provide us with a sufficiently specific model for the concrete 
specification of mechanisms of social action. Also, the theory does not have a well-established 
model of cognition and other mental processes. Moreover, a pragmatist model, at least at this 
stage, cannot be easily tested in empirical studies; in the pragmatist model, social action and 
cognition are still treated as an unexplained bundle of habitual action and thinking, cognitive 
schemata, durable but adaptive dispositions, creativity, and so on. Trying to solve these 
problems, my model specifically unpacks the pragmatist bundle and offers a more systematic 
and analytic framework to theorize and make sense of social action and social cognition, by 
bridging sociological, psychological, and anthropological approaches. 
The following section will discuss how I will tackle each component of association, 
motivation, and reasoning, individually in each empirical chapter. 
 
Methods 
This thesis makes use of several novel methodological approaches to link the theoretical 
model to the empirical study of the cases.  
Chapter 2 deals with the pattern of association among attitudes and employs two kinds of 
methods (i.e., Latent Class Analysis and Relational Class Analysis) that examine the relations 
among survey items in order to map the networks of popular beliefs and attitudes about 
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distributive justice. By examining such associative patterns, the two methods can group and 
categorize individuals according to their distinct attitudinal tendencies. The study investigates 
two kinds of attitudinal tendencies by differentiating absolute similarity and relational similarity 
of individuals’ attitudes. Examining the two kinds of attitudinal similarities provides means for 
understanding a concrete picture of popular attitudes and beliefs about distributive justice. For 
the analysis, I employ latent class analysis (LCA) to measure absolute similarity and relational 
class analysis (RCA) to measure relational similarity. This methodological approach is useful for 
investigating individual-level heterogeneity in the patterns of popular beliefs, attitudes, opinions, 
and ideology, and can specifically reveal different subtypes of individuals who share distinct 
beliefs and attitudes toward economic inequality and redistribution. The joint classification of 
LCA and RCA allows us to subdivide individuals according to the associative structure of their 
beliefs about inequality in society, and regression-based analysis of the results can examine 
which individual-level characteristics affect such patterns. This method can overcome the 
limitations of other methodological approaches that treat national boundaries as the unit of 
analysis or that focus on the relationship between variables and ignore individual-level 
heterogeneity in cognitive-attitudinal schemata (e.g., factor analysis). Full explanation and the 
methodological implication of this analytic strategy and methodological details will be provided 
in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 3 examines the motivational basis of attitudes and opinions and attempts to show 
how people’s attitudes and preferences about economic redistribution policies are affected by 
two kinds of psychosocial dispositions (i.e., social dominance orientation (SDO) and 
authoritarianism). Following a widely used methodological approach in social psychological 
studies, I use structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to model the mechanism that 
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explains how macro-level backgrounds, such as regional and educational inequality, affect the 
distribution of people’s psychosocial dispositions, which consequently produce more acquiescent 
and tolerant attitudes toward inequality in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas. As this 
chapter deals with the motivation part of the AMR model, it seeks to capture individuals’ 
motivational basis as a latent variable and estimate its effect on political-economic attitudes. 
While using a conventional SEM model to test the proposed mechanism, my empirical strategy 
slightly differs from what is usually used in psychological social psychology. That is, while I 
focus on SDO and authoritarianism, I use items that reflect group- and context-specific 
psychosocial dispositions to construct the latent variables, rather than using items that constitute 
context-free, pre-dispositional, personality scales. In contrast to such sanitized, context-free 
“individual difference” traits in psychology, my methodological strategy employs survey items 
that specifically reflect people’s perception of their actual environments. This approach is 
grounded upon the idea that psychological dispositions are the product of motivated social 
cognition, which is culturally shaped under the meaning structure of moral-political schemata; 
the dispositions stem from individuals’ underlying motivated substructure manifested through 
the moral, cultural, and political repertoires available to them. In this way, I capture individuals’ 
SDO and authoritarianism as culturally ascribed motivational tendencies, which has a subtle but 
critical difference from the individual difference approach in psychological studies. Again, more 
explanation will be presented in the corresponding chapter. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I take a novel approach to examine the pattern of reasoning 
revealed in people’s distributive justice attitudes by using probabilistic graphical modeling, 
namely Bayesian Networks. Bayesian Network analysis basically refers to the methodological 
strategy that combines graphical modeling with Bayesian analysis in order to analyze and map 
25 
 
the probabilistic causal dependency structure among the random variables included in the 
analysis. Even though Bayesian Network analysis is often used to tackle causal relational 
patterns by using directed acyclic graph (DAG) and testing conditional independencies between 
variables, I do not use Bayesian Network analysis to illustrate causal relationships but rather to 
reveal individuals’ “lay theories” of distributive justice and project a holistic picture of people’s 
belief systems regarding inequality, economic redistribution, and helping the poor. Actors’ 
reasoning process relies on their underlying lay theoretical understanding (Furnham 1988; 
Giddens 1984) of how the social world works, and such lay theories constitute how they view 
and make sense of social issues such as inequality, poverty, and redistribution. By showing the 
dependency structure among a variety of attitudes and beliefs related to distributive justice, this 
method can infer how the process of lay theorization is organized in the belief system about 
distributive justice. Conventional statistical analyses, such as regression-based models, are not 
suitable for examining the larger relationship structure among multiple variables and cannot treat 
models where variables can be independent and dependent variables at the same time, and path 
analysis or structural equation models are constructed based on the models already designed by a 
researcher’s theoretical interest or hypothesis, rather than revealing the relationship patterns in a 
holistic way, and cannot solve endogeneity problems (e.g., two-way causal relationship) very 
well. By using this method, I can specifically show how actual connections between individual 
beliefs look and how such patterns are consistent with or different from the theoretical models 
hypothesized in scholarly literature. This method can also exhibit actors’ lay theories and models 
of inequality and distributive justice before they are funneled into and unconsciously 
reformulated through their narratives, conscious arguments, and discursive consciousness. Thus, 
this method can be useful in showing the patterns of actors’ underlying, pre-narrative 
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understandings of various dimensions of distributive justice and can clearly reveal the difference 
between scholarly assumptions on how people think about inequality and the actual lay 
theoretical models processed in actors’ social cognition. 
On the whole, the methods used in the three chapters apply the conceptual framework to 
empirical analysis and provide new ways to analyze social survey data that overcome the 
limitations of some past methodological approaches. These methods can also be utilized for 
analysis of popular attitudes and public opinion in other societies and for intergroup or cross-
national comparisons. 
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Chapter 2 
The Associative Structure of Attitudes toward Distributive Justice 
 
This chapter investigates the associative patterns of Chinese citizens’ attitudes toward 
inequality and distributive justice. As explained in the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter 
pertains to the association part of the AMR framework, which refers to the structural, patterned 
circuitry of associative networks in our mental and bodily processes that create cognitive and 
affective habits. In this chapter, I focus on the association of attitudes and the associative patterns 
of the constituents of individuals’ belief system.  
Cultural and political sociologists have long been interested in studying the ideational 
associations that construct individuals’ worldview, belief system, and political attitudes. At the 
individual-level, association of ideas confers more or less durable structure to individuals’ 
cognitive and affective schemata, constituting the channels of meaning-structure and an effective 
heuristic basis for social cognition. While the precise mechanisms and characteristics of 
individuals’ cognitive-affective schemata are generally explored by psychologists, sociologists 
shed light on the patterns and effect of collective schematic structures shared by groups, cultures, 
and societies. Since Durkheim’s idea of shared representations to Zerubavel’s (1999) concept of 
though communities or Martin’s (2000) idea of multidimensional belief space, sociologists have 
found that individuals’ cognitive schema, attitudinal tendencies, and ideological orientations are 
embedded within the large network of meaning and signification, where the tools for individuals’ 
social cognition are socially distributed, so that culture shows at least a minimum level of 
coherence while also showing fragmented, incoherent, and dynamic patterns with heterogeneous 
elements (DiMaggio 1997; Zerubavel and Smith 2010; Ghazinani and Baldassarri 2011). 
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In this research program that examines structural association between ideas10, there are 
broadly two kinds of sociological inquiries: studying contents or constraint. The first approach 
(contents) taken by empirical studies focuses on individuals’ attitudinal tendencies, policy 
preferences, ideological orientations, attitudes toward specific social issues, and so on. They 
study what specific attitudes, opinions, or ideas individuals have. For example, they study what 
percentage of population is liberal, supports same sex marriage, or listens to classical music. 
Most sociological studies that analyze public opinion or individuals’ attitudes fall within this 
domain. The second approach is shown in the studies that are often influenced by Converse’s 
classic work (1964) that defines ideology as attitudinal constraint, which particularly focuses on 
the formal properties of attitudinal structure, belief systems, or opinion polarization at the 
aggregate-level.11 Rather than looking at what individuals believe or how they think of particular 
social issues, these studies focus on the structural properties of social organization of beliefs and 
attitudes. While there could be various ways to recognize and diagnose the structural properties 
of aggregate-level distribution of attitudes, I contend that the fundamental insight or idea of such 
formal analysis can be represented by the term constraint, as Martin pointed out by using 
Durkheim’s ideas (see Martin 2002:865).  
                                                             
10 For example, analysis of cultural and symbolic/semiotic codes (Cerulo 1995; Sewell 2005), anthropological 
analysis of culture and cognitive anthropology (Douglas 1986; D’Andrade 1995), ‘sociology of associations’ such as 
actor-network theory (Latour 2005), studies on categorization and boundary making (Lamont 2002), mechanisms of 
social valuation (Zuckerman 2012; Lamont 2012), the role of shared repertoires in social movements and collective 
action (Tilly 1986; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), and more broadly, social constructionist (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966) and social constructivist (Vygotsky 1978) perspectives. 
 
11 For example, Martin’s (2002) studies multidimensional belief space in society by focusing on its two kinds of 
attributes of consensus and tightness. In a related domain, a number of studies also have tried to analyze and detect 
the patterns of polarization (i.e., bipolarization) in public opinion. For example, overcoming the limitation of past 
studies that mainly looked at the distribution of single issues, Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) investigated public 
opinion polarization by examining bivariate correlation between pairs of issues and between issues and 
partisanship/ideology. Both studies mainly focus on the formal properties of public opinion or belief system rather 
than looking at the specific contents of individuals’ opinions and attitudes. 
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In studying patterns of association in individuals’ attitudes toward distributive justice in 
this chapter, I present a research framework that recognizes these two domains, namely contents 
and constraint, as the two most important faces of attitudinal association. While various methods 
have been proposed to analyze the patterns of attitudinal association in past studies12, most of 
them focus on only one of these two aspects. The limitation of such conventional approaches is 
that it cannot recognize or show the full, comprehensive picture of belief system in society.  
By using two methodological tools together, which will be introduced later in detail, this 
chapter examines both contents and constraint of popular attitudes toward distributive justice 
and, at the same time, show the individual-level heterogeneity in contents and constraint to 
overcome the limitations of past studies and concretely map the social contour of attitudes 
toward distributive justice.  
The reason why this kind of approach is necessary for studying individuals’ perception of 
and attitudes toward distributive justice is because the literature of empirical social justice 
research has shown that justice beliefs and attitudes show multidimensional aspect. Although the 
concept of justice is generally associated with an abstract image of universal and timeless 
principles and moral, philosophical, and normative approaches to justice have often tackled the 
problem of justice from such a perspective, studies of people’s actual conceptions of distributive 
justice show that it does not obey a certain universal or absolute axiomatic rule.  The 
accumulated body of literature in empirical social justice research on perception and beliefs 
about distributive justice has shown that individual and group-level heterogeneity and contextual 
                                                             
12 For example, Goldberg’s (2011) relational class analysis can be used for uncovering schematic associations; latent 
class analysis (LCA) and principal component analysis (PCA; Carmines and Stimson 1982) can be utilized for 
investigating attitudinal associations. Other methods also have been proposed as methodological tools for analyzing 
the associative networks, such as cultural domain analysis (Borgatti 1994), algebraic representations or entropic 
measures for formal analysis of beliefs and attitudes (Martin and Wiley 1999; Martin 2002), correlational constraints 
(Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), or cultural network analysis (Sieck 2010). See Mohr (1998) for other formal 
techniques useful for analyzing the structural patterns of cultural dimensions. 
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contingency are manifested in people’s conceptions and perceptions of social justice (Deutsch 
1975, 1985; Miller 1999; Walzer 1983; Wegener and Liebig 1995a, 1995b; Aalberg 2003; 
Törnblom 1992; Folger 1986; Reis 1986).  
Such past studies suggest that one of the key tasks for empirically examining the 
perception and beliefs about distributive justice is to concretely map the multifaceted and 
multidimensional structure of justice beliefs and ideas.  Nevertheless, there are some important 
questions that past studies have paid limited attention to in order to understand the patterns of 
distributive justice beliefs. For example, to what extent do individuals in a same society share 
similar or different schematic understandings on distributive justice issues?  If some people 
possess more sophisticated and ideological views about distributive justice than other people, 
then what are the characteristics of their beliefs and what are their demographic backgrounds? 
Aside from egalitarian or meritocratic ideologies, are there other kinds of attitudinal tendencies 
in people’s ideas about various issues of inequality and redistribution?   
To answer these questions, this chapter will investigate the patterns of distributive justice 
beliefs and attitudes using a nationally representative social survey on people’s attitudes toward 
socioeconomic inequality.  As explained earlier, to make a more comprehensive analysis of the 
multidimensional aspect of justice beliefs, I will analyze people’s general distributive justice 
attitudes (contents) and show the relational patterns among various distributive justice ideas and 
attitudes (constraint).  By inspecting the relational patterns of distributive justice beliefs, we can 
have a clearer understanding of how people perceive various issues of distributive justice and 
how such thinking is characterized by the associative structure of their beliefs and attitudes.  
Empirically, this study focuses on the case of contemporary China, the country whose 
high level of socioeconomic inequality has been regarded as one of the biggest sources of social 
31 
 
discontent. Numerous Chinese policy makers, scholars, and foreign observers have asserted that 
the significance of distributive injustice in China will possibly result in social turbulence that 
would hurt the political stability and legitimacy of the communist party-state. However, such 
diagnoses are often not grounded upon specific examination and mapping of Chinese people’s 
actual cognitive and attitudinal schemata regarding diverse issues of distributive injustice. By 
employing a novel analytic strategy to concretely map popular ideas and beliefs about economic 
inequality and redistribution, this study will provide new evidence for and insight into the 
relationship between the high level of economic inequality and public opinion in contemporary 
Chinese society.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows.  First, I will overview major theories and 
studies of distributive justice and discuss how this study can specifically reveal the multiplicity 
and individual-level heterogeneity of justice schema that past studies have emphasized but failed 
to fully capture.  I will then discuss the sources and characteristics of distributive justice and 
stratification beliefs in China.  Next, I will provide explanation for the analytic strategy and 
methods used in this chapter to explore the patterns of justice beliefs.  The empirical analysis 
employs two kinds of classification strategies (i.e., relational class analysis and latent class 
analysis) to group individuals according to their distinct patterns of distributive justice perception 
and beliefs.  Using the two methods, I will examine the heterogeneous patterns of people’s 
distributive justice beliefs.  
This study makes contributions in the following areas.  First, it presents a new way to 
empirically study people’s actual conception of justice. Although a number of studies have 
emphasized the multidimensional aspect of distributive justice principles and beliefs, they have 
had limited tools to uncover individuals’ concrete schematic structure.  Taking a novel analytic 
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approach, this study offers to the existing literature new empirical evidence that provides a richer 
picture of people’s justice beliefs and shows individual-level determinants of such a belief 
structure.  Second, this study looks at both contents and constraint in popular attitudes, which 
presents more concrete mapping of attitudinal structure. Furthermore, to overcome the 
limitations of past studies that did not fully examine the individual-level heterogeneity of 
distributive justice ideas and beliefs and mainly looked at the relationship between variables 
rather than focusing on persons, this study inspects the heterogeneous associative patterns among 
attitudes across different groups of individuals, which sheds light on distinct kinds of distributive 
justice beliefs at the individual level.  Third, this study contributes to the studies on popular 
attitudes toward distributive justice in post-socialist countries, whose political-economic 
transition from state socialism to capitalism created unique social environments for citizens in 
forming ideas about socioeconomic inequality.  In this line of literature, while research on 
Eastern European countries greatly benefited from multiple waves of International Social Justice 
Project (ISJP) surveys that led to a large number of empirical studies, study on Chinese citizens’ 
distributive justice beliefs relied on only a limited number of nationally representative social 
surveys on inequality and distributive justice (Whyte, 2010; Whyte and Han, 2008).  My study 
provides new empirical evidence to the field by taking advantage of the ISSP 2009 survey of 
social inequality module, which includes China in its sample for the first time.  
 
Multiplexity of Distributive Justice Principles 
One of the most important sources of heterogeneity in beliefs about distributive justice is 
the multidimensional nature of distributive justice principles.  Early studies took a narrow view 
of understanding the problem of distributive justice and focused on the role of equity and 
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economic utility.  Homans (1961) and Blau (1964), for example, were the early sociologists who 
dealt with the problem of distributive justice with such a perspective.  Based on exchange theory, 
both Homans and Blau approached distributive justice as fairness in the ratio between cost and 
reward for participants in an exchange.  Such insight is consistent with the view of equity theory, 
which contends that rewards should be exactly distributed among participants in proportion to 
each member’s contribution to the outcome.  These initial studies in the 1960s and the 1970s, 
mostly based on a more or less unidimensional utilitarian framework, played an important role 
for setting the stage of distributive justice research.  However, a number of studies immediately 
followed that pointed out that such a view is too narrow and that the sources and principles of 
distributive justice are much more vast and multidimensional than what the early theories had 
described.  Such studies detailed categorical typologies of justice principles and their situational 
contingency (Folger, 1986; Leventhal et al., 1980; Reis, 1986; Törnblom, 1992). 
One of the most influential studies in the multi-principle approach is the seminal work of 
Deutsch (1975, 1985), who distinguished three kinds of distributive justice principles: equity, 
equality, and need.  Such distinctions can be also found in other theoretical and empirical studies.  
For instance, Miller (1999) discussed principles of desert, need, and equality as the pluralistic 
frames of justice. Likewise, Walzer (1983) proposed three distributive principles of free 
exchange, desert, and need, rejecting universal or external claims for principles of justice, and 
argued that the meaning of justice is always shaped by local accounts and shared understandings 
of meaning of social goods.  Aalberg (2003) posited five kinds of theoretical approaches to 
principles of distributive justice: principles of equity, principles of utility, Rawls’ difference 
principle, principles of need, and principles of equality. Empirical studies tested the effect of 
individuals’ different justice principles on their political-economic attitudes such as preference 
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for welfare policy (Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, and Levanon, 2003).  The multi-principle approach 
to justice has been also studied in terms of finding “justice cosmologies” (Wegener and Liebig, 
1995b) and mapping primary and secondary justice ideologies (Wegener and Liebig, 1991).  On 
the other hand, aside from these normative, ideological, or deontological justice principles, self-
interest has been recognized as a powerful frame that determines one’s ideas about distributive 
justice. The self-interest thesis contends that people’s attitudes toward distributive justice stem 
from one’s socioeconomic position and depend on whether one benefits from existing 
stratification system (Mackenzie, 1973, Robinson and Bell, 1978; Svallfors, 1991). 
Such multidimensionality is not a characteristic peculiar to justice beliefs.  As Fiske 
wrote, attitudes in general often reveal complicated configurations since they are cognitively and 
evaluatively complex (Fiske, 2010: 227). Cognitively complex, because cognitive components 
have multiple dimensions (e.g. desert, equity, need, and equality), and evaluatively complex, 
since people’s attitudes are affected by positive and negative affect systems, which produce 
attitudinal ambivalence.  Like other attitudes, justice beliefs and attitudes also exhibit such 
complexity in its manifestation. 
 
Rethinking the Multiplexity of Justice: A Relational Approach 
If justice beliefs and attitudes are multidimensional and there is more than one 
distributive criterion, then how do people carry such multiple principles?  How does each 
principle form relations with other principles in individuals’ belief systems?  And how can we 
uncover and examine different kinds of belief systems shared among individuals? 
Although these questions are critical in understanding the patterns of justice beliefs and 
attitudes, only a limited number of studies have explicitly tackled such issues.  Some studies 
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highlighted attitudinal incoherency and inconsistency in beliefs about inequality. For example, 
past studies on Eastern European countries (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener, 1995; Smith and 
Matějů, 2011) showed how popular attitudes about distributive justice had changed after the 
dismantling of the Soviet bloc, and argued that people in those countries had much less internal 
value consistency compared to their Western counterparts.  Such an argument is based on the 
findings that Eastern Europeans in the early 1990s desired both the meritocratic system, 
expecting that it will bring capitalist prosperity to their countries, and the socioeconomic security 
that their socialist regimes provided (Kluegel et al., 1995; Smith and Matějů, 2011).  Such a 
description of low internal value consistency may be fair but there are two lingering issues there 
that require further investigation.  
The first issue, which also applies to other cross-national studies in general, has to do 
with “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Bonikowski 2011). Because 
many of the past studies on beliefs about inequality relied on cross-national surveys, such as ISJP 
and ISSP, even though they made interesting cross-national comparisons of popular attitudinal 
tendencies (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001), they essentially treated a country 
as a basic unit whose citizens share a common distributive justice schema.  Most of the past 
studies that looked into cultural and ideological variations in justice schema used countries as the 
boundary that distinguishes between different styles of sense-making of distributive justice ideas.  
Indeed, some of the studies attempted to capture individual-level differences by examining the 
effect of demographic variables in regression-based analysis.  Although such an analytic 
approach can show the relationship between certain explanatory variables and distributive justice 
attitudes, it is not suitable for mapping a concrete picture of people’s justice beliefs within 
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societies or examining different styles of associations among beliefs and attitudes across 
different groups of individuals.  
The second issue has to do with how we define internal value consistency.  Although 
holding somewhat contradictory ideas together (e.g., a belief in meritocracy and a demand for 
social protection) may seem to lack value consistency, if such a distinctive belief is collectively 
shared among a large number of people, then we can claim that their belief system exhibits 
consistency in its own distinctive way.  I contend that internal value consistency cannot be 
judged based on a priori assumptions on whether the ideological components that constitute 
people’s belief system are logically integrated among themselves, but on whether the 
components exhibit strong associations among themselves that construct a meaningful cognitive-
attitudinal schema.  In this viewpoint, what matters is not whether people’s belief systems are 
inherently logical or not, but rather what specific distributive justice beliefs exhibit significant, 
stable associations with one another.  And finding different kinds of associative patterns among 
people allows us to more clearly understand the multiplexity of justice beliefs (DiMaggio 1997).   
In order to tackle this problem of multiplexity and heterogeneity of justice belief systems, 
I take a relational approach as an analytic strategy to map the structural patterns of people’s 
justice beliefs and identify individual-level ideational heterogeneity.  The idea behind this 
relational approach comes from the cultural sociological perspective that views meaning is 
relational and meaning springs from relational contexts (DiMaggio 1997; Mohr and Duquenne 
1997; Yeung 2005). The relational nature of meaning or meaning system is important for 
attitudes regarding distributive justice. For example, even when two individuals show same 
attitudes toward a survey question “Do you think differences income in this country is too 
large?,” the substantive meaning or affect associated with each individual’s response to that 
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question would be different, if they have different opinions about other issues such as “the 
government should reduce the income gap” or “Coming from a wealthy family is very important 
for getting ahead.” As individual attitude is embedded in a larger network of attitudinal 
association in one’s mental process, such a web of association among attitudes needs to be 
considered as a whole in order to accurately map people’s belief system. A more fundamental 
reason why the relational approach is appropriate is related to the basic properties of attitudes.  
Attitudes are understood as “object evaluations stored in memory” (Judd et al., 1991), which 
come from a very large network of cognitive, affective, and behavioral correlates.  Studying the 
multiplexity and heterogeneity of justice attitudes, therefore, requires analyzing the structural 
and relational configuration formed among multiple attitudes.   
This strategy requires a specific understanding of what kind of heterogeneity needs to be 
identified.  In this study, my relational approach to study belief heterogeneity will be discussed 
in the context of analyzing survey data, the most widely used method to empirically investigate 
individuals’ justice beliefs.  Specifically, there are two kinds of heterogeneity that my study will 
concentrate on. 
 
Two Kinds of Attitudinal Heterogeneity 
The first kind of heterogeneity is about different ideological orientations of individuals, 
which can be revealed by finding groups of people who have similar ideas and attitudes.  In 
survey analysis, such groups can be found by examining the overall attitudinal similarity 
between individuals. If the difference is smaller, then the two can be categorized into a same 
group.  The attitudinal similarity is captured by examining the contingency table of survey items, 
whose rows and columns are possible sets of associations of individual responses and each cell 
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presents the frequency of subjects who gave the particular response.  Such a table shows how the 
association of variables is actually manifested in each individual’s responses, and parameter 
estimation solutions can detect underlying latent attitudinal traits that explain such associative 
patterns.  The key purpose of this approach is to examine the relations among variables to 
identify different latent traits or groups, whose members share similar beliefs and attitudes.  In 
short, this method focuses on the absolute similarity of individuals’ attitudes. The empirical 
analysis will use latent class analysis (LCA) to investigate this type of attitudinal heterogeneity. 
To return to my earlier discussion on contents versus constraint, this type of analysis is mainly 
useful for showing the contents of individuals’ attitudes (while it can also show constraint in a 
somewhat different sense). 
The second kind of heterogeneity focuses on the relational pattern itself among attitudes 
rather than their absolute similarity.  While the first method concentrated on the extent to which 
subjects make substantively similar responses, that is, whether they agree or disagree similarly 
on various issues, the second method aims to find subtypes of individuals who share a similar 
schematic frame in understanding the issues, which is reflected in the relational structure in their 
responses.  Suppose there are two kinds of political issues, X and Y.  Individual A, who strongly 
supports X and opposes Y, has opposite attitudes to another person B, who strongly opposes X 
and supports Y.  However, their attitudinal frame can be reduced to a same schematic dimension, 
where issue X and issue Y are opposing elements to each other.  For instance, let us call belief in 
a meritocratic system as X and preference for income redistribution as Y.  Individuals A and B 
disagree with each other on both issues, but they show a schematically similar way of 
approaching the issue of merit and redistribution.  Consider a person C who supports both merit-
based ideology (X) and more income redistribution (Y).  The response similarity (or Euclidian 
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distance) between A and C is greater (shorter) than that between A and B.  However, in terms of 
how issues X and Y are interrelated with each other, A and B can be grouped together due to 
their shared schematic understanding, in which X and Y are opposing elements, while C shows 
different understanding.  This insight can be more clearly illustrated by imagining a belief 
network, which consists of justice beliefs/attitudes as nodes and the strength of relationship 
among them as ties.  This belief network can be characterized by what justice beliefs/attitudes 
are clustered together by strong ties (i.e. strong, significant correlations) and what are separated 
from others (i.e. no ties or weak correlations) as the structural properties of the network.  And the 
configuration of such a belief network would look differently across different groups of 
individuals.  In contrast to the first method that focuses on absolute similarity of attitudes, this 
method inspects relational similarity.  A methodological tool is developed to analyze this kind of 
relational patterns as relational class analysis (RCA) (Goldberg, 2011), which will be explained 
in more detail in the methods section.  This methodological approach is particularly useful for 
tackling the problem of the properties of structural constraint of attitudinal association. 
In order to fully understand the multiplexity of justice beliefs, these two kinds of belief 
heterogeneity needs to be specifically examined. If only absolute similarity is considered, 
heterogeneity in meaning structure will be overlooked and the result will be misinterpreted as if 
every individual shares common schematic understanding of ideas in a given social domain. On 
the contrary, if only relationality similarity is considered, then it will show the ideational 
heterogeneity in people’s belief system but fail to show their actual attitudinal contents (e.g., 
conservatives, liberals, egalitarians, etc.).  
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In the following, I will turn to the empirical case by discussing distributive justice and 
stratification beliefs in China. Then, analytic strategy for investigating the two kinds of justice 
belief heterogeneity and results will be introduced.  
 
Distributive Justice and Stratification Beliefs in China 
Comparative studies of distributive justice beliefs have shown that people’s distributive 
justice criteria and beliefs are affected by social norms (Nisan, 1984; Wegener and Liebig, 
1995a) and the dominant ideology of society (Kluegel and Smith, 1986), since people use 
consensually held referent structures and notions of justice principles (d’Anjou, Stejin, and Van 
Aarsen, 1995).  Studies found that individuals’ beliefs about inequality and attitudes toward 
redistribution show meaningful difference across different nations and welfare regimes (Arts and 
Gelissen, 2001; Kelley and Evans, 1993). Country-specific dominant ideologies are also 
examined in past studies. For example, it is repeatedly found that Americans tend to emphasize 
the principle of merit and individualist attribution as their dominant ideology (Feagin, 1975; 
Huber and Form, 1973; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Rimlinger, 1971).  
In this context, one can ask if there is any sort of “Chinese exceptionalism” in beliefs and 
attitudes about inequality and redistribution.  A common view on this question often turns to 
traditional Chinese values and finds relevant components particularly from Confucian ethics and 
value systems.  Emphasis on hard work, persistence, thrift, industry, bearing hardships, and 
education are considered essential cultural codes in Confucian culture (Hofstede and Bond, 
2001), which alludes to the similar spirit underpinning meritocratic ideology.  It is also often 
pointed out that such a cultural emphasis on hard work and education stems from China’s long 
tradition of a merit-based civil examination system that allowed a moderate level of upward 
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social mobility for ordinary citizens.  Unlike Western societies where social status change was 
traditionally largely ascriptive and social mobility was restricted, the chances for climbing up the 
social ladder through passing the national or provincial civil-service exam was surprisingly high 
in imperial China, as shown by Ping-ti Ho’s (1962) study on the fluidity of the status system in 
the Ming and Qing dynasties.  Moreover, the republican revolution (1911) at the turn of the 20th 
century significantly eliminated traditional inherited status barriers and brought about societal 
emphasis on the pursuit of new opportunities (Whyte, 2010:15).   
A question arises: do today’s Chinese citizens also hold such beliefs in individuals’ merit 
and efforts?  Empirical evidence seems to positively weigh toward the idea.  From qualitative 
interviews in a working-class neighborhood, Lee (2009) found that working-class respondents, 
despite mixed opinions, show widespread acceptance of merit, desert, and efficiency principles 
in evaluating inequality.  Quantitative, cross-national studies based on survey analysis show 
similar results.  Based on social justice surveys, Whyte (2010) and Whyte and Han (2008) found 
that Chinese citizens hold relatively positive attitudes toward the role of individual merit, hard 
work, in explaining the cause of wealth and poverty compared to citizens in many other countries 
(i.e., Eastern and Western European countries, the United States, and Japan).  
However, focusing on belief in hard work, education, and opportunities for upward 
mobility does not fully capture complex dimensions of Chinese views on inequality.  
Traditionally, the wealth-poverty dimension was not the most important axis in the Chinese 
scheme of social differentiation, compared to other dimensions such as occupational status, 
rulers and ruled, and free and unfree (Kuhn, 1984).  That is, in traditional society, most people 
were poor, and middle and upper strata were very narrow in the socioeconomic structure that 
resembles an “onion dome” configuration, and poverty and wealth themselves were not 
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perceived as representation of injustice (Kuhn, 1984: 24).  Another important underlying view 
was powerful fatalism regarding how wealth is distributed among people, even though ordinary 
people strived for ameliorating their living conditions through hard labor and perseverance. 
There are also other kinds of cultural ideas ingrained in traditional Chinese society.  An 
important moral-cultural element is latent egalitarianism that pursues collective harmony and 
stability, which functions as a cultural anchor in Chinese society.  This egalitarianism creates a 
social space that values moral inclination toward self-sacrifice and a sense of collective 
responsibility.  Pursuit of equality is particularly emphasized in local contexts (Wang, 2008), 
featuring the high level of social and economic equality in rural collectives and urban work units 
until they were largely dismantled by agricultural reforms and privatization throughout the post-
reform period.  
Aside from these traditional cultural backgrounds, changing social and economic 
conditions in the rapidly developing society adds additional layers of complexity to Chinese 
views of inequality and distributive justice.  Three decades of hectic national economic 
development has brought about individuals’ pursuit for material success and tolerance toward 
income inequality. Simultaneously, optimism for upward mobility has been countered by popular 
frustration and discontent with economic polarization and rising unemployment rates.  
Additionally, expansion of new social opportunities that previous generations could not envisage 
and development of materialist consumption culture led to the enhancement of the “enterprising 
self” (Rose, 2007) and the “desiring self” (Rofel, 2007). These changes have motivated Chinese 
individuals to seek self-development and personal desires, and perceive Chinese society as a new 
post-socialist country flourishing with “autonomous and responsible individual actors” (Yan, 
2011: 4).  
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These various old and new factors that shape beliefs about inequality and stratification 
suggest that we would find diverse styles of belief structure among Chinese citizens.  It is also 
expected that multidimensionality and heterogeneity would characterize people’s belief systems 
regarding distributive justice.   
 
Analytic Strategy 
Methodological Approach: Relational and Latent Class Analysis 
This chapter takes a methodological approach that examines the ideational heterogeneity 
among people and finds subtypes of individuals that share distinct attitudinal patterns.  In terms 
of survey analysis, such a methodological approach attempts to examine how variables are 
interrelated with one another and shows which respondents can be grouped together based on the 
relational pattern among the variables. 
To achieve this goal, I employ two kinds of methods useful for showing individual-level 
heterogeneity in people’s attitudes and beliefs: relational class analysis (RCA) and latent class 
analysis (LCA).  These methods can reveal the two kinds of attitudinal heterogeneity explained 
in the previous section. 
First, I use RCA, developed by Goldberg (2011), a method that detects subgroups in the 
population that share distinctive patterns of beliefs and attitudes.  In RCA, the patterns are 
defined by the structural pattern of relationships among individual survey items employed in the 
analysis.  The relationship is characterized by the strength and statistical significance of 
relationship between each pair of issues.  The logic and process of RCA is as follows.  First, it 
calculates the distance between two variables for one respondent (i.e., within-person distance 
between variables) and then computes the difference between the distance and the within-person 
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distance another respondent (i.e., between-person relational distance).  This process is repeated 
for every pair of variables, and the average of relational distance for the two respondents is 
produced as a summary value of “relationality.”  It is important to note that the focus is not on 
the similarity of attitudes but on the similarity of relationships between attitudes.  This measure 
of relationality is computed for every pair of respondents.  It produces a respondent-by-
respondent relationality matrix, which shows the relational similarity between all respondents in 
the survey.   
Second, using a bootstrapping method, statistically insignificant (α ≥ 0.05) relationality 
values are removed and set to zero.  This is because RCA treats the matrix as a network.  If the 
matrix has no missing values/cells, then the network will be too dense to show meaningful 
properties.  By removing statistically insignificant values, we can have a sparser matrix that 
reveals useful information more clearly.  The remaining statistically significant cells are 
normalized and transformed to absolute values.  The result is a matrix that represents the network 
of relationality, which consists of respondents (i.e., columns and rows in the matrix; vertices in 
networks) and their relational similarity (i.e., cells in the matrix; link weights in networks).   
Finally, RCA detects subgroups in the network by using a community detection 
algorithm (i.e., modularity optimization using eigenvalues; see Newman, 2006; Newman and 
Girvan, 2004), which finds cohesive clusters of individuals and classifies them into subgroups.  
See Appendix A for mathematical formulae and other technical details of RCA. (See Goldberg, 
2011 for full explanation on the method.)  Using RCA, I can show different kinds of distributive 
justice schemata shared by different subgroups in Chinese society and examine what individual-
level characteristics are associated with such a pattern. 
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As the next level of analysis, I use LCA to examine a different aspect of individual-level 
heterogeneity in distributive justice beliefs and attitudes.  Whereas RCA clusters respondents 
based on the similarity in the relationship between beliefs/attitudes, LCA finds subgroups by 
examining the similarity in absolute responses.  Based on respondents’ answers to survey items, 
it classifies respondents according to their latent attitudinal or behavioral traits, producing a 
categorical variable that consists of a set of latent classes and estimating the probability of class 
membership of each respondent.  This latent variable is an unobserved typology that explains the 
patterns of association between observed variables.  In some aspect, LCA is similar to traditional 
factor analysis, as both are latent variable models, but LCA has several different characteristics 
that distinguish itself from factor analysis; one particularly important feature is about the 
difference between variable-oriented approaches (factor analysis) and person-oriented 
approaches (LCA) (Bergman and Magnusson, 1997).  Variable-oriented approaches like factor 
analysis are interested in finding the relationship between variables that are generalizable to all 
individuals.  In such an approach, the focus is on identifying the general, nomothetic pattern of 
factor structure based on its linear relationship with individual variables (Collins and Lanze, 
2010: 8).  In contrast, person-oriented approaches, such as LCA and RCA, are interested in 
differences among individuals and focus on finding subtypes of individuals that show similar 
attitudes or belief systems.  Using the person-oriented approach, therefore, the problem of 
assuming a same factor structure for all individuals (e.g., methodological nationalism) can be 
avoided.  
In the following analysis, I first run RCA to analyze people’s underlying belief systems 
and then apply LCA to find different types of individuals with different latent attitudes.  Then, I 
examine how the two kinds of “classes” produced by RCA and LCA jointly reveal the subtypes 
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of individuals that show distinct schematic and attitudinal patterns regarding distributive justice.  
Taking advantage of these two methods allows us to investigate the multidimensional structure 
of distributive justice principles and its individual-level heterogeneity more concretely than past 
studies.13  
 
Data and variables 
The empirical study uses the Chinese sample in the 2009 wave of International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) Social Inequality IV survey.  The survey was conducted as part of the 
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS).  The Chinese sample in ISSP 2009 data (Inequality 
module) comes from Chinese General Social Survey 2008 (http://www.chinagss.org), which 
used multi-stage stratified sampling design using four major strata and used street mapping 
technique to sample households in communities. (N=6,000) 
The ISSP Social Inequality module covers a wide variety of issues regarding people’s 
opinions about their own salary, feeling of a just payment, the level of income inequality in the 
respondent’s country, government’s responsibility to reduce income inequality and protect 
economically vulnerable population, taxes for people with high income, importance of family 
background, hard work, discrimination, and corruption for success in society, and so on. My 
                                                             
13 The differences between RCA/LCA and other statistical methods are as following. First, RCA and LCA are 
different from standard regression analysis primarily because they examine the structure of associations among 
distinct attitudes and, based on that, detect subgroups in population that show qualitatively different 
ideational/attitudinal patterns, rather than examining the effect of independent variables on dependent variable 
(regression). On the other hand, RCA and LCA are different from factor analysis particularly because while factor 
analysis produces continuous latent scales where all individuals can be arrayed, RCA and LCA produce qualitatively 
different (discrete) classes/groups. While the aim of factor analysis is to find a latent factor structure that is 
commonly shared by all individuals, person-oriented classificatory methods such as LCA and RCA more are 
focused on finding qualitatively different subgroups. In some sense, LCA is similar with cluster analysis in the sense 
that both of them show how cases can be clustered into groups, but because cluster analysis is usually not based on a 
statistical model, it does not provide information about statistical, probability structure of latent classes (ex. the 
probability that an individual belongs to one class over another), which LCA is capable to do.  
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analysis uses twenty survey items pertaining to various issues of inequality and redistribution, 
which are categorized into three groups based on discussions in past literature on different 
dimensions of distributive justice.  (See Appendix B for the full list of questions used in the 
analysis.) 
The first group is four survey items related to respondents’ self-interest and self-
perception regarding distributive justice.  Although self-interest or self-perception is sometimes 
not categorized as one of the “justice principles” in literature, I decided to include it here because 
of the goal of this research. If we are just interested in individuals’ belief system independent of 
their own socioeconomic situations or experiences, then we do not need to consider individuals’ 
perception or feelings of injustice that stem from their own specific life situation. However, 
because one of the basic goals of this research is to find the size of subgroup in population that 
shows strong resentments toward distributive injustice in society AND strong frustration with 
their own socioeconomic situation (ex. unjust pay, low socioeconomic status), individuals’ self-
perception and self-interest regarding distributive justice need to be considered in examining the 
structure of attitudinal association. Many reports on popular protests against inequality show that 
protestors have specific demands related to the specific context of their lives and have also 
direct, negative experiences that trigger their feeling of injustice that make them participate in 
social protests, potentially at the expense of their own safety. So the underlying assumption here 
is that if there is only a very weak or no meaningful relationship between attitudes toward 
inequality in society and perception of one’s distributive justice situation, it would be hard to 
expect serious social unrest or protests among them. Based on this idea, survey items that reflect 
people’s attitudes toward their income and socioeconomic position are included, such as “Do you 
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think your pay is just?,” “I earn more/less than I deserve” and “Below is a scale that runs from 
top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?”  
The second group of eight questions pertains to the distributive justice principle of equity 
and merit discussed in past literature.  The questions in this group ask to what extent economic 
success in society is achieved by legitimate means.  Some sample questions are: “To get ahead, 
how important is hard work?”  “To get ahead, how important is coming from a wealthy family?” 
and “To get all the way to the top in the country today, you have to be corrupt.”  
The final group of eight survey items is broadly related to distributive justice principles 
of equality and need, which are based on normative points of views that associate equality with 
moral principles (Alwin, 1999; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, and Levanon, 2003).  Although equality 
and need are often treated as conceptually distinct moral or justice principles, they are closely 
entwined with each other in individuals’ practical responses and it is, thus, very difficult to 
disentangle one from another based on survey responses.  Therefore, I include diverse kinds of 
survey items that broadly deal with the problem of equality and need into this category.  Some 
sample questions are: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce income differences.”  
“Differences in income in the country are too large.”  “The government should provide a decent 
standard of living for the unemployed.”  
 
Results 
Relational Class Analysis 
As the first step, I ran RCA to analyze the underlying schematic structure of justice 
beliefs.  Table 2.1 summarizes the results.  RCA identified three classes of distinct ideational 
structure, presented as Group 1, 2, and 3 in the table.  For each group, I visualized the networks 
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of variables employed in the analysis, in which links are correlation coefficients between 
variables.  The networks can be interpreted as the relational structure of people’s cognitive-
attitudinal schemata regarding distributive justice.  Each vertex in the networks indicates a 
survey item used in the analysis and the three kinds of shape/color of vertices denote three 
categories of distributive justice explained earlier: self-interest (red/round), equity-merit 
(yellow/triangle), equality-need (green/square).  Graph edges, weighted based on the strength of 
correlations, are shown when a correlation coefficient between two variables is statistically 
significant (p < .05) and removed otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Illustration of Three Kinds of Distributive Justice Schema and Their Key Characteristics Based on the Results of 
Relational Class Analysis 
 
Note: 1. Percentage of total population. 2. Standard deviations in parentheses 3. Node attributes (self-interest, equity/merit, equality/need) as 
partitioning vector. 4. Eigenvalues of the first principal components, produced by principal component analysis. Variance explained by the first 
principal component in parentheses.  
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 
   
Percentage1  58.2% 22.9% 18.9% 
Avg. Correlation Coef.2  .148 (.110) .202 (.097) .213 (.083) 
Density .611 .600 .800 
Transitivity .677 .726 .888 
Clustering Coefficients .716 .722 .905 
Modularity3 .074 .016 -.031 
Eigenvalue4 2.896 (.145) 3.822 (.191) 4.581  (.229) 
Relative Characteristics 
Modularized; 
Relatively weak association 
Less Modularized; 
Mixed association 
Tightly Clustered;  
Relatively strong association 
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To summarize the patterns, Group 1 shows relatively weak and less cohesive relations 
among survey items.  Items that belong to a same category (self-interest; equity-merit; equality-
need) are somewhat strongly connected but they have relatively weak association with items in 
other categories.  This means that for individuals who belong to Group 1, which accounts for the 
belief structure of the majority (about 58.2%) of total observations, the three domains of 
distributive justice are not meaningfully structured onto a same dimension and each domain 
exists as relatively separate modules.   
In contrast, opposite patterns can be found in Group 3, which shows stronger and 
cohesive association among variables.  Individuals who belong to this group (about 18.9%) have 
cognitive-attitudinal schema in which issues of different distributive justice categories are 
relatively more strongly and well-connected with one another.  Contrary to Group 1, strong, 
significant correlations are not only found among within-category variables, but also across 
different categories.  This type of respondent holds relatively sophisticated and well-established 
ideological views on distributive justice issues, showing the high level of attitudinal constraint of 
“ideologues” (Converse, 1964).  
Group 2 (about 22.9% of total population) shows characteristics that are more or less in 
the middle between those of Group 1 and Group 3; variables in different domains show a little 
more modularized pattern than Group 3, while also exhibiting stronger overall association than 
Group 1.  
The differences between the three clusters can be more clearly demonstrated by several 
measures of network properties.  To focus on the difference between Group 3 and Group 1, 
Group 3 shows stronger average correlation among variables than Group 1 (.213 vs. .148), higher 
density (.800 vs. .611), higher transitivity (.885 vs. 662), and a higher clustering coefficient 
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(Watts, 1999)  (.905 vs. .716). All of these measures confirm that individuals in Group 3 show 
much stronger attitudinal constraint (Converse 1964). 
With regards to the problem of multidimensionality of justice principles, a particularly 
more important measure is network modularity.  Modularity is conceptually defined as the ratio 
between the number of edges within communities (or groups or partitions) to edges that cross the 
boundary of communities and is produced by computing to what extent the ratio in the given 
network is different from the ratio of a null model in which edges are placed completely at 
random (Freeman, 2011; Newman, 2006; Newman and Girvan, 2004).  The higher the value of 
modularity, the more the network shows “modularized” structure, which indicates that the 
structural properties of the network is affected by the boundaries of subgroups, communities, or 
partitions in the network.  The network modularity measured in my analysis uses the three vertex 
categories (self-interest; equity-merit; equality-need) as the partitioning vector (see Chung and 
Lu, 2002; Newman, 2006).   
For Group 1 and Group 2, the node category is a meaningful vector that accounts for the 
community structure of each network as the positive modularity values show (.074 and .016, 
respectively) while such community-form is more salient in Group 1.  In Group 3, however, 
modularity shows a negative sign (-.031), which means that the network structure of distributive 
justice issues in Group 3 cannot be meaningfully explained by the three distributive justice 
categories, even to the extent that the three categories can explain the community structure of 
random networks slightly better.  In other words, the boundaries of different domains/dimensions 
of distributive justice do not play a significant role at all in structuring the belief system and 
attitudes regarding distributive justice for individuals in this group, because their high level of 
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belief/attitudinal coherence and congruence trumps the domain specificity of different 
distributive justice issues.   
This finding suggests that the multidimensionality of distributive justice principles widely 
discussed in the past literature depends on the cognitive-attitudinal style of an individuals’ belief 
system.  That is, for individuals who exhibit relatively stronger attitudinal coherence, the 
multidimensionality is significantly muted and the multidimensional structure can be reduced to 
a fewer number of cognitive-attitudinal dimensions.  
This pattern can be further examined by using principal component analysis (PCA), 
which can reduce high-dimensional data structure to smaller dimensions.  Eigenvalues produced 
by PCA can specifically reveal that: the higher an eigenvalue is, the better the variables can be 
reduced to a fewer number of dimensions, which means that respondents’ distributive justice 
beliefs can be successfully explained by a smaller number of underlying cognitive-attitudinal 
principles.  Table 2.1 shows the eigenvalues of and variances explained by the first components 
in each group, when PCA is carried out for each RCA group.  The results suggest that 
respondents in Group 3 exhibit a more coherent and integrated view on distributive justice 
issues, which is more easily reducible to a smaller number of dimensions (eigenvalue of the first 
principal component: 4.581) than respondents in Group 1 (2.896) or Group 2 (3.822). This result 
confirms the findings derived from other network property measures discussed above. 
However, it should be noted that the level of constraint measured by correlation 
(Baldassarri and Gelman 2008) is still not high for individuals in RCA Group3 (mean r = .213). 
And as average correlation is computed based on only statistically significant ties, it may 
exaggerate the actual level of constraint. Once we also consider ties that are not statistically 
significant and compute the average strength of correlations of all ties, it decreases to .177, with 
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an estimated standard deviation of .099, which means that individuals’ opinions on one 
distributive justice issue can explain only 17% of their opinions on another issue on average, 
even among people who have relatively high attitudinal constraint.  Therefore, despite the 
relatively stronger attitudinal coherence and constraint found for Group 3, the group’s absolute 
attitudinal constraint is actually low. 
Collectively, this analysis suggests that the attitudinal structure of the majority of Chinese 
citizens is characterized by what has been described by past studies as low attitudinal constraint 
(Converse, 1964), split-consciousness (Kluegel et al., 1995), and compartmentalized beliefs 
(Lane, 1962); these theories argue that multiple and potentially challenging beliefs can coexist in 
one’s belief system and individuals do not necessarily reconcile such contradicting beliefs.  It 
also supports past studies which contend that people’s attitudes are rarely coherently integrated 
into a single cognitive-attitudinal dimension and one type of belief is often “layered on” another 
(Kluegel and Smith, 1986). 
 
           
                 (a) Logged household income                                                (b) Years of education 
 
Figure 2.1 Respondents’ Household Income, Years of Education, and Predicted 
Probabilities of RCA Group Assignment 
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What are the factors that affect individuals’ RCA group assignment?  What kinds of 
demographic factors bring about different types of belief structure?  Studies on public opinion 
predict that the level of education would be the most important explanatory factor, as educational 
level affects one’s political knowledge and cognitive skills, which are essential factors that 
determine ideological coherence in political beliefs (Converse 1964).  To test this, I ran ordinal 
logistic regression to find the effect of individuals’ demographic factors on their cluster 
membership identified by RCA.14  The results show that respondents’ household income and the 
level of their education are the only statistically significant explanatory variables that predict 
individuals’ group assignment, when other variables are controlled for.15   
Figure 2.1 presents the relationship between household income or education and the 
predicted probabilities of belonging to each RCA Group.  It shows that when one’s income or 
education is high, individuals tend to have less modularized cognitive-attitudinal schema on 
distributive justice (Group 1) but as the level of income or education increases, one is likely to 
have more organized and ideological belief systems on distributive justice, which shows 
cohesive and meaningful associations between self-interest, equity/merit, and equality/need 
(Group 2 and 3).  In other words, individuals with high household income or educational 
attainment are more likely to have an organized, ideological belief system on various distributive 
justice issues, whereas individuals with lower income tend to have less organized opinions. 
What is a more interesting pattern revealed here is the strong, significant net effect of 
household income. While the effect of education is not very surprising since a number of past 
                                                             
14 Alternatively, multinomial logistic regression can be used since each RCA group shows substantively different 
patterns of relations among variables. However, as this chapter only focuses on some selected network properties of 
attitudinal association revealed by RCA, which exhibit ordinal characteristics as shown in Table 1, I use ordinal 
logistic regression to concentrate on those aspects. 
 
15 Other variables employed in the analysis are: age, gender, marital status, communist party membership, and 
region (urban/rural). 
56 
 
studies on attitudinal constraint point to the role of education, the strong net effect of income is 
less expected.  Simply speaking, the result suggests that in China, rich people tend to be more 
ideological with regards to distributive justice. People with higher income may be more likely to 
be “ideologues” with regards to distributive justice for justification of their economic positions 
or through their personal experiences in climbing the economic ladder, while the poorest part of 
the population does not have enough chances or experiences to think through various social or 
economic issues. Such a result is consistent with some past studies that found stronger attitudinal 
constraint among wealthier voters (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).  
 
Latent Class Analysis 
As the next step, I will undertake a latent class analysis to find different latent typologies 
of popular attitudes toward distributive justice.  The same twenty variables employed in RCA are 
used in LCA.  LCA is not only conducted for the whole sample, but also for each of the three 
groups identified by RCA.  Comparisons of models with different numbers of latent classes 
favored a model with two classes, which I labeled as egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism.  
Two model comparison indices, AIC and BIC16, are used to choose the optimal number of latent 
classes.  Chi-squared based tests are also often used to find the appropriate cutting point for 
selecting the number of latent classes.  However, as the number of variables used in the analysis 
is somewhat large (20), the number of cells whose observed frequency in the contingency table is 
very small or zero would be too many compared to the sample size (i.e., sample size: 2,074; the 
total number of cells: 20 five-category variables: 520 (≈95 trillion)). Such sparseness causes 
                                                             
16 These are penalized-likelihood criteria, which give more penalty to models that are less parsimonious: in other 
words, when loglikelihoods are same for different models, the model with the fewest parameter is indicated as a 
better model. In LCA, the parameter generally refers to the number of classes. As a result, the lower AIC and BIC 
are, the better the model.  
57 
 
serious problems for Chi-squared based tests.  Therefore, model comparison measures (AIC, 
BIC), rather than absolute model fit measures (e.g., the G2 test statistic), are preferred here to 
decide the optimal number of latent classes.  
Figure 2.2 shows the patterns of model comparison measures that show the relationship 
between the number of latent classes in LCA models and the values of AIC and BIC.  The lower 
the values of AIC and BIC, the better the latent class model is.  However, as finding too many 
latent classes would not be useful or meaningful, one has to choose an optimal point (i.e., the 
number of latent classes) which shows relatively lower values of AIC and BIC and at the same 
time, the decrease of AIC and BIC is large and efficient.  In subfigure (a), which is based on the 
full sample, it is clear that the reasonable cutting point suggested by AIC and BIC is two latent 
classes.  A greater number of classes does not greatly reduce AIC and BIC, and especially BIC is 
not substantively reduced after identifying two latent classes.  This pattern shows that we can 
properly summarize respondents’ attitudes on twenty items with two latent classes.   
In addition, I applied LCA to each of the three RCA groups identified in the above 
analysis. Subfigures (b), (c), and (d) respectively show the AIC and BIC values when LCA is 
carried out for RCA Group 1, 2, and 3. In subfigure (b), the optimal number of classes in LCA 
models is less obvious: BIC seems to suggest that two latent classes are more or less 
recommendable as the cutting point, but it is much less clear with AIC. On the other hand, 
subfigures (c) and (d) exhibit very different patterns.  Particularly, the values of BIC increase 
when more than two classes are identified, which suggests that identifying more than two classes 
actually worsens the model fit.  The values of AIC also strongly suggest that LCA models with 
two classes are superior to other models.  Such a pattern is more prominent in subfigure (d) 
(RCA Group 3) than in figure (c) (RCA Group 2).  In other words, RCA Group 3 shows the most  
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                                (a) Full sample                                                         (b) RCA Cluster 1 
  
                            (c) RCA Cluster 2                                                       (d) RCA Cluster 3 
Figure 2.2 AIC and BIC for LCA Models of Distributive Justice Attitudes 
 
outstanding pattern of attitudinal and belief polarization, whereas RCA Group 1 shows 
significantly less distinctive difference between different latent classes.  Therefore, the result of 
the LCA model based on the whole sample (subfigure (a)) can be somewhat misleading in 
summarizing the underlying attitudinal patterns and belief systems accurately.  That is, although 
the LCA result suggests that respondents can be classified into two groups according to their 
latent attitudes, it is likely that such a result is largely affected by respondents who have 
relatively well-established and coherent belief structure.  This finding also shows an important 
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implication that relational similarity captured by RCA and absolute similarity captured by LCA 
are deeply related with each other as different aspects of the same connective structure of “the 
attitudinal cognitorium”17 (Rosenberg, 1968).   
 
Figure 2.3 Variable Means by Two Latent Classes 
 
Figure 2.3 presents the result of LCA, which shows how respondents’ attitudes toward 
the twenty issues used in the analysis are organized by two latent classes.  The bars indicate 
mean values of each variable; higher values refer to more critical opinions regarding each issue 
                                                             
17 In Rosenberg’s terms: “Let us imagine a finite but vast space called the ‘attitudinal cognitorium.’ Within it are 
located hundreds (thousands?) of object-concepts, each of these being a verbal (or other symbolic) representation of 
a person, institution, policy, place, event, value standard, or other ‘thing’ which, when psychologically encountered, 
elicits some fairly stable magnitude of either positive or negative evaluative affect…” (Rosenberg, 1968: 79-80.) 
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(i.e., more egalitarian perspective, stronger focus on unfair elements, dissatisfaction with one’s 
current economic situation, etc.).  Two variables that are not in the five-point scale, one’s 
subjective social position and subjective class identity, are recoded to fit the scale.  The response 
pattern exhibited by respondents in Latent Class 1 (egalitarianism) shows relatively critical 
attitudes toward unequal conditions and one’s socioeconomic position in society.  People in this 
category tend to express more critical opinions about casual factors of wealth, the level of 
inequality, government’s responsibility, tax policies, and so on.  They are also less satisfied with 
the level of their pay and their socioeconomic positions.  Respondents of Latent Class 2 (non-
egalitarianism), in contrast, hold relatively less critical attitudes on those issues.  
There is one item whose pattern seems to deviate from the attitudinal division between 
two latent classes: opinion about the importance of hard work to get ahead.  While respondents 
in Latent Class 1 tend to show more critical opinions about various distributive justice issues 
than people in Latent Class 2 do, they are significantly more likely to think hard work is 
important.  This pattern contradicts the common understanding that connects emphasis on hard 
work with merit-based ideology that justifies the system of inequality.  It shows, at least in 
China, that a stronger belief in hard work is ironically associated with critical attitudes toward 
the status quo and unequal system.  In other words, people emphasize hard work because it is 
important for overcoming the barrier of inequality and inequity rather than because it is the 
legitimate source of inequality.  This mentality can be thought of as pragmatic belief in 
individual merit rather than ideological belief. 
However, despite these differences between the two groups, the overall size of attitudinal 
differences is not very impressive and both groups tend to show substantively similar opinions. 
While the analysis based on LCA shows contents heterogeneity in people’s beliefs, it does not 
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take into account constraint heterogeneity, which is shown by RCA. Then how does the overall 
social contour of popular attitudes toward distributive justice look like when heterogeneity in 
contents and constraints are considered together?   
 
Table 2.2 Six Classes Identified by Relational Class Analysis and Latent Class Analysis  
 
LCA 
Non-Egalitarianism 
LCA 
Egalitarianism 
Total 
RCA Group 1 
573 
(27.63%) 
635 
(30.62%) 
1,208 
RCA Group 2 
307 
(14.80%) 
168 
(8.10%) 
475 
RCA Group 3 
242 
(11.67%) 
149 
(7.18%) 
391 
Total 1,122 952 2,074 
 
       Note: Percentages in parentheses indicate the relative size to the total number of cases 
 
 
 Table 2.2 shows six different kinds of beliefs and attitudinal styles structured among 
Chinese citizens, identified by RCA and LCA.  Values, in parentheses, show the size of each 
cell’s frequency as a percentage of the total sample.  There are a few notable patterns in this 
table.  First, as already shown in Figure 2.2, all RCA groups are divided into two groups that 
show different levels of egalitarian attitudes. It means that even individuals in the group with low 
constraint and high dimensionality (RCA Group 1) can be roughly divided into two same groups. 
Second, the size of population who has relatively well-organized, coherent, and critical views on 
distributive justice in Chinese society (RCA Group 3 & LCA-egalitarianism), who are likely the 
most discontent, ideological individuals in the population regarding distributive justice, is 
relatively small (7.18 %), even smaller than their non-egalitarian counterparts (11.67%).  
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Figure 2.4 Variable Means by Two Latent Classes in RCA Group 3 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, because even the correlational constraint of the RCA 
Group 3 is actually low by conventional standards (r = .177; S.D. = .099), the result suggests that 
the size of population with highly critical egalitarian attitudes and a high level of attitudinal 
constraint would be far smaller than 7%.  Even though deciding whether the size is small or large 
is essentially a judgment call, considering the strong political focus on the problem of inequality 
and the public’s discontent reported by the media, the pattern shows a somewhat unexpected 
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discrepancy between what is perceived as “public opinion” on inequality and the actual 
characteristics of people’s ideas on distributive justice in today’s China.   
Finally, what patterns would be revealed if we focus on the attitudes of individuals in 
RCA Group 3 only? Figure 2.4 shows the mean attitude scores by two LCA groups in RCA 
Group 3, namely, individuals who have relatively stronger and coherent belief system about 
distributive justice. The most notable pattern found in this result is that the overall attitudinal 
difference between the two LCA groups in RCA group 3 is only little larger than the difference 
between the two LCA groups in the total sample (Figure 2.3). Although RCA Group 3 is 
relatively the most “ideological” group, the actual overall attitudinal distance between the two 
ideological groups is not much greater than when we observed the whole sample. This finding is 
actually consistent with some past studies on the nature of public opinion polarization in popular 
politics in the United States, which show that opinion polarization based on issue correlation 
does not necessarily has to be induced by or does not always accompany radicalization of 
attitudes (see Hetherington 2009). The above figure shows that, also in China, stronger 
attitudinal constraint is not brought about or results in extreme ideological separation between 
polarized opinions on various issues on distributive justice. Therefore, when the average 
opinions are measured, individuals in RCA Group 3 do not show far more extreme preferences 
compared to individuals in other groups, although there is a slightly greater overall attitudinal 
distance between two LCA groups in RCA Group 3 than in other RCA groups. This result 
confirms the general findings discussed so far in this chapter: when we examine the structural 
characteristics of the association of distributive justice attitudes in China, it is hard to find critical 
evidence that shows the existence of large group of individuals who have highly critical and 
ideological attitudes toward various issues of distributive justice. In general, attitudinal constraint 
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is very low and even relatively ideological group of people do not show substantively more 
extreme preferences regarding the problem of distributive injustice.  
 
Conclusion 
This study seeks to advance our understanding on the patterns of popular attitudes toward 
distributive justice by employing two kinds of methods that reveal individual-level 
heterogeneity. Past studies that examined individuals’ different kinds of distributive justice ideas 
mainly looked at the relationship between individual-level variables (i.e., demographic 
background as explanatory variables) and a limited number of opinions or latent factors, which 
does not fully represent the multiple kinds of distributive justice beliefs and ideas among people.  
The same problem also applies to studies that use multidimensional scaling (MDS) or structural 
equation modeling.  In those types of approaches, it is hard to differentiate individuals with 
heterogeneous understanding on diverse issues of distributive justice or to show different 
subtypes of individuals with distinct attitudinal tendencies. 
To overcome such limitations, this study employs novel analytic strategy and methods to 
more concretely map individuals’ belief systems on distributive justice than previous studies.  It 
shows how individuals can be classified into different subgroups based on relational similarity 
and absolute similarity in attitudinal responses, which are respectively analyzed by relational 
class analysis and latent class analysis. This approach integrates the two separate lines of 
research agenda in past literature, which either investigate the contents of beliefs or the 
constraint of beliefs. The studies in the former is useful because it can show people’s general 
attitudinal and ideological preferences and orientations in society. On the other hand, the 
methodological approaches taken in the latter studies allow us to conduct a formal investigation 
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of the structural relations between beliefs and attitudes (Martin 2002; Baldassarri and Gelman 
2008). This study not only tried to take relative advantages of both approaches but also employed 
methods that can analyze individual-level heterogeneity in contents and constraint, so that the 
complex attitudinal landscape in Chinese society can be more fully explored.  
 Results from RCA show that the multidimensional aspect of distributive justice 
principles is salient for the majority of people, while it is significantly muted for other types of 
individuals, particularly those who hold well-organized and coherent beliefs about distributive 
justice.  Another notable pattern found from this result is that people with lower income and 
education are less likely to hold a coherent set of beliefs on distributive justice.  They tend to 
exhibit less ideological cognitive-attitudinal schemata, whereas people with higher income and 
education are more likely to have relatively coherent and well-organized belief structures. This 
study contributes to the existing literature that highlighted the multiplexity of distributive justice 
principles but neglected to show how such multidimensional structure exhibits different types of 
manifestation across individuals.  Overall, RCA shows that the majority of Chinese respondents 
in the survey does not exhibit strong attitudinal coherence. Even individuals who show relatively 
stronger attitudinal constraint and less attitudinal dimensionality show a low level of 
correlational constraint in their beliefs on average.  
Results from LCA suggest that respondents can be largely divided into two groups of 
egalitarians and non-egalitarians.  Each latent class explains the attitudinal pattern of roughly 
half of total respondents.  However, the overall attitudinal difference between the two groups is 
not very large, and they tend to agree and disagree with various issues on distributive justice. On 
other hand, when the result of relational class analysis is considered together, it is found that 
there is a large variation even within each latent class, in terms of individuals’ attitudinal 
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coherence and the level of multidimensionality in their attitudes; the absolute majority of 
egalitarians identified by latent class analysis actually belongs to the relational class that shows 
relatively weak attitudinal coherence. Moreover, individuals who are in the ideological group 
(RCA Group 3) do not show significantly more extreme attitudes toward distributive justice than 
those in other RCA groups, which suggests that the level of attitudinal “constraint” is not 
strongly associated with the level of attitudinal “radicalization.” 
Overall, the six classes identified jointly by RCA and LCA provides a more concrete 
mapping of popular attitudes toward distributive justice than previous studies and strongly 
suggest that the group with an egalitarian, coherent belief system would be very small in the total 
population.  The results demonstrate that there is a gap between the common perception of public 
opinion and the actual landscape of popular perception of distributive justice in Chinese society.   
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Chapter 3 
Psychosocial Dispositions and Attitudes towards Distributive Justice 
 
This study examines the mechanism of political-economic attitude formation by 
investigating the effect of individuals’ social psychological dispositions on their attitudes 
towards economic inequality. The focus of this chapter is related to the motivation part in the 
AMR framework. While the previous chapter directly examined individuals’ distributive justice 
attitudes, this chapter looks at a different component in social cognition and studies how 
individuals’ motivational tendencies that are jointly shaped by individual-specific motivational 
substructure and cultural and situational forces affect their opinions toward economic 
redistribution.  
As explained in the first chapter, by motivation, I refer to an underlying motivational 
substructure as a fundamental motivation and to the general unconscious tendencies in the 
human mind that seeks cognitive and epistemic certainty, feeling of control, existential security, 
and belonging, and also other fundamental motives regarding morality and justice (Haidt 2007; 
Lerner 2003). In social and personality psychology, these motivations are often studied by taking 
an “individual difference” approach, which looks at more or less stable individual-level 
differences in personality, traits, or dispositions. Such an approach often draws criticisms from 
situationalist or sociological perspectives, which deny the existence of general traits or 
dispositions and contend that individual difference is due to situational or contextual forces.  
Regarding such perspectives, I view that their criticisms are understandable but not valid 
and they misunderstand the nature of personality traits or psychological dispositions. Personality, 
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traits, and dispositions should be understand as cognitive-affective information processing 
system, which is basically a network of a myriad cognitive and affective units in our mental 
system, developed as psychological and behavioral adaptive strategies to solve problems. If we 
take this kind of view, it becomes more or less clear that most debates regarding whether 
dispositions exist or not is unnecessary and misguided. Because the cognitive-affective 
information processing has to be organized as a structured system in order to be an efficient 
network of interconnections between mental units, it is obvious that the chronic parameters of 
the system will show some degree of stability, and when combined with different levels of basic 
individual-specific needs and desires (for example, see Fiske 2004), it will result in individual 
difference. On the other hand, there is little ambiguity that such a system would be heavily 
influenced by the effects of socialization, experiences, cultural contexts, frames, culturally 
shared schemata, situational cues, and meanings attached to informational input, so the 
information processing system is always malleable and subject to change.18 Although there are 
some issues of debate and controversy, this kind of integrative model that embraces both 
situations and dispositions as fundamental factors that jointly construct personality, traits, and 
dispositions have increasingly become a standard view in various fields in psychology (Powell, 
Royce ,and Voorhees 1982; Mischel and Shoda 1995, 1998; Cervone and Shoda 1999; Rusting 
1998; Higgins 1999; Anderson and Bushman 2002; Borkenau and Mauer 2007; Wilkowski and 
Robinson 2008; Krohne and Hock 2011). Therefore, rather than simply rejecting the idea of 
latent traits or dispositions, sociologists can use the pragmatist idea of “cognitive-affective 
habits” (Gross 2009), or the concept of “psychosocial dispositions” that will be proposed by this 
chapter, to understand the basic nature of dispositions and traits and examine motivational 
                                                             
18 For example, in clinical psychology, a number of studies have developed methods to assess and change 
individuals’ information processing tendencies (see Baumert and Schmitt 2012:87). 
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differences between individuals, without having to engage with the unnecessary dispositions-
situation debate.  
Among a large number of basic human motivational tendencies, this chapter will focus on 
two kinds of dispositions stemming from cognitive-existential motives that have been studied as 
important sources of conservative ideological orientations in social psychological studies: 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Existing sociological scholarship on people’s 
opinions about political and economic issues has focused on individuals’ objective conditions, 
such as income, class positions, and occupations (Hansenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Svallfors 1997; 
Edlund 1999), subjective experiences such as relative deprivation and social mobility (Wegener 
1991; Markovsky 1985; Smyth, Mishra, and Qian 2010), or macro-level values or ideology in 
society (Shepelak and Alwin 1986; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; 
Feldman and Zaller 1992). In this vast array of literature, however, social psychological 
mechanisms have received relatively little attention and are underspecified in sociology, 
especially with regard to how they are manifested in the interaction between macro-level 
conditions and micro-level psychological processes. The relative paucity of such work is critical, 
especially since past studies often failed to provide a successful account for why individuals of 
lower socioeconomic status sometimes express more conservative and tolerant attitudes with 
regards to a variety of issues concerning inequality and distributive justice (Kelly and Enns 
2010). This study argues that our understanding of popular political-economic attitudes can be 
advanced by taking into account the social psychological determinants of attitudes, to which 
sociologists have paid limited attention in past literature, and demonstrates how such a 
psychological process is embedded in structured, institutional conditions produced by historical 
trajectories and contingencies (Fishman and Lizardo 2013).  
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 Based on empirical analysis that employs two nationally representative Chinese social 
surveys, this chapter demonstrates that individuals’ social psychological dispositions concerning 
group-based inequality (i.e., authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) affect their 
attitudes toward economic redistribution. This study shows that regional educational inequality, 
largely created and institutionalized by China’s extensive state intervention, produced different 
patterns of individual psychosocial dispositions in urban and rural areas; the consequence of this 
was more acquiescent and tolerant opinions about inequality in socioeconomically disadvantaged 
areas. This analysis reveals a hidden mechanism that past sociological studies have largely 
neglected to investigate in studying popular attitudes toward economic inequality and 
redistribution and tackles the seeming paradox of the acceptance of social inequalities by 
disadvantaged actors. It shows that such attitudes are shaped by a complex social process that 
involves institutionalized regional-educational inequality, socio-cultural views and frames 
concerning social hierarchy, and psychological dispositions.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, I will introduce two social psychological 
dispositions, namely authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, and discuss their 
characteristics and relationship with education. Second, the characteristics of Chinese 
educational inequality will be discussed, and hypotheses about their effects on psychosocial 
dispositions will be introduced. Third, I will review current scholarship on Chinese citizens’ 
attitudes towards inequality and paradoxical patterns revealed in public opinion. Then, in the 
empirical analysis, I will examine the effect of psychosocial dispositions on popular attitudes 
toward redistribution, and how the urban-rural gap in overall educational level plays a role in 
determining the social outcome of such an effect. Individual-level determinants of 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation will also be examined. Based on the analysis, 
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this study shows how micro- and macro-level forces powerfully condition individuals’ attitudes 
toward economic inequality.  
 
Psychosocial Dispositions and Attitudes towards Inequality  
One of the most widely accepted explanations of the source of people’s attitudes toward 
economic inequality is the theory based on the simple motivation model of self-interest and 
economic utility (e.g., the median voter theorem). Despite the intuitive appeal of such theories, 
they are exposed to a number of criticisms. The most prominent problem with the theory is that it 
cannot explain why people in socioeconomically disadvantaged positions often show stronger 
endorsement of the status quo and demonstrate conservative attitudes. Previous sociological 
studies that found that such paradoxical attitudinal patterns emphasized the role of the dominant 
ideology and values in society (Kluegel and Smith 1986). However, this kind of explanation 
based on a top-down framework has only limited explanatory power for the within-country 
variation in people’s acceptance of inequality.  
In trying to solve this puzzle, social and political psychological studies have shown that 
there are also bottom-up processes that drive attitude formation, especially through psychological 
tendencies concerning social hierarchy and intergroup bias. The collective body of such studies 
strongly suggests that individuals’ social, political, and economic attitudes are shaped by various 
underlying cognitive and motivational factors, including social dominance orientation (Pratto et 
al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 2001), authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996; Stenner 2005), moral 
intuitions (Haidt 2007), worldview based on unconscious family models (Lakoff 1996), in-group 
bias in inter-group relations (see Levin et al. 2002), and motivated social cognition and system 
justification (Jost et al. 2003; Jost and Banaji 1994). One common theme across these findings is 
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the importance of stylized psychological orientations, which shape how individuals understand 
and evaluate the social world, especially regarding the hierarchical organization of society, 
groups, and individuals. Such orientations tend to assign greater value to one group or one type 
of individual over another or to a whole group (e.g., family, organization, society, or nation) over 
individuals.  
 
Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Psychosocial Dispositions 
Of theories introduced above, the present study focuses on authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation. The two have been studied in social and political psychological studies 
for a long time and often regarded as the best constructs that measure distinct dimensions in 
ideological attitudes concerning conservatism versus liberalism, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, 
tough versus tender, and so on. (Duckitt and Sibley 2009:98). 
Authoritarianism refers to a psychological need to minimize difference and promote 
uniformity and social order with a disposition towards intolerance, particularly with regards to 
political, racial, cultural, and moral issues (Stenner 2005)19. A strong authoritarian disposition 
leads to a preference for a strict social order and a tendency to see the world through a 
black/white schema.  Those who score high on authoritarianism feel considerable threats from 
groups such as immigrants, other races/ethnicities, or sexual minorities, and they show strong 
hawkish attitudes toward foreign policy and the resolution of conflict (Hetherington and Weiler 
2009). Authoritarian orientation also consists of such aspects as conventionalism and 
                                                             
19 Authoritarianism is a relatively old concept in psychology first proposed by Adorno’s measure of California F-
scale (Adorno et al. 1950), but there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept thanks to Altemeyer’s Right-
Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; Mirels and Dean 2006), which is based on more 
specific attitudinal clusters than the original measure. 
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authoritarian submission,20 which are closely related to conservative ideological beliefs and 
attitudes.  Although authoritarianism is generally related to cultural conservatism, there are a few 
reasons why we can expect that it is significantly associated with economic conservatism such as 
opinions about the state’s responsibility for economic redistribution which is the key dependent 
variable in this chapter. First, because authoritarianism captures tendency to justify the 
established order and status quo, individuals with a higher level of authoritarianism are less 
likely to think that the state needs to take an action to correct itself. Second, authoritarians show 
the attitudinal tendency of “tough-mindedness” (Eysenck 1954; Rokeach 1960; or “lack of love” 
according to Lipset [1959]), which produces a weaker inclination to care for the poor. Therefore, 
although authoritarianism does not contain ideas that are directly associated with laissez-faire 
economics, it tends to show positive association with anti-egalitarian attitudes toward economic 
issues.  
The idea of social dominance orientation is based on social dominance theory (SDT), 
which posits that individuals’ preference or taste for inequality can be explained by their social 
dominance orientation (SDO), a “generalized orientation towards and desire for unequal and 
dominant/subordinate relations among salient social groups, regardless of whether this implies 
ingroup domination or subordination” (Pratto et al. 2006). Individuals with high SDO tend to 
agree with and desire for an unequal system marked by group-based social inequality, which is 
ordered along a superior-inferior dimension, and they support social and economic policies that 
create and maintain inequality. This psychological disposition extends to a variety of group-
                                                             
20 Conventionalism indicates “a high degree of adherence to the social conventions perceived to be endorsed by 
society and its established authorities,” and authoritarian submission refers to “a high degree of submission to the 
authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives” (Altemeyer 1996: 
6). 
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based forms of discrimination and prejudice and political views. One important function of SDO 
is to produce “legitimizing myths” that view inequality and hierarchy as fair and moral.21 
One important difference between authoritarianism and SDO regarding their motivational 
tendencies discussed in past literature is that the two dispositions stem from slightly different 
motivations and underlying worldviews. Duckitt’s dual-process motivational (DPM) model 
(2001) explains that authoritarianism is correlated with the view that the social world is 
dangerous and threatening and with an ideology that values conformity, security, traditionalism, 
order, and structure. On the other hand, DPM proposes that SDO is based on the insights of 
Social Darwinism and Machiavellianism, which value power, dominance, and achievement and 
see the world as a competitive jungle (see Duckitt and Sibley 2009). 
Even though the effects of authoritarianism and SDO have been studied widely in 
research on intergroup biases and ideological orientations, several criticisms of the two theories 
have also been made. One of the more frequent criticisms is that the two concepts are based on 
psychological or biological reductionism, ignoring the vast influence of situational and 
contextual factors (e.g. Schmitt, Branscombe, Kappen 2003). Another criticism is that studies on 
authoritarianism and SDO assume the existence of certain personality dispositions, which many 
not actually exist, to categorize people and fit them into a nominalist typology (Martin 2001). 
                                                             
21 Authoritarianism and SDO share important ideas such as tough-mindedness (Eysenck 1954) and a preference for 
inequality and hierarchy, and both tend to be linked with conservative ideas (Pratto et al. 1994; Whitely 1999; Van 
Hiel and Mervielde 2002); nevertheless, past theoretical and empirical studies have pointed out their differences. 
One major difference has to do with the social domains in which each is more relevant. Strong authoritarians believe 
that members of a group should be submissive to order and authoritative figures; this is essentially about intra-group 
inequality. On the other hand, people of high-SDO desire to create and maintain unequal relations between groups, 
which corresponds to inter-group inequality. And although both dispositions show an affinity for conservative 
values, the authoritarian orientation, which desires sameness and submission as the basis of moral order, essentially 
pertains to socio-cultural conservatism, while SDO is more strongly connected with economic conservatism (Duriez 
and Van Hiel 2002). Some studies contend that authoritarianism and SDO are based on different motivational bases 
(Duckitt and Sibley 2009) 
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The two criticisms are commonly regarded as criticisms against the limitations of the “individual 
difference” perspective (Hollander and Howard 2000). In response to these criticisms, several 
counter-arguments have been made that basically contend that the criticisms are based on several 
misconstruals (Sidanius et al. 2004; Sidanius and Pratto 2003). The counter-arguments say that 
the original theory that proposed authoritarianism and SDO actually took the effects of 
situational and institutional factors seriously by recognizing such factors as indispensable in the 
formation of the psychological dispositions.  
In sociological literature, a more interesting perspective was presented by Perrin (2005), 
who treated authoritarianism (and anti-authoritarianism) as a political-cultural frame and 
repertoire. This idea follows cultural sociological views that regard schemata, repertoire, and 
scripts as the key elements of culture (Alexander and Smith 1993; Sewell 1992; DiMaggio 
1997). In contrast to the context-free and sanitized version of authoritarianism in the bulk of 
psychological studies, Perrin proposes an approach that views authoritarianism and anti-
authoritarianism as “elements of Americans’ political-cultural repertoire” (2005: 169). Perrin’s 
approach, however, also entails an unresolved question of whether authoritarianism is essentially 
an individual trait or a cultural repertoire.  
Extending the insights of Perrin, this study defines authoritarianism and SDO more 
specifically as psychosocial dispositions22, which are produced by the interaction between 
individual motivation and political-cultural frames and repertoires. This perspective is consistent 
with the view that regards personality, traits, and dispositions as cognitive-affective information 
                                                             
22 The term “psychosocial” is taken from Erikson’s developmental psychology, which studied the stages of 
personality development and examined how socialization process and experiences shape the characteristics of 
children’s sense of self. Here I do not use the term in Erikson’s sense, but use it to indicate that the dispositions this 
study is examining are the joint products of the style of individual-specific needs/desires and social/cultural forces, 
which produce individuals’ distinct styles of perception of the social world. 
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processing system, which reconciles different perspectives on personality traits, as introduced in 
the beginning of this chapter. The motivation aspect in psychosocial dispositions can be 
explained by the theory of Jost et al.’s influential paper (2003), which uses a “motivated social 
cognition” perspective to theorize the effects of motivation on cognition. According to this 
perspective, authoritarianism and SDO as conservative ideological orientations are adopted to 
satisfy individuals’ existential and epistemological motives, such as “needs for order, structure, 
and the avoidance of uncertainty and threat” (p. 341). Integrating the insight of motivated social 
cognition and Perrin’s political-cultural approach, this study argues that authoritarianism and 
SDO are affected by individuals’ underlying existential and cognitive motives (bottom-up 
process) and, at the same time, also shaped and expressed under the influence of social, cultural, 
and political frames and repertoires (top-down process) (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). The 
expression of psychological traits relies on, and is inseparable from, individuals’ lay theories 
about the world, social values, and discourse, all of which stem from culturally available 
schemata (Heaven et al. 2006; Furnham 1988). For example, expressing support for the 
authoritarian government in China, right-wing extremism based on nationalism and racism in 
many societies, and the justification of hierarchical order based on age or gender are neither 
simple outcomes of individual traits nor purely socio-cultural repertoires without any 
psychological basis: each must intersect with one another through the enmeshing of bottom-up 
and top-down processes. In sum, my study regards authoritarianism and SDO as products of 
individuals’ existential and epistemological motives concerning group hierarchy (Kruglanski 
1990, 1999; Jost et al. 2003; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) that are 
embedded in locally prescribed political-cultural schema about the hierarchical and unequal 
organization of society.  
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Educational Inequality and Its Effect on Psychosocial Dispositions 
While social psychological studies largely agree that cultural contexts and psychological traits 
interact with each other, the role of formal institutions in that process is understudied. I examine 
how state policies that distribute economic and social resources unequally across different areas 
can have a strong ripple effect on the social psychological contours of popular attitudes toward 
inequality, focusing on the empirical case of Chinese society.  
One of the most striking aspects of the educational environment in China is its prominent 
regional, particularly urban-rural, gap. Despite the government’s efforts to expand educational 
opportunities under recent leadership (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao), education in rural areas in 
China has enjoyed fewer opportunities and resources than in urban areas in almost every aspect. 
The national survey used in this study shows that the average number of years of education of 
rural hukou (household registration) holders is 5.76, and about 56% of the rural population has 
the educational attainment of primary school or below, whereas the average education of urban 
hukou holders is 10.63 years.23 The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) conducted in 2008, 
which surveyed a much larger sample, also reveals a huge educational gap between rural and 
urban populations (Table 3.1).24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23 The average age difference between the two groups is 2.98, so age cannot be considered a critical factor in that 
difference. (The range of age is 18-98.) 
 
24 The primary reason for this educational gap is that education is, along with medical expenses, one of the biggest 
financial burdens for many rural households. Another important reason why many rural students do not continue 
their studies is because the schoolwork is not very relevant for their future prospects (Institute of Rural Education 
2009). The fact that many children in rural areas do not live with their parents who work as migrant workers in 
urban areas also contributes to this inequality.  
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Table 3.1 Educational Attainment by Hukou Status  
Educational 
Attainment 
Rural (%) Urban (%) 
Rural-
Urban 
Difference 
Primary or below 53.9 16.8 37.1 
Junior high 32.7 27.3 5.4 
Senior high 11.0 30.8 –19.8 
College or above 2.5 25.0 –22.5 
Total 100% 100%  
N 2,570 3,350  
Data: China General Social Survey 2008 (N = 5,920) 
 
The significance of the urban and rural gap in overall educational inequality is found in 
Qian and Smyth’s study (2007), which shows that the major source of educational inequality is 
the educational gap between urban and rural areas rather than between coastal and inland areas. 
Again, this significant educational inequality between rural and urban areas is to large extent due 
to state policies that favored urban and coastal areas during the socialist period under Mao and 
the post-reform period, especially during the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s eras.  
This stark difference in educational opportunity has an important political implication for 
attitudinal differences, as past studies point out the powerful effect of education on individuals’ 
ideological orientation (Lipset 1959; Kohn and Schooler, 1969; Achterberg and Houtman 2009). 
Based on the pattern revealed in Table 3.1, I posit that institutionalized regional-educational 
inequality produced differences in psychosocial dispositions between rural and urban China, 
which consequently affected the geographical distribution of attitudes toward income 
redistribution.  
More specifically, I examine the following propositions. First, I suggest that the level of 
authoritarianism is higher in rural areas in China. A number of past empirical studies have 
confirmed that authoritarianism has a negative association with the level of education 
(McFarland 1999; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Achterberg and Houtman 2009). The association 
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between education and authoritarianism is usually attributed to the fact that educational 
attainment increases individuals’ cognitive capacity or breadth of perspective such that they can 
question authoritarian values, and enhances one’s critical attitudes toward blind submission to 
authority and unjustified hierarchical systems (Stenner 2005). As the average educational 
attainment is much lower in rural areas, the general authoritarian disposition would accordingly 
be stronger in rural areas. Consequently, we can observe a weaker preference for economic 
redistribution by the state in rural areas, where the average level of authoritarianism is higher 
than urban areas. The same reasoning is also applied to the case of SDO. The definition and 
theory of SDO tells us that higher SDO is associated with more accepting views about inequality, 
because stronger SDO means desire for group-based dominance, which legitimizes the unequal 
conditions or relationships between groups. Individuals with high SDO, regardless of one’s 
group membership, are more likely to show general preference and tolerance for anti-egalitarian 
system, inequality, and hierarchical organization of community or society.  
Studies on the relationship between education and SDO produced mixed results. Some of 
the previous studies have found that SDO is not significantly related to the level of education 
(McFarland and Adelson 1996; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002), while other studies confirm that 
increasing educational exposure decreases the expression of SDO (Sidanius, Sinclair and Pratto 
2006; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1994, 1996). This study accepts the findings of the latter studies 
and hypothesizes that the lower level of educational attainment in rural areas increases SDO, 
which leads to relatively conservative attitudes toward redistributive social policies.  
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Figure 3.1 Proposed Causal Linkage between Macro and Micro Factors Influencing 
Popular Attitudes toward Economic Redistribution 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the chain of influence my study attempts to uncover. In sum, the 
proposed mechanism is that the relatively lower educational attainment in rural areas, caused by 
macro-institutional factors, strengthens psychosocial dispositions of authoritarianism and SDO, 
both of which have a close affinity with conservative ideology. This mechanism will be tested in 
the empirical analysis using structural equation models.  
 
Paradoxical Patterns of Attitudes toward Economic Redistribution in China 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the large part of income inequality in China comes 
from rural-urban income inequality. Such regional inequality in China has their origins in state-
imposed institutions, such as the urban-biased policies beginning in the Mao era (Whyte 1996) 
and the economic developmental strategies, heavily favoring coastal areas, of the reform era. The 
impact of these policies has been amplified by the household registration system (hukou system), 
which resulted in the reinforcement and fortification of this inequality since the 1950s. The 
hukou system restricts the spatial mobility of the population based on a person’s hukou status 
(i.e., rural or urban), which causes rural residents to face substantial obstacles if they want to 
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move to urban areas. The great wall that the hukou system creates, dividing urban and rural areas 
and exacerbating regional inequality, is often regarded as a Chinese version of “apartheid” (Chan 
and Buckingham 2008). This institutional barrier affects a huge population because a large part 
of China is still deeply rural: about half of the total population still lives in rural areas (50.3% at 
the end of 2010). These conditions have resulted in the multiplication of rural and urban 
inequality in living standards, social mobility, and opportunity.  
Despite the stark urban-rural disparity in Chinese society, recent studies have found that 
rural residents do not exhibit more negative attitudes than their urban counterparts in many 
realms of distributive justice, such as perception of current inequalities, opinions about equality 
and inequality, and views about individual and social opportunities. Moreover, rural residents 
often express relatively positive and accepting attitudes toward such issues (Whyte 2010; Han 
2009, 2012). Figure 3.2, based on China Inequality and Distributive Justice Survey 2009 (to be 
explained later), shows an example of the puzzling patterns that reveals the discrepancy between 
actual income distribution and attitudes toward inequality and redistribution. 
The figure shows a pattern that departs from expectations, which predict that rural 
residents would have significantly more critical opinions on distributive justice than urban 
residents. The population with the lowest income, i.e., rural farmers, has the highest acceptance 
of increased inequality for the sake of national prosperity. This kind of pattern can be found in 
other survey items as well: rural farmers show equally or less critical, and often significantly 
more positive and accepting, attitudes toward various distributive justice issues, such as the 
appropriate level of inequality and redistributive polices (see Whyte 2010). The finding that 
lower socioeconomic groups express a similar or even greater acceptance of inequality poses a 
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challenge to existing theories of determinants of attitudes toward inequality. For example, 
rational actor-based models of policy preferences (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and theories that  
 
Figure 3.2 Average Household Income Distribution and Distributive Justice Attitudes by 
Rural/Urban Occupation Groups 
emphasize the effects of class and occupation on attitudes and opinions (Svallfors 1997; Manza 
and Brooks 2003) all seem to neglect a hidden mechanism of attitude formation, since they do 
not adequately explain the patterns revealed in the Chinese case. The following empirical 
analyses will tackle this puzzling attitudinal pattern. 
 
Data and Research Strategy  
For empirical analysis, I make use of structural equation modeling to test the model 
presented in Figure 3.1. The analysis employs two nationally representative Chinese social 
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surveys. One data set is the second-wave data of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS 2008). The 
survey is supported by the Institute of Political Science in Academia Sinica and the Institute for 
Advanced Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University. ABS 
has conducted two waves of surveys across thirteen East Asian and five South Asian societies, 
and the survey covers various kinds of public opinion and attitudes about political and social 
values, democracy, and governance.  My study uses Chinese cases in the survey, a nationally 
representative sample gathered through stratified multistage area sampling with probability 
proportional to size (PPS) measures (except for Tibet Autonomous Region) and face-to-face 
interviews of voting age adults (18 years old and above) under the direction of the Research 
Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. The interviews were conducted between 
December 2007 and June 2008, followed by a supplementary make-up survey in December 
2008. With a completion rate of 72.6%, the interviews produced 5,098 successful samples in 
total. (Contact the author for more technical details of the survey.) This survey is useful because 
it contains items that reflect respondents’ authoritarian orientation. The following list shows the 
items used to construct an authoritarianism scale (Cronbach’s alpha: .70). 
o Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. (A-1) 
o Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher. (A-2) 
o The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in 
society. (A-3) 
o When a country is facing a difficult situation, it is OK for the government to disregard the 
law in order to deal with the situation. (A-4) 
o If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. 
(A-5) 
o You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right. (A-6) 
o A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him. (A-7) 
o If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic. (A-8) 
 
These questions are useful and appropriate items for creating an authoritarianism scale as 
a latent variable since they all deal with the question of submission to in-groups and authority 
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and support for strong leadership with uncompromising power, all of which are the core 
attributes of authoritarianism (Whitley 1999). Specifically, these items reflect the key ideas of 
authoritarianism presented in past literature: (i) childrearing values form the most important 
ideas that reflect an authoritarian disposition (A-1); (ii) authoritarians tend to think that 
established authorities are generally right about things (A-2, A-3) and are more inclined to think 
political leaders are worthy (A-3, A-5, A-6); (iii) authoritarians show greater intolerance towards 
threatening societal conditions (A-4); and (iv) authoritarians favor enhancing sameness and 
minimizing difference (A-3, A-7, A-8) (Stenner 2005). Overall, these items capture the 
submissive and obedient aspects of authoritarianism (i.e., conventionalism and authoritarian 
submission) rather than authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer 1996).    
To examine the relationship between authoritarianism and economic conservatism, the 
latent authoritarianism variable predicts the following 4-point scale question in the survey: “In 
order to preserve social justice, the government should prevent the gap between rich and poor 
from growing any larger” (1: strongly disagree – 4: strongly agree).7    
The second dataset is the China Inequality and Distributive Justice Survey (2009), a high-
quality, nationally representative survey based on a spatial probability sampling method, 
constructed through joint efforts by several institutions in the US and China.8 The spatial 
probability sampling method used such information as local population estimates, maps, 
geographic information system (GIS), and global positioning system (GPS) devices to identify 
and interview 2,967 nationally representative adults between 18 and 70 with a response rate of 
about 70%. For more information about the technical details of the spatial sampling method, see 
Landry and Shen (2005). The analysis utilizes survey questions that reflect psychosocial 
dispositions of SDO (Cronbach’s alpha: .72). It should be noted that my construct is a context-
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specific SDO because the survey items employed in the analysis reference specific groups, 
compared to the usual SDO constructs. 
o Men are more suited to leadership responsibilities than are women. (SDO-1)  
o Where there are fewer jobs, men should work and women stay at home. (SDO-2) 
o It is fair for people who hold power to receive somewhat privileged treatment. (SDO-3)  
o It is fair that people with household registrations in the city have more opportunities than 
those with household registrations in the countryside. (SDO-4) 
o It is fair that rural migrants are not easily permitted to obtain household registration in the 
city. (SDO-5) 
o It is fair that rural migrants are not allowed to obtain urban welfare benefits. (SDO-6) 
o City dwellers’ standard of living is higher because they have made greater contributions 
to national development (SDO-7) 
o Country and city people should have equal rights to employment. (SDO-8) 
o For the prosperity of the country, there must be big gaps in income. (SDO-9) 
o The state must work to reduce income inequality. (SDO-10) 
o The state should ensure a minimum living standard for all. (SDO-11) 
 
Again, the survey items used here show close similarities with diverse SDO scale items 
used in past studies. Such items include gender-specific SDO questions (SDO-1, SDO-2), “Some 
people are just more worthy than others” (SDO-3, SDO-7), “It’s OK if some groups have more 
of a chance in life than others,” “Inferior groups should stay in their place,” “Sometimes other 
groups must be kept in their place,” “We should do what we can to equalize conditions for 
different groups” (SDO-4, SDO-5, SOD-6, SDO-8), and “We should strive to make incomes as 
equal as possible” (SDO-9, SDO-10, SDO-11). One difference from the authoritarianism model 
is that the items concerning economic inequality and redistribution policy (SDO-9, SDO-10, 
SDO-11) are not separated out as outcome variables, but included as manifest variables that 
construct the latent SDO, since the desire for inequality between different social groups is a 
fundamental element that constitutes SDO (Pratto et al. 1994; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Duriez 
and Hiel 2002; Ho et al. 2012). Taking out the three variables as “egalitarianism-SDO” produced 
a significantly worse overall model fit than using all eleven items together to construct a single 
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latent SDO, and thus the items are not subdivided into separate group-specific SDOs when 
estimating the structural equation model. In sum, the analysis will investigate the effect of 
education on SDO and whether latent SDO is statistically significantly manifested in observed 
variables pertaining to opinions about economic redistribution.  
It is important to note that the survey questions selected for both analyses constitute a 
China-specific and group-specific version of SDO scale items used in psychological studies, 
which are generally abstract and context-free (e.g., “It would be good if groups could be equal”). 
The context-free aspect of the psychological scales have often attracted criticism from the 
situationalist perspective, which holds that situational factors outweigh the significance, if any, 
of latent psychological dispositions, such that the latter is not a meaningful determinant of 
people’s attitudes and behaviors in most situations. With regards to my earlier discussion of 
psychosocial traits as political-cultural schemata, the novel approach taken by the present study 
has an advantage over other versions of SDO constructs because it captures the psychosocial 
disposition as a political-cultural idea and frame attached to concrete, context-dependent, and 
case-specific examples. The two social surveys employed for analysis have another important 
merit in that they are based on nationally representative samples, providing more useful 
information regarding the relationship between psychological dispositions and demographic 
variables.  
 
Results 
To test the proposed mechanism of my argument, I employed a structural equation modeling 
technique, which can detect the chain of influence from macro-regional background to 
individuals’ attitudes toward redistributive social policies. The analysis presented in Figure 3.3 
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shows the results estimated by structural equation models, which demonstrate the nexus of 
relationships that flow from macro-structural conditions (urban-rural disparity), to individual-
level status (educational attainment), to psychosocial dispositions (authoritarianism/SDO), and 
finally to political and economic opinions (the government’s responsibility for redistribution). 
For simplicity, the figure does not display individual path coefficients of control variables in the 
model; the effect of control variables and their statistical significance will be presented and 
closely examined later (Table 3.2 and 3.3). 
The top figure shows the effect of region (urban/rural) on educational attainment, the 
effect of education on the level of authoritarianism, and finally the influence of authoritarianism 
on attitudes toward the responsibility of the government to reduce the income gap. Because 
individuals’ attitudes toward inequality and the role of the government are measured by a single 
indicator, it is very likely that the variable does not perfectly measure individuals’ latent 
attitudes, which is often a problem when a single variable is used to predict a latent construct. In 
order to solve this problem, I created a reliability-corrected single-indicator latent construct for 
the variable (Hayduk 1987). This correction did not substantively change the results. The model 
shows that rural residence tends to significantly decrease the level of education (β = –.40, p 
< .001), and a lower level of education is significantly associated with a higher level of 
authoritarianism (β = –.15, p < .001). Finally, the authoritarianism scale shows a significant, 
negative relationship with attitudes toward the role of government in preventing income gaps 
from widening (β = –.14, p < .001).  
The bottom figure shows the case of SDO. Similarly, it shows the significant negative 
effect of region (rural) on education (β = –.49, p < .001), which increases the strength of latent 
SDO (β = –.18, p < .001), manifested in economic SDO items regarding economic inequality  
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(a) Authoritarianism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: RMSEA: .035, CFI: .936, Chi2/df: 347.55/88 
Data: Asian Barometer Survey (2008), N = 2,368 
(b) Social Dominance Orientation 
 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: RMSEA: .045, CFI: .935, Chi2/df: 773.85/121 
Data: China Inequality and Distributive Justice Survey (2009), N = 2,639 
Figure 3.3 Test of the Models of the Relationship between Region, Education, Psychological 
Dispositions, and Opinion about Redistribution (Standardized Coefficients) 
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(SDO-9: β = .41, p < .001; SDO-10: β = .15, p < .001; SDO-11: β = .18, p < .001).  This result 
confirms the argument of this paper that the lower level of educational attainment in rural areas 
increases SDO, which leads to relatively conservative attitudes toward redistributive social 
policies.  
Although significant chi-squares are produced due to the large sample size of our 
datasets, both models show good model fits in terms of alternative fit statistics, such as RMSEA 
and CFI (Hu and Bentler 1995). 
Overall, both models show that rural residents have lower levels of educational 
attainment and, consistent with this study’s hypothesis, that education has a negative relationship 
with both psychosocial dispositions. The latent dispositions have negative associations with 
preference for redistribution, which shows that the conservative ideas underpinning the two 
psychosocial traits lead individuals to reduce their support for the government’s responsibility to 
reduce economic disparity. The results also show the important role played by a culturally-
ingrained social order that legitimizes hierarchical and categorically-differentiated relationships 
between parents and children, teachers and students, men and women, political leaders and 
ordinary people, and migrants and residents, all of which provide the cognitive-affective schemas 
and language for authoritarianism and SDO. The psychosocial dispositions are also manifested in 
the attitudes toward hukou-based discrimination, whose pattern comes from the social 
institutional environment of Chinese society. 
In sum, the analysis reveals how political-economic attitudes can be produced by the 
chain of influence flowing from macro-level conditions to psycho-cultural ideas and motivations 
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concerning social hierarchy, accounting for social psychological processes through which 
acquiescent opinions about inequality in rural areas are produced25.  
In the following, I will focus on the effect of other socioeconomic variables included in 
the SEM models and examine the relationships between individuals’ socioeconomic 
characteristics and psychosocial dispositions. To more clearly demonstrate the mediating role of 
education, I will present and compare the results of multiple SEM models that include slightly 
different sets of covariates. 
Table 3.2 Structural Equation Model Estimates of Paths from 
Socioeconomic Variables to Authoritarian Attitudes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Age .274*** .188*** .167*** 
 (.023) (.027) (.027) 
Gender (Female) .059* .027 .022 
 (.024) (.025) (.024) 
Marital Status (Married) .069** .064* .045 
 (.024) (.025) (.025) 
Subjective Social Status –.003 .028 .032 
 (.024) (.025) (.024) 
Region (Rural) .094*** .008 –.016 
 (.024) (.027) (.027) 
Years of Education  –.191*** –.146*** 
  (.029) (.030) 
Internet Use   –.160*** 
   (.027) 
     
Observations 2,437 2,368 2,368 
χ2/df 204.82/67 228.63/76 347.55/88 
RMSEA .029 .029 .035 
CFI .946 .956 .936 
Source: Asian Barometer Survey (2008) Chinese sample 
Notes: Standardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses.) 
***p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05. Two-tailed tests. (Two-tailed test) 
                                                             
25 It should be noted that, however, the net model does not reject that region (or rural residence) has a net effect on 
distributive justice attitudes. In supplementary analysis (not reported here), it is found that rural residence still has a 
significant effect on attitudes toward economic redistribution even when authoritarianism or SDO is controlled for, 
which is consistent with the findings in past studies (Whyte 2010). The effect size of rural residence variable and its 
statistical significance, however, decline when the psychological dispositions are controlled for.  
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Model 1 shows that older people, females, married people, and rural citizens express 
relatively stronger authoritarian attitudes than younger people, males, non-married people, and 
urban citizens. However, when the level of education is introduced in Model 2, the differences 
between urban and rural citizens and different genders become statistically non-significant. The 
non-significant coefficient of the region variable in Model 2 suggests that the rural-urban 
difference in authoritarian attitudes is attributable to the difference in educational level, rather 
than to traditional or hierarchical cultural values often associated with the image of rural life. 
Such a result does not mean that there is no difference in cultural values between the two 
regions, but the difference in attitudinal tendencies in the two areas is largely due to the effect of 
education rather than deeply instilled cultural and local value systems.  
One might argue that the significant effect of education is attributable to individuals’ 
access to information and political knowledge, often regarded as the basis of public opinion, and 
the urban and rural attitudinal differences depend on the extent to which people have access to 
information (e.g., different Internet penetration rates in each area). In order to control for the 
effect of information, Model 3 includes a variable “Internet Use,” which is coded as 1 if a 
respondent’s main source of news is Internet (rather than television, radio, personal contact, 
magazine, or other media). It shows that Internet use is highly significant (p < .001), confirming 
that increased exposure to (relatively unofficial) information can affect people’s perspectives on 
authoritarian submission and conventionalism. Including this variable in the model, however, 
does not substantively change the effect of education, which suggests that the effect of education 
on authoritarianism is not determined by the level of access to information.  
On the other hand, all models show that subjective social status does not have a 
significant net effect on authoritarianism, which is consistent with the claims that 
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authoritarianism is not driven by one’s economic position but by one’s cultural position 
(Achterberg and Houtman 2009), which correlates with educational level.  
 
Table 3.3 Structural Equation Model Estimates of Relationships between Socioeconomic 
Variables and Social Dominance Orientation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Age .084*** .045 .047 .044 
 (.024) (.025) (.026) (.025) 
Gender (Female) .070** .067** .068** .066** 
 (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
Marital Status (Married) .014 .011 .011 .012 
 (.024) (.024) (.024) (.023) 
Household Income –.154*** –.106*** –107*** –.096*** 
 (.025) (.027) (.027) (.027) 
Residence/Hukou (Rural) –.050* .016 .015 .010 
 (.025) (.027) (.028) (.028) 
Years of Education   –.172*** –.176*** –.178*** 
   (.030) (.031) (.031) 
Unofficial Information    .009 .017 
    (.029) (.030) 
Expected Family Mobility     –.052* 
     (.023) 
      
Observations 2,643 2,640 2,640 2,639 
χ2/df 586.90/85 622.06/96 716.82/107 773.85/121 
RMSEA .047 .046 .046 .045 
CFI .926 .937 .938 .935 
Source: China Inequality and Distributive Justice Survey (2009) 
Notes: Unofficial information: average response towards 1) Use the Internet to learn news (1: never – 5: 
frequently) and 2) Get news from foreign media (1: never –5: frequently); Expected Family Mobility: expected 
family economic situation 5 years later (1: much worse–5: much better).   
Standardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses.) *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. (Two-tailed test) 
 
 
Table 3.3 reports the results from the SEM models of SDO. Taking advantage of the 
greater amount of information available on individuals’ background in the data set, the analysis 
includes additional explanatory variables, such as one’s household income and expected 
economic situation of family. Model 1 shows that older people, females, people with lower 
incomes, and rural citizens have higher levels of SDO. Again, however, as in the case of 
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authoritarianism, the significant difference between rural and urban citizens is explained away by 
the respondents’ levels of education, confirming the powerful influence of education (Model 2). 
And as can be seen in Model 3, the “Unofficial information” variable, which measures 
the extent to which one uses the Internet or gets news from international media, does not 
significantly change the effect of education, contrary to the case of authoritarianism. This reflects 
the difference between authoritarianism and SDO; authoritarianism, as socio-cultural 
conservatism (Duriez and Van Hiel 2002), is affected by increased exposure to information and 
rich frames of reference, whereas SDO, having a direct relationship with economic conservatism, 
does not change through such a channel.  
Another notable pattern revealed in this analysis is the highly significant effect of 
household income, which shows that there is a negative association between the SDO scale and 
family income. There is not enough information to come to a conclusion on the relationship 
between income and SDO in past studies, since past studies have shown mixed results that 
depend on contexts (i.e., different countries and groups; see Sidanius and Pratto 2001:82). I 
suggest that the significant negative association between family income and SDO revealed in this 
analysis can be understood by considering higher family income as a factor that decreases 
perceived risk and insecurity. As Duckitt and Sibley (2009) point out, SDO originates from the 
worldview that regards the social world as a competitive jungle, and such motivational bases 
lead to the stronger level of SDO. I suggest that the higher level of family income can attenuate 
the feeling of economic insecurity and threat perceived by individuals, which satisfies their 
underlying existential motives that would otherwise enhance aggressive and hostile attitudes in 
intergroup conflicts. Such an effect of underlying risk perception is also confirmed in Model 4, 
which includes a variable on people’s family economic prospects for the next five years. It shows 
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that people’s optimistic expectations for their family’s upward mobility has a significant negative 
relationship with their SDO.  
In both analyses of determinants of authoritarianism and SDO, the significant effect of 
education is consistent throughout all models, confirming that education has a critical effect in 
determining individuals’ psychosocial dispositions in China. 
 
Conclusion 
Why people in the lower classes often exhibit conservative attitudes toward inequality is 
an important and longstanding puzzle for social scientists (Kelly and Enns 2010) because it 
entails workers betraying their own vested interests in the redistributive political system. Facing 
this puzzle, sociologists have not paid sufficient attention to the psychological factors that affect 
such attitudes and how such factors are influenced by social contexts. Much of the past 
discussion has centered on the role of socioeconomic cleavages, and even when the role of 
culture and ideology is discussed, social psychological factors that constitute and sustain such 
ideas and beliefs have been underspecified.  
Filling such a gap in the literature and bridging sociological and psychological 
approaches to inequality, this study makes the following contributions. First, findings from this 
study demonstrate the role of psychological mechanisms often neglected in past sociological 
scholarship on the determinants of political-economic attitudes. It shows that authoritarianism 
and SDO affect attitudes toward inequality and redistribution, and the difference between rural 
and urban in the patterns of such psychosocial dispositions is attributable to the highly significant 
effect of education. Also, the Chinese example suggests that state policies can condition the 
social background for the operation of social psychological mechanisms. The geographical 
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distribution of authoritarianism and SDO among Chinese citizens is affected by unequal 
conditions of educational opportunity between rural and urban areas, which are the combined 
outcome of socialist legacies (i.e., the hukou system) and the state-led post-reform development 
strategy that disproportionately benefited the urban area. Because rural residents have 
considerably limited educational opportunities in comparison to urban citizens, the average level 
of the two psychosocial dispositions is relatively higher, which results in more tolerant views of 
inequality among the rural population.26  
 The study also contributes to a better understanding of popular attitudes toward inequality 
in China and offers political implications for today’s Chinese society. A number of studies and 
observations on Chinese society have pointed out that the level of income inequality has reached 
a danger zone, but few of these studies actually investigated the social psychological 
characteristics of popular attitudes toward inequality. By shedding light on the role of 
psychology of inequality, this study provides an insight into the counter-intuitive picture of rural 
residents’ relatively conservative opinions. As with past studies that showed rural citizens’ 
relatively tolerant attitudes towards distributive justice, this paper presents a cautiously 
optimistic prospect for the primary goal of today’s China, namely the maintenance of social 
stability. The results suggest that the disadvantaged groups in Chinese society will not furiously 
attempt to subvert the status quo in the immediate future. This prognosis, however, is only a 
tentative one. Past studies suggest that authoritarianism and SDO are subject to change through 
situational cues, and moreover, they have opposing elements in their internal dynamics; the 
                                                             
26 It needs to be mentioned that a large part of the popular protests in China has been undertaken by rural farmers in 
the countryside, particularly since the 1990s, but that does not mean that farmers are more prone to engage in 
protests than urban citizens. The source of most mass protests in the countryside is caused by much more 
problematic issues peculiar to rural areas, such as unfair compensation for appropriation and confiscation of 
property and unjust land seizures by local authorities, not by rural citizens’ attitudes toward income inequality or 
rural-urban disparity. 
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psychological energy that constrains authoritarian attitudes to obedience and submission can turn 
its current to converge on anti-authoritarianism (Perrin 2005), and the SDO of subordinate 
groups can transform from the legitimization of intergroup hierarchy to hostile attitudes against 
outgroups (i.e., dominant groups). Thus, although the findings of the present study corroborate 
the claim that today’s Chinese society is not a “social volcano” (Whyte 2010), it should be noted 
that the effects of psychosocial dispositions may show complex dynamics in the future. 
Finally, despite the China-specific contexts brought into the analysis, this paper offers 
general theoretical insights into the mechanism of social psychological legitimation of inequality. 
Specifically, it provides a new way to understand and approach authoritarianism and SDO in 
sociology by treating them as the joint product of motivated social cognition and political-
cultural schemata. The findings of this paper show that the interaction between the two factors is 
affected by one’s level of education and institutional conditions associated with the educational 
opportunity structure. This paper also suggests that the manifestation of authoritarian and social 
dominance motives as political-cultural ideas in society is dependent on historical contingencies 
and momentous social events that shape the political and cultural authority structure in society 
and define in-groups and out-groups (e.g., the Cultural Revolution in Mao-era China in the late 
1960s and the post-September 11th sociopolitical discourse in the United States). The paper also 
presents a novel analytic strategy for utilizing large-scale social surveys to reflect individuals’ 
psychosocial dispositions and using social survey items to grasp context-dependent, group-
specific dispositions. 
In future studies, the complex and dynamic patterns of interaction between micro and 
macro factors (i.e., motivated cognition, cultural repertoire, and institutions) need to be further 
explored in order to concretely account for the attitude formation process. These studies can 
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benefit from looking at how the interaction of specific cultural models and schemas concerning 
inequality with institutional forces such as educational systems, electoral politics, welfare policy, 
immigration policy, labor markets, and political or religious authority structures can mold, 
enhance, or depress authoritarian attitudes and social dominance orientations. Such future studies 
will improve our understanding of the mechanism of how individuals’ legitimation of inequality 
is affected by varieties of cultural and institutional conditions.  
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Chapter 4 
Reasoning and Attitudes toward Distributive Justice 
 
This chapter focuses on the realm of reasoning in the AMR framework and examines the 
characteristics of individuals’ reasoning about inequality and distributive justice by analyzing 
social survey data. Undoubtedly, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions on social issues are outcomes of 
a certain level of reasoning, which is humans’ distinct mental power of conducting deduction, 
induction, causal inference, decision-making, calculation, and so on. Although other animals 
such as nonhuman primates show some degree of reasoning, their reasoning abilities are never 
close to humans’ capacity to process complex information based on high-level cognition, 
particularly guided by language.  
In philosophy and sociology, reasoning is often conceptually distinguished into two 
kinds, practical reason and theoretical (speculative) reason: roughly, the former governs our 
action and intention and the latter marks our logical thinking and beliefs. In sociology, the idea 
of practical reason has been strongly associated with the perspective of Bourdieusian practice 
theory, which views practical reason as reflection of individual- or collective-level habits 
constituted by social relations such as field and capital. In such conceptualization, the 
sociological perspective on reasoning is largely silent about theoretical, speculative reason and 
focuses on practical reasoning as individuals’ embodied dispositional potentialities that 
reproduce objective social relations (Bourdieu 1998).  
Although this kind of perspective is useful for grasping the culturally embodied and 
socially embedded nature of reasoning and provides an effective critique of rational action 
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theory, it sheds light on only limited aspects of human reasoning because it holds its primary 
interest in revealing the characteristics of practice, rather than focusing on the process and 
dynamics of reasoning per se. Sociological theories, to move away from economic and utilitarian 
views on the mechanism of social action, took the spotlight from the process of reasoning to 
other aspects of reasoning that defy the utilitarian means-ends framework, such as the habitual 
aspect of reasoning (practice theory and pragmatism), normative orientations for social action 
(e.g., Talcott Parsons), or the creative character of human action (e.g., Hans Joas, John Dewey). 
And in doing so, little attention has been given to the study of reasoning. Admittedly, the 
theoretical and speculative aspect of reasoning has not been completely ignored in sociological 
theory (e.g., rational choice theories). Even those studies, however, were primarily interested in 
showing the mechanism of how individuals’ rational action can lead to (often unintended) 
aggregate phenomena, under some degree of external constraints, in organizations, collective 
actions, economies, or social systems, rather than focusing on the characteristics of reasoning 
itself (although sometimes strong versus weak rationality was differentiated) (see Goldthrope 
1998).  
The problem with treating practical and theoretical reason separately is that actors’ actual 
reasoning process is usually the joint outcome of both kinds of reasoning, and the two share a 
number of common elements. Our theoretical reasoning often shows habitual, semiautomatic, 
reflexive (rather than reflective), and situation-dependent characteristics, and such reasoning is 
also often motivated by underlying intentions, which constitute the necessary condition for 
practical reasoning. On the other hand, practical reasoning is usually guided by speculative, 
theoretical reasoning such as causal understanding of how the world works, reckoning expected 
utilities, and tacit mental processes that consider probabilities of events coming into action. Also, 
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some common underlying elements, such as the pursuit of explanatory coherence, are relevant to 
both kinds of reasoning (Harman 1976). In this light, dividing reason into two separate domains 
of theoretical and practical reason is not a very useful or accurate model for understanding how 
reasoning actually works, unless we are just interested in looking at some very rare cases where 
only one of the two styles of reasoning is exclusively dominant. Moreover, the dichotomous 
distinction is implicitly based on some questionable assumptions of Cartesian dualism between 
mind and body (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) or between mental action and physical action. 
Sociological literature on reasoning also confronts other kinds of limitations; the studies 
are sometimes weakly organized with one another, the connection between the studies is too 
loose to provide a coherent body of literature, and the literature suffers from the paucity of 
empirical works that directly tackle the problem of reasoning. In this chapter, drawing on works 
from multiple disciplines, I will provide an alternative framework for theorizing reasoning into 
social theory and apply the conceptual ideas to an empirical investigation. First of all, rather than 
straddling the dichotomous distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, I will base 
my discussion of reasoning on two kinds of fundamental orientations of reasoning, which are 
sensemaking and decision-making. Then I will discuss how the two functions of human 
reasoning can be understood as a sociologically useful concept of lay theories. After such 
conceptual discussions on reasoning, I will turn to the empirical case, which examines people’s 
opinions about economic inequality and distributive justice in China; show what kinds of lay 
reasoning are employed in their attitudes and beliefs about inequality; and demonstrate how such 
reasoning is marked by several important characteristics of lay theories on inequality. For 
empirical analysis, I make use of Bayesian network analysis, in order to reveal the map of 
people’s lay theorizing about various aspects of distributive justice.  
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The Two Functions of Reasoning: Decision-Making and Sensemaking 
In this and following sections, I will discuss how we can approach the problem of 
reasoning in a step-by-step process. First, I contend that reasoning serves twofold goals of 
decision-making and sensemaking. Then I explain how both decision- and sense-making can be 
understood by the idea of “lay theory” (Furnham 1988, 2000; Ostertag 2010; Ji 2008; Levy, Chi, 
and Hong 2006). 
Decision-making refers to the conscious and unconscious process of conducting action or 
arriving at a conclusion among possible alternatives. It involves balancing costs and benefits of 
possible outcomes, and considering weights and probabilities of relevant factors. Studies on how 
people make decisions had been predominantly based on normative utility theory and formal 
models. In the utility framework, decision-making is understood as a process of weighing costs 
and rewards associated with an action, taking probabilities and weights into account. Inevitably, 
some unrealistic assumptions underlying such a view attracted criticisms along the way, and 
alternative theories with more realistic assumptions emerged, such as subjective utility theory 
(see Tallman and Gray 1990). The most successful and widely accepted alternative is Simon’s 
(1947) behavioral model of rational choice. In this theory, individuals are described as 
information processors, and due to their limited capacity in information storing and processing, 
individuals act as decision “satisficers” rather than utility maximizers. Hence, decision-making is 
accomplished out of the trade-off between speed (or efficiency) and accuracy (or cost). This 
trade-off is often regarded as some sort of “optimization” under constraints, but such an account 
distorts the idea of bounded rationality.27 Actors cannot “optimize” their behaviors when they 
                                                             
27 In one of his personal conversations, Herbert Simon even once (jokingly) said he considered suing the authors 
who misused his theory of bounded rationality in such a way (Gigerenzer 2004: 391). 
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have incomplete information or when the situation is unfamiliar, namely when they don’t know 
what they don’t know. So the optimization perspective is actually based on almost equally 
unrealistic assumptions as the theory based on perfect rationality.  
 While Simon’s model of bounded rationality has been widely studied and used for 
decades, the center of decision-making studies has gradually moved from mathematical and 
statistical models to the psychological end (Weber and Johnson 2009), where dual-process 
models of decision-making, reasoning, and social cognition have made significant contributions 
(Evans 2008; Ferreira et al. 2006; Sanfey and Chang 2008). Although many kinds of dual-
process models have been proposed and each focuses on different aspects of our mental process, 
they commonly share the idea that there are two kinds of information processing: (1) 
unconscious, automatic, hot, rapid, heuristic, intuitive, and impulsive system-1 and (2) 
conscious, deliberative, cold, slow, analytic, and reflexive system-2. Because system-1 has a 
higher capacity than system-2, much of our information-processing and decision-making runs on 
system-1.28 
Besides these psychological approaches, sociological studies on practical reasoning have 
also tried to show that decision-making cannot be reduced to the rationality dimension. One of 
their focuses that differs from psychological studies is their heavy attention to body and 
                                                             
28 While the dual-process model has gained popularity, particularly during the last 10 years or so, an increasing 
number of studies have detected some critical problems with this simple binary model. For example, several studies 
(see Evans 2008, 2012) have pointed out that a strict dual-process framework is misleading because system-1 and 
system-2 actually share many common features that were once regarded as belonging to only one of them (e.g., 
cognitive biases, heuristic processing), and the properties of the two systems proposed by many psychological 
studies cannot be properly mapped onto the dichotomous framework, which suggests alternative frameworks based 
on a dynamic graded continuum (Cleeremans and Jiménez 2002) or single system accounts (Osman 2004). Because 
each system is based on a mixture of different kinds of information processing systems, the overall system should be 
conceived of as multiple processes, rather than a simple binary system. Even further, the complex and context-
dependent relationship between the currently conceived dual processes also complicates the issue, as explicated by 
default interventionist and parallel competitive accounts. For this reason, Evans (2008) suggests that we use a 
different terminology of “type 1” and “type 2” for analytical distinctions, rather than using the word “system” 
(although he admits the limitation of the new wording at the same time).  
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embodied habits, whereas dual-processing accounts in psychology are more interested in 
reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. On the other hand, in constructing an integrative 
theory of action, practice and pragmatist theories tried to overcome and avoid the dichotomy of 
mind and body (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Joas 1996).  
Overall, cognitive psychological studies of dual-process models have shown that the 
decision-making process rides on the interplay between two different types of information 
processing systems, and the sociological theory of practice and pragmatism has shown the 
primacy of embodied habits and dispositions shaped by structural and situational conditions. 
Despite some critical differences,29 the cognitive psychological theory and practice/pragmatist 
theory seem to be in a reachable distance from each other (Lizardo 2012; Vaisey 2009). They 
commonly provide a more comprehensive picture than utility-based theories to describe how 
decision-making takes place in directing our action and thinking. 
On the other hand, the idea of sensemaking refers to individuals’ mental activity of, 
literally, the making of sense (Weick 1995), thereby rendering meaningful and coherent 
understanding of one’s perceived environment and experiences. Through various kinds of mental 
work such as synthesizing information, extracting cues, framing situations, explanations, and 
self-reflection, actors engaging in sensemaking impose meaning on their environments in the 
way they make sense, often collectively and retrospectively. Compared to decision-making, 
sensemaking deals with meaning, cognitive frame, identity, reflexivity, and explanation. Without 
                                                             
29 One important difference is that pragmatism and practice theory try to avoid or overcome any kind of dualism 
(especially mind vs. body) in constructing a sociological theory of action, whereas the dual-process theory assumes 
the existence of two distinct kinds of information processing systems. In order to bridge this gap, some sociological 
studies (Vaisey and Frye, forthcoming; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010) suggest that the holistic approach championed by 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) can be strengthened and reformulated by incorporating the analytical distinction 
between type 1 and type 2 cognition while still discarding Cartesian dualism. I basically sympathize with this idea, 
although the success of such an approach would depend on the future development, revision, or dismissal of the 
dual-process theory in psychology.  
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proper sensemaking, actors’ perception of their social environments remains disintegrated and 
meaningless, which invites feeling of anxiety and insecurity. Due to actors’ cognitive motivation 
to frame their experiences and existential motivation to retain ontological security, the activities 
of sensemaking as part of actors’ practical reasoning emerge to introduce meaning and order to 
their experiences.  
Weick (1995) summarizes seven key properties of sensemaking, and thus explains that 
sensemaking is (1) grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, (3) enactive of sensible 
environments, (4) social, (5) ongoing, (6) focused on and by extracted cues, and (7) driven by 
plausibility rather than accuracy. These characteristics of the sensemaking process remind us of 
the key ideas in the pragmatist theory (Weber and Glynn 2006). For example, the theories of 
sensemaking and pragmatism commonly share the view that action is part of an ongoing process, 
rather than being hinged upon isolatable sets of “means-ends” (Whitford 2002). And as Weick 
(2006) said, the pragmatist perspective of “order-interruption-rediscovery” is sensemaking in a 
nutshell (p. 1731).  
One of the main differences between sensemaking and decision-making can be found in 
their focus on different temporal points in actions; sensemaking mostly occurs before decision-
making, providing the epistemic basis for action, or after an action to retrospectively frame the 
experience or an event. Thus, the action led by decision-making is understood, interpreted, and 
framed by the sensemaking activity.  
 
Individuals as Lay Theorists 
Then what is the most important element shared commonly by sensemaking and 
decision-making that affects both processes? It is actors’ intuitive, folk understanding about how 
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the world works; becoming a social actor is enabled by holding theoretical understanding about 
the social world and internalizing such tacit theories in one’s causal perception of experiences 
and observations. Simply speaking, humans are lay psychologists, lay sociologists, lay 
meteorologists, lay economists, lay moralists, lay philosophers, and so on. Such theoretical 
understanding is often far from an objective, scientific theory but is an informal, intuitive, naïve, 
everyday understanding of how things work, which is largely mediated by commonsense 
reasoning and serves motivational needs for the perceiver.30  
Studies on “lay theories” have been concentrated in social psychology (see Furham 1988 
and Hong et al. 2001). The literature has started as study on the role of commonsense psychology 
(for example, Heider 1958), which found the importance of commonsense beliefs and 
understandings in determining people’s perception of the social world, events, and interpersonal 
relations. The idea of lay theory is essentially similar to other concepts such as background 
beliefs, cognitive frames, and causal attribution, but the concept is particularly useful since it 
focuses on individuals’ tacit mental process of theorizing and studies how people explain: it 
shares similar insights with ethnomethodology or other sociological theories (Martin 2011) that 
question how people “explain” things, while sociologists generally try to explain people’s 
“behaviors.” Although lay theories are basically novice, non-scientific, folk theories by 
definition, lay common sense and “scientific” arguments often share more commonalities than 
differences (Furnham 1988: 207).  
How do decision-making and sensemaking exactly fit into this idea of lay theory? In the 
case of sensemaking, it is clear that construction of lay theories is for epistemic integration, 
                                                             
30 There are several underlying motivations that fuel the engine of reasoning, such as existential motivation to have a 
sense of ontological security in a protective cocoon (Giddens 1984), cognitive motivation to understand and make 
sense of one’s environment, and motives for self-esteem and self-presentation (Hewstone 1983; Furham 1988). 
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which serves to make sense about individuals’ social world and their experiences effectively and 
efficiently. The cognitive effort to make sense of new or familiar environments is guided by 
individuals’ implicit taxonomies of their environments. Similar to the role of sensemaking, lay 
theories play a functional role that imparts stable, predictable, logically consistent, cause-and-
effect structure to one’s perception of the social world (Furnham 1988; Ostertag 2010). Lay 
theories are used not only to construct such lay epistemology but also to justify people’s 
behaviors or social realities. Thus, the whole process of sensemaking is basically aimed at 
constructing and reconstructing one’s lay theories. And such lay understanding and sensemaking 
often rely on “private/internal speech” (Vygotsky 1934) and “dialogical self” (Peirce 1934; 
Wiley 2006): the understanding is internalized through egocentric communication with one’s self 
and stored as tacit knowledge, which has theoretical resonance with pragmatist theory (see Wiley 
2006; Somers 1994). 
On the other hand, lay theories affect decision-making, since the decision-making process 
is dependent upon one’s assumptions about expected outcomes, which are derived from their 
internalized causal models of the world: namely, theoretical understanding about how the world 
naturally works. In many contexts, the operation of decision-making has its roots in 
commonsense reasoning as discussed in ethnomethodology (Cicourel), or “ignorant othering” 
(Ostertag 2010), both of which are internalized (in Vygotskian sense) as the basis of decision-
making. Ideas similar to ethnomethodological or Vygotskian perspectives are also proposed in 
studies on lay theories by Cameron et al. (2001) and Morris et al. (2001), who emphasized the 
importance of cognitive socialization of lay theories in developmental perspective (as opposed to 
nativist theories that focus on children’s innate capacity to build their lay theories; see 
Hirschfield 2001 and Hong et al. 2001 for summary). Thus the decision-making process operates 
107 
 
based upon underlying knowledge structures existing in lay theories that preclude an infinite 
number of alternative possible hypotheses, confine the boundary of “rational” decision-making, 
and provide the logic of justification for the process and outcome of decision-making.31 
 
Lay Theories about Economic Inequality and Distributive Justice 
Based on the discussions provided so far, now I will more specifically focus on the 
problem of beliefs and attitudes about economic inequality and redistribution and how they are 
derived from people’s reasoning. Here I list several key lay theories used by people to construct 
and justify their ideas on distributive justice in three broad categories: causal attribution, lay 
macroeconomic theories, and moral reasoning.  
Causal attribution of wealth and poverty refers to individuals’ causal perception of what 
determines that people become rich or poor. Attribution occurs as a semi-automatic process as 
part of social cognition oriented toward cognitive efficiency (Hollander and Howard 2000), and 
it often stems from individuals’ motivation to justify their position and avoid accusation (Heider 
1958; Exline and Lobel 1999; Leach, Snider and Iyer 2002) or from socially prevalent intergroup 
stereotypes (Feagin 1972, 1975). In this study, I concentrate on internal and external attributions. 
Internal attribution regards the source of wealth and poverty as individuals’ differential levels of 
ability, talent, efforts, and work ethic, which backs the idea of meritocratic beliefs. By contrast, 
external attribution focuses on the influence of socioeconomic structure, discrimination, 
inequalities in family background, and other unfair sources of inequality. The pattern of 
                                                             
31 This treatment of reasoning as lay theory may be criticized for missing discussions on the characteristics of 
practical reasoning, particularly its embodied and habitual aspect. However, I view such a structured, semiautomatic, 
and reflexive feature of practical reasoning as the outcome of association (e.g., psychomotor association), rather than 
the function or dynamics of reasoning itself. In my AMR framework, the more or less durable and embodied 
habitual patterns of practical reasoning are not considered as attributes of reasoning, since such structural dynamics, 
strictly speaking, do not stem from reasoning itself but from associative networks discussed in the first chapter.  
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individuals’ causal attribution often has a close relationship with their political stance and 
ideology, since it corresponds to their judgment about fairness, as empirical works show (Cohen 
1982; Skitka and Tetlock 1992). The kind of attribution people make leads to different outcomes 
in perception of justice and preferences for social policies. For example, internal attribution of 
poverty causes negative attitudes toward the poor and opposing views about governmental 
redistribution policies (Ng and Allen 2005). 
Lay macroeconomic theories are people’s understanding and assumptions about how 
economy works and the relationship between economic inequality and macroeconomic 
performance, particularly economic growth or development. For example, the idea that 
inequality and development have a positive relationship is often accepted by many people, 
especially in developing countries. That is, people tend to internalize a development model that 
some level of inequality is inevitable and even justifiable for the sake of national economic 
development. Xie et al. (2012), based on a social survey conducted in six Chinese provinces, 
show that the majority of Chinese citizens tend to estimate the level of inequality of countries 
(i.e., China, Japan, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan) based on their perception of the levels 
of development of the countries. Since most people do not have good foreknowledge about the 
exact level of inequality in those countries, they tend to project a high level of inequality to more 
developed countries and a low level of inequality to less developed countries. Xie et al. (2012) 
call this mechanism “societal projection” and discusses that such societal projection constitutes 
an important part of “developmental paradigm,” which assumes that all societies go through 
similar stages of development. On the other hand, the positive relationship between inequality 
and development is justified not only by societal projection but also by the metaphoric idea of 
“trickle-down” economics tacitly immanent in lay economic theories; the development-induced 
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inequality will be eventually overcome because the wealth created by the rich will be, some day 
in the future, spread to people at the lower rung of society. This idea is well reflected in Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous slogan: “Let some people get rich first” (rang yi bu fen ren xian fu qi lai). 
Besides this kind of developmental model, another lay economic theory widely internalized 
among citizens is the functionalist idea that differential rewards according to individuals’ 
contribution, merit, and output are necessary for the development of society. Distributing 
resources to individuals equally would hurt the efficiency of economy because it would depress 
individuals’ incentives and extrinsic motivation to maximize their potential and productivity. 
Although this theory possesses some underlying affinity with the internal casual attribution of 
wealth and poverty, the former is different from the latter in the sense that it justifies inequality 
on the ground of efficiency rather than fairness.  
Moral reasoning is about determining what is right/wrong and what the right thing to do 
is. In past psychological theories, moral reasoning was regarded as logical, rational thinking that 
relies on the level of cognitive development (Kohlberg 1969; Turiel 1983). However, recent 
development in moral psychology sees that moral reasoning is largely driven and governed by 
underlying intuitions, emotions, and motivational bases, where reasoned judgment plays mostly 
the role of post hoc justification. Haidt’s social intuitionist model (2001, 2007) and the dual 
process model of Greene and colleagues (Greene 2007; Greene et al. 2008), for example, show 
that moral reasoning originates from intuitive and emotional responses. Thus moral “reasoning” 
and intuitive moral “judgment” are conceptually distinct processes (e.g., moral judgment can 
occur without moral reasoning), but the boundary between the two is actually unclear and 
ambiguous (e.g., many kinds of moral “reasoning” are actually not different from intuitive moral 
judgment/responses). (See Paxton and Greene [2010] for more discussion.) Thus, by “moral 
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reasoning,” here I refer to a layman’s habitual and casual moral responses to everyday issues, 
particularly normative, moralistic justification of welfare policies and supporting the poor 
(Feagin 1975). Among various normative underpinnings of attitudes and opinions about 
inequality and welfare policy, the moral intuitions of care and protection (Haidt 2001, 2007) 
provide important moral imperatives that justify egalitarian policies and produce critical attitudes 
toward inequality. Such moral intuitions affect lay moral reasoning. But not all types of moral 
reasoning are associated with egalitarianism. People often think about moral consequences of 
welfare policies in terms of desert and fairness, which constitute the concept of deservingness of 
the poor for welfare support. And such moralistic approaches, which are often biased under the 
influence of prevalent cognitive frames or moral categories in society, view welfare programs as 
the cause of increase in a culture of welfare dependency and unemployment by providing welfare 
benefits to those “undeserving” poor who lack self-discipline and work ethics (Murray 1984; 
Steensland 2006, 2010; Massey 2007). It should be noted that moral reasoning is often dependent 
on causal attribution of wealth and poverty, since causal perception of societal outcomes affects 
one’s moral evaluation. 
 These three kinds of lay theories regarding individuals’ opinions and beliefs about 
inequality and distributive justice reflect that our reasoning stems from the intricate 
intertwinement between sensemaking and decision-making processes. Individuals’ sensemaking 
activity organizes various information, observations, experiences, and cultural ideas related to 
inequality, the rich, the poor, welfare, and redistribution into meaning networks that constitute 
the epistemic basis of our reasoning (Fiske 2012). On the other hand, relying on such cultural 
understanding of the social world, individuals make judgment to form an opinion or arrive at 
conclusions regarding each distributive justice issue and express their opinions.  
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Are Individuals Good Lay Theorists? 
If ordinary individuals are equipped with some of these theories and wield them in their 
reasoning about inequality, how good are their reasoning skills? Are people capable of using 
such lay theories consistently in thinking through various kinds of issues related to distributive 
justice? Early political theorists in the early 20th century, who experienced the wave of 
totalitarianism, thought that the “masses” are incapable of independent, logical reasoning and are 
credulous and irrational (e.g., Arendt 1951). Later, some groups of political scientists (e.g., the 
“Michigan school” scholars) proposed a more nuanced but similar line of arguments contending 
that only political sophisticates have cognitive ability and political interests to hold consistent 
political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), that there is no true preference in mass 
opinion and public opinion is merely a reflection of political elites’ discourse (Zaller 1992), and 
that individuals rely on “low-information” input in executing their reasoning about candidates 
and political issues (Popkin 1991). The public’s ignorance of social, political, and economic 
matters is also frequently emphasized as a well-established finding in political science literature 
(Ferejohn 1990; Kinder 1998; Luskin 2002), which is, according to Bartels (1996), “one of the 
best-documented features of contemporary politics” (cited in Friedman 2012: 1).  
Given such characteristics of political beliefs and attitudes of lay people, how would their 
lay theories about inequality and distributive justice look? Studies on lay theories also emphasize 
that advanced economic theories (about inequality, development, and so on) are not well known 
or discussed by lay people. For most people, beliefs about political and economic matters such as 
inequality and redistribution are acquired through personal experiences or absorbing the 
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discourse presented in media (Furnham 1988: 148), and beliefs can even take an illogical form as 
long as they are functional for the perceiver (Hong et al. 2001).  
In the empirical analysis in this paper, I will focus on the following questions to examine 
the characteristics of people’s lay theories about inequality and distributive justice. First, can we 
find any of the three kinds of lay theoretical reasoning mentioned earlier (i.e., causal attribution, 
lay macroeconomic theories, and moral reasoning) in people’s attitudes and opinions about 
inequality and distributive justice? Are their attitudinal responses toward individual survey items 
associated with one another in a way that reflects their sensemaking and decision-making (i.e., 
forming an opinion) about various domains of distributive justices? Second, does the overall 
configuration of individuals’ lay reasoning show logically consistent and coherent structure? Or 
is the network of beliefs based on certain structures that reflect other kinds of consciousness and 
meaning structure that cannot be reduced to the narrow definition of logical thinking? 
This analysis contributes to studying the characteristics of lay theories in the formation of 
public opinion, which has rarely been explored in past literature in sociology and political 
science (see Herbst 1998 for some discussion on the role of lay theory in public opinion). In the 
following sections, I will turn to our empirical case and begin with introducing the 
methodological strategy used to examine the properties of individuals’ lay theories about 
inequality and preference for welfare policy. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Methods 
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In order to examine the properties of lay theories on inequality, this study uses 
probabilistic graphical modeling, particularly Bayesian network (also called Bayesian belief 
network or probabilistic causal network) analysis.  
Bayesian network analysis basically refers to the methodological strategy that combines 
graphical modeling with Bayesian analysis in order to analyze and graphically map the 
probabilistic causal dependency structure among a set of random variables included in an 
analysis. In the context of this study, the random variables are attitudinal responses, and their 
causal dependency structure reflects the attitudinal dependency structure in individuals’ belief 
systems; the structure can be a form of deductive reasoning or attitude heuristics invoked by 
commonsense knowledge or intuitive judgment. Although Bayesian network analysis has been 
very rarely used in sociology and political science and limitedly in psychology, recently there 
has been rapidly growing interest in using it to model social cognition (see Lopez, Ramirez, and 
Casado 2012). 
 The causal structure is represented as graphical structure (G), which consists of vertices 
(nodes) and edges (arcs or links). Bayesian network analysis produces a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) of the joint probability structure distribution induced by the model, which encodes 
individuals’ attitudinal structure regarding inequality. To be clear, this graphical representation 
does not show deterministic relationship structure in reasoning process, but probability structure 
as a probabilistic model. That is, the Bayesian network model constructs a joint distribution 
structure over every combination of responses in N variables, according to which one can 
estimate posterior distribution of any Xj when the value of Xi is specified. Thus, analyzing 
attitudes with Bayesian networks means treating the multidimensional attitudes as complex 
probability distributions, thereby unearthing lay theoretical structure embedded in the 
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relationships among attitudes. Assigning probability structure (or stochastic structure) to the 
belief network reflects to what extent the level of uncertainty is strong in lay beliefs and 
arguments about distributive justice.  
Finding the knowledge structure by factorizing a distribution using a graphical 
representation (network) is usually done by finding conditionally independent relationships 
among variables, where the concept of d-separation (direction-dependent separation; Pearl 1988) 
is used. Simply speaking, two nodes in the network, say X and Y, are conditionally independent, 
or d-separated in graphical tests, if every path from X to Y is blocked by a set of random 
variables Z in DAG.32 Conditional independence between two variables is presented as graphical 
segregation (i.e., no edge) in the visualized output, whereas an arrow (directed edge) from node 
A to node B indicates that B is causally dependent on A. Conditional independence tests using d-
separation are used in various kinds of structure learning algorithms based on constraint-based 
algorithms, one of which is used for this study (specifically, the grow-shrink algorithm). Grow-
shrink algorithm (Margaritis 2003) uses a fast and efficient algorithm to detect Markov 
blankets33 of variables in Bayesian network. In my analysis, I used partial correlation test for the 
conditional independence method, which is widely used in constraint-based algorithms. 
Therefore, simply speaking, the results of Bayesian network analysis presented in this chapter 
can be understood as partial correlational relationship of distinct attitudinal responses.  
On the other hand, even though Bayesian network analysis is often used for tackling 
causal relational patterns by using DAG and testing conditional independencies between 
                                                             
32 More specifically, X and Y are d-separated given Z when their connective structures are either serial (XZY; 
XZY) or diverging (XZY), or when the structure is converging and Z (XZY) is not conditioned on. 
See Pearl (2000) for a more detailed explanation. 
 
33 “Markov blanket” means a subset of nodes for a node X in a Bayesian network that consists of X’s parents, 
children, and children’s parents (see Pearl 1997).  
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variables, I do not use Bayesian networks in this study for illustrating causal relationships but 
rather for inferring individuals’ lay theories and belief systems concerning distributive justice 
from the statistical relationships between attitude variables and projecting a holistic picture of 
people’s belief systems regarding inequality.  
By showing the dependency structure among a variety of attitudes and beliefs related to 
distributive justice, this method can infer how individuals’ lay theories are organized in their 
belief system regarding distributive justice. This methodological approach has several 
advantages over other conventional statistical methods. For example, regression-based models 
are not suitable for examining the larger relationship structure among multiple variables where 
each variable can be an independent variable and a dependent variable at the same time. And 
path analyses or structural equation models are constructed based on the models already 
designed by a researcher’s theoretical interest or hypothesis, while Bayesian network analysis is 
conducted by a data-driven approach, where the causal structure, inference, and representation 
can be automatically derived from data, although expert knowledge can be applied to the 
modeling. On the other hand, Bayesian network analysis is useful for investigating the whole 
dependency network of variables, in contrast to latent variable methods such as factor analysis or 
structural equation modeling that focuses on only the variables that contribute to latent factor 
structure.34 Compared to the correlational network of variables shown by running RCA, 
                                                             
34 More specifically, if a researcher’s main goal is to find a certain latent variable that exists among individuals and 
show how such a latent variable is associated with other variables (e.g., socioeconomic variables), then factor 
analytic methods should be used (e.g., standard factor analysis or structural equation modeling). However, in doing 
so, the variables that do not contribute to factor structure are simply ignored and have to be excluded from the 
analysis. Also the researcher is forced to ignore each variable’s uniqueness (“error”) and just focus on the common 
variance (latent factor) shared among variables, even when different variables actually deliver substantively 
different messages. So when factor analysis is used, the researcher has to lose substantive information contained in 
data. Because Bayesian network analysis does not require such a procedure and simply shows dependency structure 
among variables, it can be more faithful to what the data present. (But, as mentioned above, it all depends on what a 
researcher’s main research purpose is.) On the other hand, when some latent variable methods such as structural 
equation modeling is used, the researcher has to have a hypothesized model on (one-way) causal relationships 
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Bayesian network can show more distilled dependency structure among variables based on 
conditional independence tests (i.e., partial correlation in the case of this chapter). For more 
detailed explanation of Bayesian network analysis, see Koller and Friedman (2009) or Darwiche 
(2009). 
 
(A) (B) 
Figure 4.1 Hypothetical Belief Networks 
 
Before getting into the actual analysis, let us start with some hypothetical examples35 in 
order to see whether the Bayesian network model works correctly and produces reasonable 
results. Figure 4.1 shows two hypothetical examples of belief networks represented by Bayesian 
networks. For graph (A), I hypothesized a case where all individual beliefs are affected by 
income. In order to simulate such a case, I created 24 hypothetical random variables that 
represent individuals’ beliefs, which are produced by a linear combination of randomly 
distributed income and residual errors (N = 3,000). The Bayesian network aptly shows that all 
                                                             
between variables and force it to modeling, while in reality there is often an endogeneity problem, which means 
there is a loop of causality (two-way relationship) between two variables. In Bayesian network, one can leave the 
causal direction between two variables undecided (undirected graph), so it can have more flexibility in dealing with 
the endogeneity problem.  
35 Bayesian network analysis in this chapter is done using the bnlearn package on R (Scutari 2010). The Bayesian 
networks produced by bnlearn is exported as a DOT file to Gephi for visualization. 
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random variables are causally influenced by individuals’ income (p < .001), showing directed 
arrows from income to random variables. Because all variables are created as a function of 
income, there were significant correlations between the variables, but such significant 
associations are removed from the graph after conditional independence structure among 
variables is considered. The only exception is that the significant effect (p < .01) of variable I on 
variable W is produced by random chance under the joint uniform distribution situation. 
Now let us examine another hypothetical case in which all beliefs and attitudes are 
produced by two factors, such as income and education. Graph (B) represents such an example, 
which consists of 24 random variables, income, and education. The random variables are 
produced by linear combinations of income, education, and residual errors, which are randomly 
generated. This output of the Bayesian network, again, shows a result consistent with the 
underlying dependency structure I used to create the belief network. All variables are 
significantly affected by income and education (p < .001), and there is no significant association 
between other random variables except for random chances (D  L; p < .01). 
 
Data and Variables 
I use China Inequality and Distributive Justice Survey data (2009). (See Chapter 3 for 
information on the data set.) The data set contains an exhaustive list of survey questions 
regarding various dimensions of people’s attitudes toward inequality, their attribution of wealth 
and poverty, and their preferences about redistributive policies. In the Bayesian network 
analysis, I use the following selected items that are directly or indirectly related to one of the 
abovementioned lay theories on inequality and distributive justice.  
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 Demographic variables: age, education, household income, Internet use, Communist 
Party membership, region (rural versus urban) 
 Attitudinal responses (see Table 4.1)  
Although demographic variables are not attitudes, they are included in the analysis to 
control for them in recovering dependency structure among attitude variables and also to show to 
what extent the dependency structure of attitudes is shaped by individuals’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds. 
Of course, there are some inevitable biases in constructing the list of variables, since 
variable selection depends on the researcher’s interest and the availability of survey items. 
Nevertheless, the above set of variables covers most, if not all, of the widely discussed theories 
in sociological and political scientific literature on the determinants of attitudes toward inequality 
and redistribution: self-interest, relative deprivation, subjective utility, experience of past 
mobility, merit-based ideology, causal attribution, moral reasoning, developmentalism, and 
effects of various demographic variables including age, education, income, access to information 
(i.e., Internet), and political membership. Certainly the possibility exists that there are some 
hidden latent variables (e.g., personality traits) that affect multiple variables at the same time and 
that the Bayesian network model cannot reveal due to the limitation of survey items. However, 
strictly speaking, such a problem (i.e., an omitted variable) can also be a potential problem in 
most other methodological strategies that examine relationships between variables. Moreover, 
unless there is an obvious, easily recognizable third variable missing in the analysis, two 
variables connected in the Bayesian network reflect “meaningfully” associated ideas in 
individuals’ lay theoretical basis of attitudes toward inequality.
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Table 4.1 Attitudinal Responses of Survey Participants. 
Label Survey Questions (abbreviated) 
national Opinion on national income difference (1: too small–5: too large) 
relative Living standard compared with others in this county/city/district (1: much worse–5: much 
better) 
mobility Estimated family economic situation 5 years later (1: much worse–5: much better) 
satisfied Level of satisfaction with current living standard (1: very dissatisfied–7: very satisfied) 
matthew Recently the rich have become richer and the poor have become poorer? (1: strongly disagree–
5: strongly agree) 
powerful Social inequalities persist because they benefit the rich and powerful? (1: strongly disagree–5: 
strongly agree) 
unjust The gap between the rich and the poor is just? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
hardwork Hard work is always rewarded? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
opportunity1 People have equal opportunities to succeed? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
opportunity2 The opportunities for someone like you to raise their living standard are still great? (1: strongly 
disagree–5: strongly agree) 
ind_resp It is his/her own responsibility to be rich or poor? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
cause_poverty Poverty is caused by lack of ability, talents, or efforts? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree): 
mean score of two survey items 
cause_rich People become rich because of their ability or hard work? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly 
agree): mean score of two survey items 
cause_rich2 People become rich because of their connections or background? (1: strongly disagree–5: 
strongly agree): mean score of two survey items 
Reward People have incentives to work hard only when income differences large enough? (1: strongly 
disagree–5: strongly agree) 
just_inequality If there is equality of opportunity, differences between rich and poor are just? (1: strongly 
disagree–5: strongly agree) 
prosperity For the prosperity of the country, there must be big gaps in income? (1: strongly disagree–5: 
strongly agree) 
freemarket A free market economy is crucial to the economic development of our country? (1: strongly 
disagree–5: strongly agree) 
poor_change In 5 years the percentage of poor will? (1: decrease–3: increase) 
state_min State should ensure minimum living standard for all? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
state_gap State must work to reduce income inequality? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
rich_duty Rich have no obligation to help the poor? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
poor_demand Poor people have the right to demand help from the rich? (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly 
agree) 
transfer To satisfy everyone’s needs, even if you must take from the rich to assist the poor, it should be 
done (1: strongly disagree–5: strongly agree) 
 
One merit of analyzing individuals’ lay theories using this approach is that it can examine 
the characteristics of people’s lay reasoning before their underlying ideas and beliefs are 
captured in their discursive consciousness (Giddens 1984). People’s narratives and verbal 
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explanations about their beliefs and ideas are often different from their practical consciousness, 
which often has a stronger influence on individuals’ behaviors (Vaisey 2009). Employing a novel 
methodological approach, this study can tap into the structure of lay beliefs that are not 
channeled into individuals’ discursive consciousness or into post hoc narratives or justifications. 
One thing I need to make it clear is that this study does not show the actual process of reasoning 
that happens when individuals take the survey, but instead reveals the characteristics of 
individuals’ largely pre-formed lay theories about inequality and distributive justice, which are 
outcomes of their political-cultural understanding of how society and economy work and the 
characteristics of rich and poor people (i.e., sensemaking) and their mental activities of weighing 
evidence and using intellectual or moral judgment to form and express opinions (i.e., decision-
making).  
 
Findings 
Figure 4.2 shows the Bayesian network of attitudes toward inequality and distributive 
justice. Each node in the network represents each survey item listed above, and edges represent 
statistically significant edges (Pearson’s linear correlation, using alpha threshold: 0.05; the total 
number of tests run for learning the structure: 272,949). Two separated nodes in the graph 
indicate that they are conditionally independent; that is, the correlation between variables X and 
Y is not statistically significant when a third variable Z is controlled for. Although Bayesian 
network models use structure learning algorithms to determine the orientation of edges, namely 
the direction of causal relationship, I do not rely on such a method. There are three reasons. First, 
some variables are simply associated with rather than causally dependent on one another, when 
they contain very similar ideas (e.g., opportunity1 and opportunity2; cause_rich and cause_rich2) 
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or when their relationship does not imply causal or temporal order, so direction orientation is 
often neither necessary nor possible. Second, sometimes the causal direction can flow in both 
ways. For example, even a relationship that seemingly flows in one way, such as income and 
belief in merits, can be bidirectional; higher income can increase belief in merits, but also 
stronger belief in merits may cause difference in behavioral patterns leading to higher income. 
Since the data set used for analysis is cross-sectional, we cannot preclude the possibility of 
bidirectional relationship between most of the variables. Third, although structure learning 
algorithms determine the directionality of edges using direction orientation rules and model 
validation methods, they cannot produce a completely accurate picture of directionality among 
variables, and it often requires human interpretation in order to determine the direction of causal 
relationship. 
 Thus, rather than using DAG representation, I simply use the skeleton model, which 
leaves the directions undetermined, produced by Bayesian networks, using the Growth-Shrink 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Result of Bayesian Network Analysis (N = 2,494) 
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 Figure 4.2 shows the result of Bayesian network analysis. As there are 30 nodes and 115 
edges, it is impossible to examine its every individual relationship in this chapter. Therefore, I 
will selectively focus on a few kinds of aspects that particularly deserve more attention. 
 First, the overall configuration of Bayesian networks is featured as a single giant 
component with no disconnected nodes or isolated groups. This suggests that the 30 variables 
employed in the analysis are connected with one another either directly or indirectly as a single 
belief network. Another noticeable pattern shown in the figure is that the variables related to 
more or less objective conditions of respondents (i.e., age, income, education, party, internet, 
mobility, satisfied, and relative) form their own closely connected cluster at the right-hand side 
of the network, colored in red, while other subjective attitude and opinion variables form their 
own subgroup; most attitude variables are connected to a very limited number of background 
variables and show more significant relationships with other subjective variables. This indicates 
that individuals’ objective conditions mostly have indirect, rather than direct, effects on 
individual beliefs and ideas through the chains of lay theories. 
Next, the effect of income on attitudes merits examination. A number of past studies on 
people’s attitudes and opinions about inequality and policy preferences hypothesized that income 
is one of the most powerful determining factors of attitudes toward inequality and policy 
preference, and many studies found a significant effect of income. However, do such findings 
necessarily mean that income has direct effect on every single belief, attitude, and opinion that 
shows significant associations with income? If that is true, the result of the Bayesian network 
would resemble the patterns exhibited in Figure 4.1; as individual attitudes are produced as 
functions of income in the simulated model, there are direct links between income and other 
variables, while there are no direct links between other variables except for random chances. The 
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result of the Bayesian network is shown in Figure 4.3. In sharp contrast to Figure 4.1, the 
household income variable has direct association with only two attitude variables: poor_demand 
and prosperity. All other variables significantly connected to the income variable are other 
background variables such as age, education, mobility, region, relative, party, and satisfied.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Household Income and Its Neighbors in Bayesian Network 
 
 The result strongly suggests that although one’s (household) income can be a significant 
predictor for a number of attitudinal variables in statistical examination, such relationships may 
not genuinely stem from the effect of income per se, but rather from a chain of associative 
thinking and motivated reasoning that starts from a very limited number of ideas and beliefs 
directly influenced by income. The result also implies that individuals may be selfish, but they 
are not very good at being selfish. There would be basically two reasons. The first reason is that 
when individuals are prodded to express their ideas and opinions about inequality and 
redistribution, various factors such as intuitive reasoning, lay theories, emotions, limited 
cognitive attention, and so on can overwhelm the effect of one’s level of income. Another 
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possibility is that people often do not know much about or do not much care about their actual, 
specific position in the income ladder of the whole society, which makes the effect of the income 
variable much less than prominent in attitude formation. In this light, what is probably more 
interesting than the effect of income itself would be the subjective experience and feeling related 
to one’s income, such as one’s subjective, relative living standards (relative), mobility 
experience (mobility), and satisfaction with living standards (satisfaction). According to the 
result, however, each of these also has a generally limited impact on attitude variables. Overall, 
the result provides us with a new perspective on how economic background affects attitudes and 
opinions, with findings that challenge past studies. 
Figure 4.4 focuses on variables related to causal attribution of wealth and poverty. Three 
variables are employed to reflect people’s causal perception: merit-based explanation of wealth 
(i.e., meritocratic/internal attribution; cause_rich), external attribution of wealth (i.e., emphasis 
on connection and family background; cause_rich2), and merit-based/internal explanation for 
poverty (cause_poverty). The result shows that none of the three causal attribution variables, 
namely cause_poverty, cause_rich, and cause_rich2, are directly influenced by one’s household 
income; instead they are associated with other background variables such as mobility ( 
cause_rich), Internet ( cause_rich2), and living standard satisfaction ( cause_poverty). Such 
a result suggests that individuals who experience upward mobility are more likely to support the 
idea of merit-based explanation for wealth, individuals who have access to the Internet are more 
likely to think rich people accumulate their wealth through connections and family background, 
and people who are more psychologically satisfied with their living standards tend to make 
individualistic causal attribution of poverty. Again, the disconnect between the income variable 
and three causal attribution variables suggests that income itself is not a powerful influencer that 
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determines people’s causal attribution patterns, but rather it affects attribution in an indirect way, 
and each type of causal attributional thinking is to large extent independent of objective social 
backgrounds. Another intriguing pattern is that each type of causal attribution is triggered by 
somewhat different kinds of experiences. 
 
                          (I) cause_rich                                                         (II) cause_rich 2 
 
(III) cause_poverty 
 
Figure 4.4 Causal Attribution of Wealth and Poverty 
 
Besides, all tree causal attribution variables are commonly connected to state_min 
(opinion about whether state should ensure minimum living standards for all) and, somewhat 
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obviously, to hardwork (opinion about whether hard work is always rewarded). The result 
suggests that the issue of ensuring minimum living standards is significantly determined by the 
style of individuals’ causal attribution. 
On the other hand, there are three cases of association between variables that show 
somewhat puzzling results. The first one is the significant positive partial correlational 
relationship between cause_rich (internal attribution of wealth) and cause_rich2 (external 
attribution of wealth) (similar result was also found in Whyte [2010:111]). There is no way we 
can directly test if such a significant association is due to acquiescence bias, but if we assume it 
is not due to a survey bias, then this result presents an interesting implication, which is that 
among individuals who show critical attitudes about how people become rich, many of them 
actually subscribe to an individualistic, merit-based perspective on inequality at the same time. 
Similar curious patterns are also found for internal attribution of poverty (cause_poverty): 
stronger internal attribution of poverty is significantly and positively associated with state_min 
(State should ensure minimum living standard for all) and negatively associated with rich_duty 
(Rich have no obligation to help the poor) while holding all other variables in the analysis 
constant. In some sense, explaining such paradoxical patterns is not too difficult. Unless internal 
attribution of poverty is ideologically connected to anti-egalitarianism, it actually logically 
makes sense to think that society should provide more support for poor people because they lack 
ability or talent. What is important is the political or ideological implication of these 
relationships. While cause_rich2 (external attribution of wealth) is only associated with 
egalitarian attitudes (except for its association with cause_rich), variables that reflect merit-based 
causal attribution (cause_rich and cause_poverty) are linked to both egalitarian ideas (state_min 
and rich_duty) and anti-egalitarian ideas (transfer). Collectively, these results show that Chinese 
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citizens, in general, accept both individualistic and structural explanations for becoming rich and 
also show that merit-based perspective is not ideologically attached to conservative or anti-
egalitarian views in China.  
  
  
                           (I) prosperity                                                     (II) freemarket 
 
(III) poor_change 
 
Figure 4.5 Lay Macroeconomic Reasoning 
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Next, I will turn to the lay macroeconomic theories mentioned earlier, focusing on three 
variables, which are prosperity, freemarket, and poor_change. The variable prosperity (Figure 
4.5-I) is about whether there must be big gaps in income for the prosperity of the country. This is 
related to the idea of developmentalism that Xie et al. (2012) found among Chinese citizens. This 
idea holds that development and inequality have an inevitable and positive relationship, which 
often feeds the collectivist ideology of national development, and tends to provide a political and 
economic logic for the justification of income disparity in developing societies. This variable 
turns out to show interesting and somewhat counterintuitive patterns in several ways. Most of all, 
the result shows that it has a negative association with household income, which means that 
people with less income are more likely to support the idea of necessary inequality for national 
development. Such a curious pattern is also revealed in the relationships between prosperity and 
poor_demand and transfer: stronger support for the idea that inequality is necessary for 
prosperity accompanies more egalitarian attitudes as to the two questions related to helping the 
poor. However, at the same time, the prosperity variable shows significant association with anti-
egalitarian policy preferences (i.e., negative association with state_gap and positive association 
with rich_duty).  
Some interesting patterns are also found with regard to the freemarket variable (Figure 
4.5-II), which asks whether a free market economy is crucial to the economic development of 
China. Although the question does not directly tap the problem of inequality, its association with 
other attitudes reflects individuals’ tacit sensemaking that organize opinions about free market 
economy and attitudes toward tackling economic inequality together into their commonsense 
reason (Garfinkel 1967).  Similar to the case of prosperity, the freemarket variable shows some 
contradicting patterns: while the freemarket variable is associated with four variables of 
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individualistic attribution of inequality that justify the status quo (hardwork, cause_poverty, 
just_inequality, and opportunity2), it is also associated with egalitarian views when it comes to 
inequality (state_gap, national, matthew). This interesting and paradoxical relationships between 
lay macroeconomic theories and moral reasoning about egalitarian redistribution provide 
important political implications with regard to the political-economic consciousness of ordinary 
Chinese citizens: their lay macroeconomic theories offer an important source of legitimation of 
the status quo of society. Even when individuals strongly support the idea that the state should 
help the poor, they are more likely to adopt the idea that inequality is an inevitable outcome of 
economic development of the nation, which is necessary for national prosperity. So individuals’ 
support for egalitarian policies should be interpreted as favoring a liberal welfare state style 
approach in dealing with inequality, rather than radical, “soak the rich” approach (Whyte and Im 
2013; Shapiro 2002). Moreover, the result shows that individuals with lower income are more 
likely to support the “development paradigm” (Xie et al. 2012), which suggests that the rapid 
economic growth and transition of the country is perceived as new opportunities for upward 
mobility in the eyes of people in lower socioeconomic positions. This is a strong signal that 
developmental paradigm plays the role of justifying income inequality for lower income 
individuals in China. 
Finally, the poor_change variable (Figure 4.5-III) is about the expected trend in the 
percentage of the population that is poor in the next five years, with higher values indicating an 
increase in the percentage. There is no particularly counterintuitive aspect in the association of 
this variable with its neighbors. However, to what attitudes it is not connected has interesting 
implications, since it has been argued that the idea of poverty reduction and the expansion of 
new opportunities for poor people have had the social psychological effect of alleviating the 
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public’s discontent with rising inequality in China. However, the result shows that poor_change 
itself does not have a direct influence on attitudes related to redistribution or inequality, but it 
does have an indirect effect through a multistep process by being associated with individuals’ 
evaluation of the justness of inequality (e.g., unjust, matthew). This result indicates that 
optimistic projection of future trends in poverty does not automatically translate into positive 
attitudes toward inequality by itself, but its effect is channeled through one’s evaluative stance 
toward whether the current inequality is just and fair.  
Overall, the counterintuitive patterns uncovered in the analysis show that lay people’s 
understanding about these various issues is far from a clear-cut reasoning that is exclusively 
ideological or completely self-serving. The patterns of their lay reasoning tend to be an inclusive 
plaza of ideas where mutually conflicting ideas can cohabit rather than a competitive arena for 
formal, logical, exclusive arguments. This suggests that a layman’s reasoning about social issues 
takes the form of pragmatic, commonsense evaluation, which can embrace opposing ideas 
together (e.g., “Inequality is necessary for development” and “The poor have the right to demand 
from the rich”), and it is not rendered by a strong political ideology. It is important to note that 
such a counterintuitive picture is particularly more salient when it comes to lay macroeconomic 
theories.  
On the other hand, the nodes that have the largest degrees (i.e., the number of links to 
other nodes) are hardwork and ind_res (both have degrees of 11). But such a high degree is 
partly due to the number of similar survey questions included in the analysis (such as causal 
attribution, opportunity, etc.), so looking at the degree is not very meaningful or useful for 
understanding the pattern. So instead I focus on variables that are specifically pertinent to the 
issue of redistribution and examine which variable has the most frequent connections to such 
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variables. There are five variables in the analysis that are about redistribution: transfer, 
poor_demand, rich_duty, state_gap, and state_min. Among the 30 variables included in the 
analysis, the one that has the largest number of connections to these variables is prosperity, 
which has an association with four out of the five variables. Although, as shown above, the effect 
of prosperity is curious and does not exhibit a clear, consistent logic, it has a strong influence in 
determining people’s attitudes toward economic redistribution. The prosperity variable is 
followed by two causal attribution variables (cause_poverty and cause_rich 2), which affect three 
out of the five variables. This suggests that lay macroeconomic theory and causal attribution are 
the most important ideas in reasoning about distributive justice. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to analyze the patterns of people’s lay theoretical understanding and 
beliefs about inequality and distributive justice in today’s China, using a novel methodological 
approach. Instead of relying on the conventional distinction between practical and theoretical 
reasoning or focusing on some anti-utilitarian concept of reasoning, this study discusses an 
alternative framework that distinguishes two functions of reasoning, namely sensemaking and 
decision-making, and proposes “lay theories” as the most important common element shared by 
the two functions of reasoning. Lay theories process perceived information into ordered, 
predictable, meaningful, and theoretical interpretation of the social world and serve as a 
cognitive and motivational template for making decisions. This study uses the concept of lay 
theoretical reasoning for examining the patterns of attitudes and beliefs about inequality and 
distributive justice in today’s China.  
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 The study, employing Bayesian network analysis, presents several intriguing findings. 
First, in contrast to the simulated samples of belief network presented in Figure 4.1, most 
objective variables have a very limited direct influence on attitudes and beliefs about inequality 
and redistribution, including subjective variables that reflect individuals’ objective conditions, 
such as perceived relative living standards and satisfaction with one’s living standards. This 
finding suggests that individuals’ objective conditions mostly have indirect, rather than direct, 
influence on individuals’ ideas and beliefs through the chains of lay theoretical reasoning. 
Secondly, causal attribution of wealth and poverty, such as meritocratic or external attribution of 
wealth and poverty, turns out to be largely independent of objective social backgrounds, 
including one’s household income. However, such attribution is significantly influenced by one’s 
direct experiences, such as using the Internet ( external attribution of wealth), experiencing 
upward mobility ( meritocratic attribution of wealth), or being satisfied with one’s living 
standards ( meritocratic attribution of poverty). This result tells us that the psychology of 
causal attribution is more strongly shaped by individuals’ distinct life experiences than their 
income. It shows that there are more diverse channels through which individuals with low 
income can come to tolerate or justify the high level of inequality in society, and various kinds of 
injustices (e.g., interactional injustice and procedural injustice) that people experience can have 
stronger effect on individuals’ sense of injustice and moral outrage than distributive justice. It is 
also found that internal causal attribution of wealth and poverty is significantly associated with 
some egalitarian attitudes and anti-egalitarian attitudes at the same time, which suggest that the 
relationship between individuals’ lay theories of causal attribution and moral reasoning about 
economic redistribution is strongly contingent on contexts, and the style of individuals’ 
sensemaking and decision-making varies across different contexts of distributive justice.  
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On the other hand, intriguing patterns are found with regard to macroeconomic lay 
theories. The Bayesian network analysis shows that people’s opinion about whether income 
inequality is necessary for national prosperity has a negative relationship with their income, 
conditioning on other factors and opinions, and has a positive relationship with egalitarian 
attitudes with regard to redistribution or social protection. This means that people with lower 
income are more likely to think that inequality is necessary for China, and people with stronger 
support for such necessary inequality are more likely to hold egalitarian beliefs. Belief in free 
market economy also shows an interesting pattern; it is positively associated with individualistic 
attribution of wealth and poverty, but, on the other hand, it is also positively associated with 
some egalitarian views on inequality.  
On the whole, these results suggest three important conclusions. The first conclusion is 
that the way people reason about various issues of inequality and distributive justice does not 
have a deterministic relationship with objective variables, particularly income. Income does have 
a direct effect on some small number of beliefs, but the majority of beliefs and attitudes about 
inequality are not directly influenced by income. Some other subjective experiences related to 
one’s income are also not very significant factors in affecting the overall belief network. This 
result tells us that the opinions and predictions of scholars and experts on Chinese society are 
based on more or less inaccurate model of individuals’ thinking and reasoning about inequality. 
Individuals’ beliefs are more strongly affected by their own distinct logic and patterns of 
sensemaking and judgment about the social world and that cannot be effectively captured by 
their absolute levels of income or objective socioeconomic conditions (unlike the implicit 
assumptions in many commentaries on Chinese society).  
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 The second conclusion is that, in most people’s minds, seemingly conflicting ideas can 
coexist with one another, which looks like an inclusive plaza of ideas and lay theories. 
Individuals’ lay theoretical understanding of the social world often follows commonsense 
understanding, in which normative but logically inconsistent statements (e.g., “Inequality is 
necessary for development” and “We should reduce inequality”) can exist together (Converse 
1964; Garfinkel 1967). This characteristic of individuals’ reasoning has not been specifically 
emphasized in past literature except for a limited number of studies on “split consciousness” or 
“compartmentalized beliefs” in individuals’ attitudes toward inequality (see Chapter 2). As both 
1) the relationship between causal attribution and moral reasoning about redistribution and 2) the 
relationship between lay macroeconomic theory and moral reasoning about redistribution show, 
individuals usually have lay theoretical reasons to be both critical and also tolerant of inequality, 
and this is why the public, perhaps not only in China36, does not show extreme attitudes toward 
inequality.  
Finally, the results show two different kinds of images of a “lay theorist” at the same 
time. The first image tells us that individuals are not very good lay theorists. The significant 
relationships between conflicting ideas and the disconnection between one’s objective conditions 
and various distributive justice attitudes show that. But one the other hand, there is a second, 
somewhat subtle, image that emerges from carefully interpreting the results of empirical 
analysis, which is that individuals are consciously or unconsciously heavily engaged in 
sensemaking and decision-making. Although the aggregate patterns sometimes show some 
illogical and paradoxical patterns, such patterns may be actually the result of the convoluted 
complexity of individuals’ tacit sensemaking about how society and economy works and 
                                                             
36 For example, Page and Jacobs (2009), from their analysis of Inequality Survey data, found that majorities of 
Americans embrace the philosophy of conservative egalitarianism.  
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decision-making process (i.e., forming an opinion or arriving at a conclusion about a specific 
distributive justice issue) that considers multiple factors at the same time. So although the overall 
attitudinal dependency structure shown in this chapter displays the first kind of image at a 
superficial level, once we seriously consider what kind of sensemaking and decision-making 
processes occurs under the superficial connections among attitudes, we can actually realize that 
individuals are complex, rather than “good” or “poor,” lay theorists. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion  
 
“Not every revolutionary situation leads to revolution.” – V. L. Lenin  
 
Empirical analysis of attitudes, opinions, and beliefs has a long tradition in social science, 
dating back to the studies of early sociologists and psychologists who tried to measure people’s 
explicit attitudes and opinions (e.g., Thurstone, Likert, and Gutman). On the other hand, 
experimental psychological studies have examined the more or less hidden domain in the human 
mental process where implicit, unconscious attitudes and biases influence our opinions and 
behaviors. Although studying explicit or implicit attitudes reveals a large part of our attitudinal 
patterns and belief system, there is a large area in our attitudes and beliefs that is neither 
completely explicit/conscious nor completely implicit/unconscious. That gray area includes the 
ideational structure of attitudes, cognitive and attitudinal schema and frames, cultural models of 
motives, and the underlying lay theoretical understanding of the social world. In examining 
popular perception of and attitudes toward distributive justice in today’s China, this dissertation 
examined that area by employing social survey data and novel theoretical and methodological 
approaches. 
One of the central beliefs that undergird participatory politics is the existence of an 
institutionalized reciprocal relationship between public opinion and social policy. Ideally, the 
aggregate public opinion sends out a signal to adjust the direction of policy movement, thereby 
imposing pressure on politicians and policymakers to meet popular demands. As Manza and 
Brooks (2012) maintained, in various branches of political sociology concerning policy making, 
state formation, and political conflicts, even though they often did not explicitly focus on public 
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opinion, the operation of public opinion is presupposed as an important causal force in their 
theoretical models and empirical research. However, those studies did not specifically look into 
various characteristics and operating mechanisms of individuals’ attitudes and belief system or 
empirically examine how people’s political attitudes or ideologies are structured. By providing a 
systematic and comprehensive analysis of individuals’ beliefs and attitudes about inequality in 
China, this study contributes to a better understanding of popular attitudes toward inequality and 
discusses political implications for today’s Chinese society. Particularly, it brings our attention to 
the relatively ignored and veiled mechanisms that underpin the psychology of inequality.  
 Based on my analytic framework, the empirical analysis of this dissertation focuses on 
three kinds of elements that govern the basis of our social action and cognition: the association of 
ideas, motivational tendencies shaped by political-cultural models of motives, and individuals’ 
lay theories and sensemaking. The first empirical chapter examines the patterns of association in 
individuals’ attitudes toward distributive justice, particularly focusing on the dimensionality of 
attitudes. Studying the characteristics of association of ideas has been an important research 
agenda in multiple areas, since Hume’s philosophical thesis on human nature or Durkheim’s 
explanation on how the idea of sacredness spans out and becomes contagious through the 
“association of ideas” (Durkheim 1995 [1912], p. 326). Sociologists and cognitive 
anthropologists interested in performing formal analysis of culture and meaning structure used 
various methods to measure and analyze the map of ideas, meanings, symbols, frames, and 
cognitive frames (e.g., Mohr 1998). Martin (2000, 2002), by extending and developing the 
concept of “constraint” in public opinion research in political psychology, discusses two aspects 
of the multidimensional space of beliefs: consensus and tightness. He contends that the 
movement of individuals’ beliefs is bound to the dimensional constraint imposed by the social 
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space of beliefs. While his approach is very useful in understanding the social nature of 
attitudinal constraint in people’s beliefs, it cannot be used to uncover the heterogeneity of 
individuals’ beliefs and attitudes. My study aims to advance our understanding of the 
multidimensional social space of beliefs by showing the patterns of individual-level 
heterogeneity in beliefs about distributive justice. Its approach lies at the intersection between 
Durkhemian perspective, in the sense that it looks at the commonly shared moral system in 
society, and political psychological studies (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992) that show that the 
strength of attitudinal constraint varies across different groups in society.  
The analysis shows two key findings. First, results produced by relational class analysis 
show that the multidimensional aspect of distributive justice principles is salient for the majority 
of people, indicating that various issues of distributive injustice are structured in such a way that 
they are often independent of one another, while such dimensionality is significantly muted for 
others, who hold a well-organized, ideological belief system regarding distributive justice. 
Results from latent class analysis suggest that respondents can be largely divided into two groups 
of egalitarians and non-egalitarians, but when the result of relational class analysis is considered 
together, the absolute majority of egalitarians identified by latent class analysis actually belongs 
to the relational class with relatively weak attitudinal coherence.  
If people’s attitudes and beliefs are located in the multidimensional belief space of 
society, what does this weak attitudinal coherence tell us about the belief system in Chinese 
society? The results seem to highlight the influence and importance of macro-level political 
institutional condition. In a democratic multiparty system, there exists a wide array of political 
and cultural signals that sort diverse issues into opposing clusters of issues and ideas, whereby 
people possess or construct attitudes reflecting the ideological orientation and issue preferences 
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of their party (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, p. 190). The ideological spectrum in China is not 
as structured as that of Western societies. Although there are ideological ideas that construct a 
political left and right in Chinese society, they are not as broad or salient as the ideological 
orientations of Western societies, which cover diverse domains, including the economic, 
political, moral, and social. Due to the lack of a multiparty system, the ideological packaging of 
ideas by elites is less frequent, and ideological structures are more fluid and adaptive in the 
rapidly growing and changing society. Such a political environment is not fertile ground for 
conferring strong attitudinal constraint to political attitudes. And in such a “belief space,” it 
would not be easy to find a cautionary sign that signals the imminent social upheaval triggered 
by the problem of inequality.  
 The focus and approach of the first empirical chapter that examined the associative 
patterns of belief systems are shaped by the so-called “cultural turn” or “cognitive turn” in 
sociology that discovered the importance of the role of meanings, symbols, language, frames, 
schemata, and repertoires. However, I contend that in sociology there has been an overemphasis 
on the cognitive origin of social action, values, and culture, and this focus on cognition needs to 
meet a motivational turn in order to obtain a more accurate and balanced view on the mechanism 
of social action and cognition. Although the role of motivation in social action was treated as an 
important engine of action by some early mid-20th-century theorists like Talcott Parsons, due to 
the theories’ problematic assumptions and implicit reliance on psychoanalytic theory, the 
problem of motivation has been either simply ignored or regarded as an inappropriate subject of 
sociology, which is also partly due to sociology’s inclination to prefer a top-down framework in 
explaining human behavior. However, thanks to new findings in cognitive and social 
psychology, this kind of implicit view that the cognitive aspect of our internal environment can 
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be analytically detached from the affective domain, such as emotion, feelings, sentiments, and 
motivation, is gradually regarded as an inaccurate, obsolete view of the human mental process. It 
is now demanded that our model of social action requires incorporating the affective domain into 
theorizing and integrating the social and the mental. However, there have been only very limited 
efforts in sociology to achieve that goal (Ignatow 2007; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Frye, 
forthcoming; Willer 2009), and there are few studies on the role of motivation and how it takes 
its concrete form under the influence of cultural contexts.  
 The second empirical chapter tackles this problem, and investigates the role of two kinds 
of psychosocial dispositions, as culturally shaped motivational tendencies, that affect 
individuals’ attitudes toward redistributive policies. In doing so, it shows how regional cleavage 
and educational inequality affect the social distribution of such psychosocial dispositions in 
Chinese society. Specifically, the study focuses on two kinds of psychosocial dispositions – 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientations – which are regarded as motives related to 
individuals’ desire for order/structure and need for avoidance of threat. The study finds that 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, as political-cultural psychosocial dispositions, 
bring about more tolerant attitudes toward economic inequality, and the difference between rural 
and urban in the patterns of psychosocial dispositions is attributable to the highly significant 
effect of education. The chain of influences from regional inequality to educational inequality to 
attitudes toward economic redistribution results in relatively more tolerant views on inequality in 
socioeconomically disadvantaged rural areas and among the less educated population. 
 Finally, the third empirical chapter sheds light on what has been relatively understudied 
in sociological literature: the problem of reasoning. Although we are constantly engaged in the 
mental action of thinking, planning, understanding, deducing, inducing, and making decisions 
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using our theoretical, speculative reason, sociological literature has not shown sufficient interest 
in illuminating the characteristics of such a kind of reasoning. Drawing insights from theories on 
sensemaking, the ethnomethodological view on commonsense reasoning, and particularly studies 
on lay theories, my study captures the most important aspect of actors’ reasoning as their 
theoretical understanding and explanation of the social world, which imbue individuals’ 
perceptions and experiences with order, predictability, and a feeling of control, and provide an 
epistemic basis for decision-making. As with the case of association and motivation, how 
individuals think and reason is dependent upon their “thought communities” (Fleck 1935; 
Zerubavel 1997). Employing Bayesian network analysis as a tool for uncovering the general 
pattern of lay theoretical reasoning, my analysis shows several important findings on the 
characteristics of individuals’ attitudes toward inequality and describes the structure of the belief 
space of their thought communities.  
First, it finds that the effect of objective factors such as one’s income or education on 
attitudes toward inequality occurs mostly in an indirect way. Income has a significant direct 
effect on only a handful of beliefs or attitudes, while such an effect creates a ripple effect in 
one’s entire belief system so that the impact of income on attitudes is realized through weakened, 
indirect effects. Second, it is found that the belief in the idea that inequality is necessary for the 
prosperity of the country plays the most influential role in determining attitudes toward 
economic redistribution. This finding is a particularly important and suggestive one, since it is 
found that such a belief in “necessary inequality” is associated with egalitarian attitudes, 
particularly regarding assisting the poor. Also, people’s belief in free market is, on the one hand, 
associated with individualistic attribution of inequality but, on the other hand, significantly 
associated with some egalitarian views on inequality. Combined with other findings, these results 
142 
 
tell us that our assumptions and models on how people think about inequality and how they carry 
out their reasoning to hold certain attitudes toward distributive justice are not necessarily 
accurate once we actually look into the patterns of their reasoning. My analysis shows that the 
“social mindscape” of lay theoretical reasoning on inequality and distributive justice entails the 
coexistence of mutually conflicting ideas bound together by commonsense belief or pragmatic 
consciousness, and in such a process, demographic variables often do not exert a great influence. 
The results suggest that the overall characteristic of people’s mentality regarding various issues 
of distributive justice can be summarized as “kludge”: the logic of mind and belief system 
operating in a somewhat haphazard, clumsy, inconsistent, and poorly matched way.  
Overall, the messages of these three analyses can be summarized as following. First, for 
the majority of ordinary people, their belief system concerning various faces of distributive 
justice is constructed in a way featuring weak association, lack of coherence, and dimensionality. 
Focusing on the cognitive features of distributive justice attitudes, the analysis suggests that most 
people do not possess ideologically well-organized attitudes toward the problem of inequality 
and distributive injustice. Second, there are psychosocial dispositions of conservative 
orientations that are strengthened among individuals with lower socioeconomic status; the 
distribution of such dispositions among people is shaped by institutional backgrounds such as 
household registration system and regional educational inequality. By examining the 
motivational bases of political-cultural attitudes toward inequality, this finding points to the 
existence of conservative psychological tendencies that suppress critical attitudes toward 
inequality, justify the system, and legitimize the hierarchical order of society. Finally, analysis of 
the patterns and characteristics of reasoning shows that people’s thoughts and understanding on 
inequality and distributive justice include heterogeneous and sometimes mutually conflicting 
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ideas, showing that people in general have both conservative and liberal ideas together in their 
lay theoretical understanding and evaluation on inequality. This finding suggests that although 
people may find the large income gap and wealth inequality uncomfortable, unfair, or unjust, at 
the same time, they also tend to think that such economic disparity is more or less inevitable and 
even necessary. Collectively, these three findings suggest to us that although the Chinese public 
may think that inequality is a critical social problem that needs to be addressed, it will be very 
unlikely to see an explosion of social discontent fueled by people’s insuppressible anger towards 
the injustice of the wealth gap in China.  
Indeed, this research is not free from theoretical and empirical limitations. While the 
overarching analytic framework (AMR) is based on the idea that association, motivation, and 
reasoning are intricately intertwined with one another so as to give rise to our social action and 
cognition, each of my empirical analyses dealt with each component separately rather than 
looking at their joint effect. In my future studies, I plan to carry out experimental analyses that 
examine the effect of three factors at the same time. Another limitation comes from the fact that 
this research relies on social survey data only and cannot show what survey data do not tell us. 
The analysis does not show us individuals’ narratives or experiences concerning inequality and 
injustice in society, and the questions employed in the surveys may not be able to accurately 
measure or reflect people’s actual sentiments, emotions, and mood about inequality. As Bourdieu 
(1979) argued “public opinion does not exist,” the assumption that public opinion as presumed 
and designed by survey polls exists and is shared among people with same meaning structure is 
not warranted. Therefore, qualitative data and evidence are required in order to confirm or 
supplement the findings produced by mainly relying on quantitative research. Finally, throughout 
the analyses presented in this dissertation, there is always a lingering question of “comparison.” 
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Because this dissertation solely focused on the Chinese case, there always remains the question 
of how it is different from the case of other societies. Using the methodological techniques used 
in this thesis, I will carry out extensive cross-national comparisons in the patterns of association, 
motivation, and reasoning in people’s beliefs about inequality in different societies.  
In general, the conclusion of this thesis is in line with that of past studies that showed 
rural citizens’ relatively tolerant attitudes and Chinese citizens’ relatively generally less critical 
attitudes compared to other countries (Whyte and Han 2008; Han 2009; Whyte 2010). This 
conclusion presents a cautiously optimistic prospect for the primary goal of today’s China, 
namely the maintenance of social stability. The results suggest that the relatively disadvantaged 
groups in Chinese society will not engage in a collective action to subvert the status quo in the 
immediate future. 
This prognosis, however, can be only a tentative one. For example, past studies suggest 
that psychosocial dispositions such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are 
subject to change through situational cues, and moreover, they have opposing elements in their 
internal dynamics; the psychological energy that constrains authoritarian attitudes to obedience 
and submission can turn its current to converge on anti-authoritarianism (Perrin 2005), and the 
SDO of subordinate groups can transform from the legitimization of intergroup hierarchy to 
hostile discrimination against dominant groups. Thus, although the findings of this dissertation 
suggest that today’s Chinese society is not a “social volcano” when it comes to the problem of 
distributive justice, it should be noted that the social psychology of inequality and justice may 
show different dynamics in the future. 
Moreover, the fact that inequality may not be the “real” problem suggests that the way 
political leaders in China rein in public opinion is misguided. Contrary to the worries of the 
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leaders who place heavy focus on reducing inequality to maintain political stability, distributive 
injustice is not a likely key source of instability, but procedural, legal, religious, and interactional 
injustices that directly hurt the basic rights and moral feelings of people are. Thus the key 
political message of my study is that if the government places its primary efforts on curbing 
inequality as a means to gain legitimacy and political support for the authoritarian state, it will 
likely to face a politically undesirable consequence, because it indicates that the political 
leadership is incapable of solving other more important kinds of injustice that have a direct and 
stronger impact on ordinary people. It is worthwhile to remember that even Marx was not a 
defender of distributive justice. In contrast to the commonsense perception, inequality in wealth 
or income was not Marx’s central concern; his fundamental interest was on production rather 
than redistribution and on how to humanize economic activity (see Fleischacker 2004). How to 
humanize the so-called “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” will require much more than 
simply making gestures of reducing the income gap; as shown in the introductory chapter, most 
direct causes of hundreds of thousands of mass protests come from violation of natural human 
and legal rights and from chronic corruption and abuse of power by the authorities.  
Thus, if the Chinese government intends to alleviate the popular feelings of injustice, it 
should focus on how to fix harder problems that are related to human, economic, and political 
rights of ordinary people, such as mistreatment of factory workers, unfair compensation for 
appropriation of people’s properties, officials’ widespread rent-seeking and corruption associated 
with those problems, and so on, most of which happen at the local level, rather than the nation-
wide income gap. However, any careful observers who are familiar with the realpolitik in China 
will know that such a task is a very tall order. The large population size, the sheer distance 
between central and local governments, the structure of the decentralized authoritarian state, and 
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the complex local dynamics and social networks all together multiply the difficulty of correcting 
deeply institutionalized forms of injustices. The social and political stability of China will be 
determined by how the political leadership deals with these various faces of justice and secures 
its “moral standing” (Mehta and Winship 2010) in the midst of rapid social, political, and 
economic transformations of this giant country. 
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Appendix A: Relational Class Analysis 
The first step of RCA starts with computing a measure of relationality for each pair of respondents. For a 
dataset that has K variables, relationality between observations i and j can be formally presented as 
following: 
    =
2
 (  − 1)
        
   ∗    
   
 
     
   
   
 
where:  
   
   = 1 −    Δ  
    −  Δ  
     
is the size of relational similarity between observations i and j for two variables k and l, 
Δ  
   =    
  −    
  
is within-observational distance between variable k and l, and 
   
   =   
    1    Δ  
   ∗ Δ  
   ≥ 0
−1    Δ  
   ∗ Δ  
   < 0
  
is a coefficient that determines the sign of relational similarity for computing relationality. 
 This process produces relationality     , bounded by +1 and –1, that indicates to what extent a pair 
of respondents exhibit similar relational patterns in their responses. Greater absolute values of 
relationality (i.e., relationality close to +1 or –1) between two observations indicate that they share similar 
underlying schematic dimensions in their responses, and relationality close to zero denote that their 
responses are based on different understanding on the issues. After relationality is computed, RCA creates 
an observation-by-observation matrix in which each cell contains relationality, bounded by –1 and +1, 
between each pair of observations. Because RCA is interested in the absolute size of relationality, it 
transforms relationality measures by their absolute values. Then, the bootstrapping method is used to test 
the statistical significance of relationality values, and statistically insignificant ones are removed and set 
to zero. This process produces a relationality matrix that shows statistically significant relationality 
measures between each pair of observations. Next, in order to detect community structure from the 
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matrix, which is basically a network of observations based on relationality ties, a graph partitioning 
method is used to find groups of individuals that are relatively strongly clustered by relationality. RCA 
uses the spectral partitioning method using eigenvalues (Newman 2006) to partition the graph and find 
cohesive groups. Respondents in a same subgroup share a relatively similar relational pattern of responses 
that is distinct from other subgroups. For full explanation on technical and theoretical details of RCA, see 
Goldberg (2011).
 Appendix B: ISSP Survey Items Used for Relational Class Analysis and Latent Class Analysis  
  Item Wording Scaling Mean (SD) 
Equity/ 
Merit 
V6 To get ahead in life, how important is coming from a wealthy family? 1: Very important, 5: Not important at all 2.15 (1.00) 
V10 To get ahead in life, how important is hard work? 1: Very important, 5: Not important at all 1.80 (.78) 
V11 To get ahead in life, how important is knowing the right people? 1: Very important, 5: Not important at all 1.89 (.83) 
V12 To get ahead in life, how important is having political connections? 1: Very important, 5: Not important at all 2.39 (1.05) 
V17 To get all the way to the top in China today, you have to be corrupt. 1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 3.16 (1.11) 
V18 In China, only students from the best secondary schools have a good chance 
to obtain a university education. 
1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 2.74 (1.07) 
V19 In China, only the rich can afford the costs of attending university. 1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 2.72 (1.06) 
Equality/ 
Need 
V32 Differences in income in China are too large 1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 1.73 (.71) 
V33 It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. 
1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 1.93 (.79) 
V34 The government should provide a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed. 
1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 1.86 (.69) 
V35 The government should spend less on benefits for the poor. 1: Strongly agree, 5: Strongly disagree 2.74 (1.24) 
V36 Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their 
income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller 
share? 
1: Much larger share,  
5: Much smaller share 
2.11 (.77) 
V37 Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those with 
high incomes? Taxes are… 
1: Much too high, 5: Much too low 3.40 (.86) 
V38 Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can 
buy better health care than people with lower incomes? 
1: Very just, definitely right,  
5: Very unjust, definitely wrong 
2.40 (1.03) 
V39 Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can 
buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes? 
1: Very just, definitely right,  
5: Very unjust, definitely wrong 
2.31 (1.04) 
V54 First, what type of society is China today – which diagram comes closest? (Diagrams of stratification patterns: 1: the 
most unequal, 5: the most equal) 
2.16 (.96) 
Self-
Interest 
V21 Would you say that you earn… 1: Much less than I deserve,  
5: Much more than I deserve 
2.33 (.72) 
V53 Is your pay just? We are not asking about how much you would like to earn 
- but what you feel is just given your skills and effort. 
1: Much less than is just,  
5: Much more than is just 
2.36 (1.91) 
V44 In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups 
which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to 
bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale? 
1: Bottom, 10: Top 4.65 (1.91) 
V66 Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class. Please  
tell me which social class you would say you belong to? 
1: Lower class, 6: Upper class 2.66 (1.19) 
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